tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-221299492024-03-21T11:03:22.123-07:00Humble OilA Tickler of Events to Comedannoynted1http://www.blogger.com/profile/14945400306838778051noreply@blogger.comBlogger13125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22129949.post-13624263310210538152007-05-07T04:00:00.000-07:002008-11-12T20:45:56.355-08:00"IN THE KNOW": Carlos Truan | Hugo Berlanga & The Primrose Path & Rangel Law School @ Texas A&I University.<a href="http://ccintheknow.blogspot.com/2007/05/carlos-truan-hugo-berlanga-primrose.html">"IN THE KNOW": Carlos Truan | Hugo Berlanga & The Primrose Path & Rangel Law School @ Texas A&I University.<br /><br /><span class="q" id="q_11266236227e1037_0"><span class="gmail_quote">Subject: ["IN THE KNOW"] Carlos Truan | Hugo Berlanga & The Primrose Path & Rangel Law...<br />To: </span></span></a><a href="mailto:kenedenonews@gmail.com" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)"> kenedenonews@gmail.com</a><br /><br />[<a href="http://storkclub-winchell.blogspot.com/2007/05/irma-rangel-legacy-relating-to.html" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)"> http://storkclub-winchell<wbr>.blogspot.com/2007/05/irma<wbr>-rangel-legacy-relating-to.html</a>]<br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGHU-9yfLmh9h2kzcifIxXqfChfg47ypcw7x7FyMUylHgE88vlNnCCMtWGYkIMc01FlC8-s5csT_E5gnvjJhM4eL4dSOFdfD5f14M1j0CvBPNs5ce-r9L4FytdEGeWe5ez7uve/s1600-h/irmarangel.jpg" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)"> <img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGHU-9yfLmh9h2kzcifIxXqfChfg47ypcw7x7FyMUylHgE88vlNnCCMtWGYkIMc01FlC8-s5csT_E5gnvjJhM4eL4dSOFdfD5f14M1j0CvBPNs5ce-r9L4FytdEGeWe5ez7uve/s400/irmarangel.jpg" alt="" border="0" /></a> <a href="http://www.ibcmemorial.org/irma.html" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)"> http://www.ibcmemorial.org<wbr>/irma.html</a><br /><br />Monday, May 7, 2007<br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Carlos Truan | Hugo Berlanga | Henry Cuellar | Edwards, Al | Todd Hunter | Luci0 : The Primrose Path & Rangel Law School @ Texas A&I University. </span><br /><br />Or posture for another agenda?<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhMl9RLjzOGAMxDRjAUuzYjiQqafs0QBigtD-b_k8bcW4lwvmIuJuoIzwm-NBzI3TwR3Njq_8qgztHDDrVFxl6xSNhDth3HNMJHoFN1VnEdPIjXcj6G1k3M1AkBQiQxBxhweMPM/s1600-h/truan+tamucc+crowd.jpg" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)"> <img src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhMl9RLjzOGAMxDRjAUuzYjiQqafs0QBigtD-b_k8bcW4lwvmIuJuoIzwm-NBzI3TwR3Njq_8qgztHDDrVFxl6xSNhDth3HNMJHoFN1VnEdPIjXcj6G1k3M1AkBQiQxBxhweMPM/s400/truan+tamucc+crowd.jpg" alt="" border="0" /></a><br /><br />Who at that time wanted a Pharmacy College?<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj795oWIyHfQVxp5FetPACXSP8zz6WNyxhlnfkU4xUBpHMJJxH-RR75XDf-20adHd-pOkuwVSBJ6IR4jjZKODITfho5ieZ0XOa88w6Qjknef2wA0XlvPBqn2SRyIScy_WduZhx8/s1600-h/xL+Garza+and+former+State+Rep+Hugo+Berlanga.jpg" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)"> <img src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj795oWIyHfQVxp5FetPACXSP8zz6WNyxhlnfkU4xUBpHMJJxH-RR75XDf-20adHd-pOkuwVSBJ6IR4jjZKODITfho5ieZ0XOa88w6Qjknef2wA0XlvPBqn2SRyIScy_WduZhx8/s400/xL+Garza+and+former+State+Rep+Hugo+Berlanga.jpg" alt="" border="0" /></a><br /><br />Celanese, King Ranch, URI?<br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg-Kn3bdCX-Rfg4ijeayBwH_LWMDYO_C50YopfFtzvGF25yDbcC35tpF3bGWiOyFml5ReOzCTQz_N7zbVdZndB_i7QNmN_JPxG6Dp9Fo7sj70_dfn5BuemLfdFCl3lmWWwqYigt/s1600-h/tamucc+cisneros.jpg" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)"> <img src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg-Kn3bdCX-Rfg4ijeayBwH_LWMDYO_C50YopfFtzvGF25yDbcC35tpF3bGWiOyFml5ReOzCTQz_N7zbVdZndB_i7QNmN_JPxG6Dp9Fo7sj70_dfn5BuemLfdFCl3lmWWwqYigt/s400/tamucc+cisneros.jpg" alt="" border="0" /></a><br /><br />Now we have this unorthodox legislation for an Engineering School @ TAMUCC?<br /><br /><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgsYI6Cm2YeF7gcXoKmzqfAaw81nis92YYRvCHrZZgqqdglobQIX2rbhAqsX8QPMk10sX6IiCdSB7F7UjC-X3GRuoV7G2Qv6Z_XWhYxm4J7sbF2_OFctx75OaJ1G1jN2InaNrIi/s1600-h/dusty+durrill.jpg" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)"><img style="width: 205px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgsYI6Cm2YeF7gcXoKmzqfAaw81nis92YYRvCHrZZgqqdglobQIX2rbhAqsX8QPMk10sX6IiCdSB7F7UjC-X3GRuoV7G2Qv6Z_XWhYxm4J7sbF2_OFctx75OaJ1G1jN2InaNrIi/s400/dusty+durrill.jpg" alt="" border="0" /> </a><br /><br /><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgq04zs7OEYiUuxYtQStA-8129pb4FB07VAR4Ua927akLuQaV16BTb6YCvkI0y_cKVRBG2ojEcSfLWFrso2n3ehMbnSMeVR3Dvh09ug1Tg85MwvIJh2tSXfIlejQusaLmCJltND/s1600-h/banales+richter.jpg" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)"><img src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgq04zs7OEYiUuxYtQStA-8129pb4FB07VAR4Ua927akLuQaV16BTb6YCvkI0y_cKVRBG2ojEcSfLWFrso2n3ehMbnSMeVR3Dvh09ug1Tg85MwvIJh2tSXfIlejQusaLmCJltND/s400/banales+richter.jpg" alt="" border="0" /> </a><br /><br />This is a Developing Medical Community with the ability to become the finest in the world. Medical Nanotechnology is already here, $ are already here.<br /><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">The Political Faction at TAMUCC will find their equilibrium eventually. An engineering school @ CCSU / TAMUCC is obtuse to the medical assets we have accumulated and the Philanthropy already well rooted in South Texas. </span><br /><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;"><a style="color: rgb(204, 51, 204);" href="http://www.ibcmemorial.org/irma.html" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)">Irma Rangel</a> Legislation was for the establishment of a law school at Texas A & I </span><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><a href="http://storkclub-winchell.blogspot.com/2007/05/irma-rangel-legacy-relating-to.html" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)">The Age of Winchell: Irma Rangel Legacy : Relating to the establishment of a law school at Texas A&I University.<br /><br /><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Hugo Berlanga | Henry Cuellar | Edwards, Al | Todd Hunter | Eddie Lucio</span></a><br /><br /><table width="98%"><tbody><tr><td width="19%"><table bgcolor="yellow" border="0" cellpadding="1" cellspacing="0"> <tbody><tr><td><b>Bill:</b> </td> <td> <span>SB 646</span> </td> </tr> </tbody></table> </td> <td> <b> <span style="font-weight: bold;">Legislative Session:</span></b> <span>71(R)</span> </td> <td align="right"> <b> <span style="font-weight: bold;">Council Document:</span></b> <span>71R 1835 MHT-D</span> </td> <td align="right" nowrap="nowrap" valign="top"> <table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"> <tbody><tr> <td valign="top"> <a>Add to Bill List</a> </td> <td valign="top"><br /></td> </tr> </tbody></table> </td> </tr> </tbody></table> <span><a name="11266236227e1037_112661aad7065ef2_112660ee6c0dad4d_11265eeba4f0b580_startcontent"> </a></span> <input name="__VIEWSTATE" value="dDwxODA5MTEwNzc5Ozs+aVAeDYSfxPXaE/w4XUgWW99BrEk=" type="hidden"> <table style="width: 98%;" border="0"> <tbody><tr> <td style="font-weight: bold; width: 19%;" valign="top">Last Action:</td><td style="font-style: italic;">02/28/1989 S Reported favorably w/o amendments</td> </tr><tr> <td><br /></td> </tr> </tbody></table><table style="width: 98%;" border="0"> <tbody><tr> <td style="font-weight: bold; width: 19%;" valign="top">Caption Version:</td><td>Introduced</td> </tr><tr> <td style="font-weight: bold; width: 19%;" valign="top"> Caption Text:</td><td>Relating to the establishment of a law school at Texas A&I University.</td> </tr><tr> <td><br /></td> </tr> </tbody></table><table style="width: 98%;" border="0"> <tbody><tr> <td style="font-weight: bold; width: 19%;" valign="top"> Author:</td><td>Truan</td> </tr><tr> <td><br /></td> </tr> </tbody></table><table style="width: 98%;" border="0"> <tbody><tr> <td style="font-weight: bold; width: 19%;" valign="top">Subjects:</td><td>Education--Higher-- General (I0231)<br />TEXAS A&I UNIVERSITY (U2467)<br /></td> </tr><tr> <td><br /></td> </tr> </tbody></table><table style="width: 98%;" border="0"> <tbody><tr> <td style="font-weight: bold; width: 19%;" valign="top"> Companion:</td><td><a href="http://www.legis.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=71R&Bill=HB1630" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)">HB 1630</a> by Rangel, Identical<br /></td> </tr><tr> <td><br /></td> </tr> </tbody></table> <table style="width: 98%;" border="0"><tbody><tr> <td style="font-weight: bold; width: 19%;" valign="top">Senate Committee:</td><td style="width: 35%;"><a href="http://www.legis.state.tx.us/Committees/MembershipCmte.aspx?LegSess=71R&CmteCode=C530" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)"> Education</a></td><td><br /></td> </tr><tr> <td style="font-weight: bold; width: 19%;" valign="top">Status:</td><td style="width: 35%;">Out of committee</td><td><br /></td> </tr><tr> <td style="font-weight: bold; width: 19%;" valign="top"> Vote:</td><td colspan="2">Ayes=9 Nays=1 Present Not Voting=0 Absent=1</td></tr></tbody></table><span><br /><a href="http://storkclub-winchell.blogspot.com/2007/05/irma-rangel-legacy-relating-to.html" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)"><br /></a><br /><br />--<br />Posted By The Advocate to <a href="http://googleurself.blogspot.com/2007/05/age-of-winchell-irma-rangel-legacy.html" target="_blank" onclick="return top.js.OpenExtLink(window,event,this)"> Google Yourself Corpus Christi </a> at 5/07/2007 02:46:00 AM</span>Jaime Kenedeñohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12787459880135027366noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22129949.post-81948671752267035692007-12-13T22:30:00.000-08:002008-11-12T20:45:55.080-08:00Texas Monthly Web Press<a href="http://texasmonthly.blogspot.com/2007/01/patrick-carr-murder-of-presbyterian.html">Texas Monthly Web Press</a>: Search page for "lab"<br /><br /><h2 class="date-header">Tuesday, January 16, 2007</h2> <a name="6429605547872245478"></a> <p><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgbNZh_cbHqp28wEtJuGKJMRG9yA1Hx311uGz9fTaAMlExvkuOT8nTr3FMgFwrXX6OEf1glniCFWtwjw6p5xDfj0scBQEW480m-hFY5nGHMffF5TlHsVaORXCSU-QM9HNCJA9y6/s1600-h/cover.jpg"><img style="margin: 0pt 10px 10px 0pt; float: left; cursor: pointer; width: 409px; height: 533px;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgbNZh_cbHqp28wEtJuGKJMRG9yA1Hx311uGz9fTaAMlExvkuOT8nTr3FMgFwrXX6OEf1glniCFWtwjw6p5xDfj0scBQEW480m-hFY5nGHMffF5TlHsVaORXCSU-QM9HNCJA9y6/s400/cover.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5020568005727880242" border="0" /></a><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBXP-ZnDOkb9z2V0zEw1mAFcxtCJgYdfxqsU8XVyl_zxJtjRKXvw7nhVRX97deYfz5iefPQJ-bInpKk6rJeYDQMuWZNgWToxSysh-rks3KfOgG3PhqxrSokhQeP3kxCC5aSzxSVQ/s1600-h/cover.jpg"><br /></a></p><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBXP-ZnDOkb9z2V0zEw1mAFcxtCJgYdfxqsU8XVyl_zxJtjRKXvw7nhVRX97deYfz5iefPQJ-bInpKk6rJeYDQMuWZNgWToxSysh-rks3KfOgG3PhqxrSokhQeP3kxCC5aSzxSVQ/s1600-h/cover.jpg"> </a><h1 id="blog-title"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBXP-ZnDOkb9z2V0zEw1mAFcxtCJgYdfxqsU8XVyl_zxJtjRKXvw7nhVRX97deYfz5iefPQJ-bInpKk6rJeYDQMuWZNgWToxSysh-rks3KfOgG3PhqxrSokhQeP3kxCC5aSzxSVQ/s1600-h/cover.jpg"><br /></a></h1><h1 id="blog-title"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBXP-ZnDOkb9z2V0zEw1mAFcxtCJgYdfxqsU8XVyl_zxJtjRKXvw7nhVRX97deYfz5iefPQJ-bInpKk6rJeYDQMuWZNgWToxSysh-rks3KfOgG3PhqxrSokhQeP3kxCC5aSzxSVQ/s1600-h/cover.jpg"> patrick carr </a></h1><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBXP-ZnDOkb9z2V0zEw1mAFcxtCJgYdfxqsU8XVyl_zxJtjRKXvw7nhVRX97deYfz5iefPQJ-bInpKk6rJeYDQMuWZNgWToxSysh-rks3KfOgG3PhqxrSokhQeP3kxCC5aSzxSVQ/s1600-h/cover.jpg"> </a><p id="description"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjBXP-ZnDOkb9z2V0zEw1mAFcxtCJgYdfxqsU8XVyl_zxJtjRKXvw7nhVRX97deYfz5iefPQJ-bInpKk6rJeYDQMuWZNgWToxSysh-rks3KfOgG3PhqxrSokhQeP3kxCC5aSzxSVQ/s1600-h/cover.jpg">The murder of a Presbyterian minister's son in Texas exposes the US government's criminal activities.</a></p><br /><br /><blockquote>If Houston, Texas weren't, thanks to the power of oil and the military industrialist complex that defends it, the shadow capital of the world, I'd say Mr. Treece was right. Instead he's wrong.<br />The Houston Crime Lab is the printing press for Mob and CIA get-out-of-jail-free-cards and licenses-to-kill.<br />This is the biggest local, state, national AND international news story to come down the Pike in the history of the Republic. Period. NO national scandal compares...not Tammany Hall, not the Texas Veterans Land Board Scandal, not Watergate, not Iran-Contra nor the S&L Scandal..though the Iran-Contra and S&L Scandal are part of this story.<br />Iran-Contra was operating out of Texas and Louisiana and thanks to a qui tam law suit involving former Under-Secretary at HUD, Catherine Austin Fitts, we learned that Houston was also ground-zero of the S&L slime pit.Drug money was being funneled through HUD loans to fund the Contras.<br />KBR, Halliburton, Temple-Inland (on whose board sits the CEO of the Carlyle Group), Air Products and Chemicals (on whose board sits L Paul Bremer), etc. all have a substantial presence in Houston and Ellington Field, Houston, was not only home to Claire Chennault's Flying Tigers during WWII, whose mercenary efforts were funded by Indo-China's drug money, but also home to key Iran-Contra personalities in the 1980's including James R Bath</blockquote>Jaime Kenedeñohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12787459880135027366noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22129949.post-31237673875697773342008-03-21T22:56:00.000-07:002008-03-21T23:04:37.570-07:00Okay, since I care little for the price of Gold,oil, or bread.....eventually they all have an impact on "Home sweet Home"!?!<br /><br /><br />The price is $4.5 American dollars for a loaf of bread in Kuwait.But yet a $16.00 fill up gets a full tank there.<br /><br />I wonder what is the price of gold in Kuwait?dannoynted1http://www.blogger.com/profile/14945400306838778051noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22129949.post-37490370247388282722007-12-14T00:50:00.000-08:002007-12-14T00:55:46.740-08:00This is the Guy who Is vots against education and a drone to big oil and the gop party ~towing carpetbaggers for the party line.out TJPC<br />Legal & Legislative<br />Publications<br />Services<br />Statistics<br />Training & Events<br />Search<br />Texas Juvenile Probation Commission Header <br /><br />Click here to skip to text only menus<br />Attorney General says that a parent has a right to see school counseling recording on his or her child [JC-0538] (02-3-29)<br />On August 7, 2002, the Texas Attorney General said that under federal and state law a parent has a right to see school counseling records on his or her child, subject to a very narrow exception.<br /><br />02-3-29. Opinion Attorney General No. JC-0538, 2002 WL 1814029, 2002 Tex.Ag.Lexis ___ (8/7/02) [Texas Juvenile Law (5th Edition 2000)].<br /><br />Re: Whether a parent has an unrestricted right of access to the school counseling records of his or her minor child (RQ-0506-JC)<br /><br />Mr. Felipe T. Alanis<br />Commissioner of Education<br />Texas Education Agency<br />1701 North Congress Avenue<br />Austin, Texas 78701-1494<br /><br />Dear Mr. Alanis:<br /><br />Your predecessor in office requested our opinion as to whether a parent has an unrestricted right of access to the school counseling records of his or her minor child. The question arises because of an apparent conflict between section 26.004 of the Education Code, which grants to a parent access "to all written records of a school district concerning the parent's child, " and section 611.0045 of the Health and Safety Code, which authorizes a mental health professional, under certain circumstances, to deny access to a patient's record "if the professional determines that release... would be harmful to the patient's physical, mental, or emotional health." In addition, federal law generally grants to a parent a right of access to all "education records" concerning his or her child. We conclude that only under very narrow and unusual circumstances may such records be withheld from the parent.<br /><br />Section 26.004 of the Education Code provides, in relevant part:<br /><br /> A parent is entitled to access to all written records of a school district concerning the parent's child, including:<br /><br /> ....<br /><br /> (5) counseling records;<br /><br /> (6) psychological records;<br /><br /> ....<br /><br /> (9) teacher and counselor evaluations;....<br /><br />Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 26.004 (Vernon 1996). This statute requires that a school district provide access to a child's parent of "all written... counseling records." See also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.073(a)(2) (Vernon 1996) ("Unless limited by court order, a parent appointed as a conservator of a child has at all times the right... of access to medical, dental, psychological, and educational records of the child.").<br /><br />On the other hand, you suggest that section 611.0045 of the Health and Safety Code may, under particular circumstances, permit a school counselor to deny such records to the parent. That statute provides, in relevant part:<br /><br /> (a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, a patient is entitled to have access to the content of a confidential record made about the patient.<br /><br /> (b) The professional may deny access to any portion of a record if the professional determines that release of that portion would be harmful to the patient's physical, mental, or emotional health.<br /><br /> (c) If the professional denies access to any portion of a record, the professional shall give the patient a signed and dated written statement that having access to the record would be harmful to the patient's physical, mental, or emotional health and shall include a copy of the written statement in the patient's records. The statement must specify the portion of the record to which access is denied, the reason for denial, and the duration of the denial.<br /><br /> ....<br /><br /> (e) If a professional denies access to a portion of a confidential record, )<br /><br /> the professional shall allow examination and copying of the record by another professional if the patient selects the professional to treat the patient for the same or a related condition as the professional denying access.<br /><br />Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 611.0045 (Vernon Supp. 2002). "Professional" is defined as:<br /><br /> (A) a person authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation;<br /><br /> (B) a person licensed or certified by this state to diagnose, evaluate, or treat any mental or emotional condition or disorder; or<br /><br /> (C) a person the patient reasonably believes is authorized, licensed, or certified as provided by this subsection.<br /><br />Id. § 611.001(2) (Vernon 1992). The term "patient" means "a person who consults or is interviewed by a professional for diagnosis, evaluation, or treatment of any mental or emotional condition or disorder, including alcoholism or drug addiction." Id. § 611.001(1).<br /><br />Section 611.004 states that "[a] professional may disclose confidential information only... to a person who has the written consent of the patient, or a parent if the patient is a minor." Id. § 611.004(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2002). In Abrams v. Jones, 35 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2000), the Texas Supreme Court held that, "[b]ecause subsection (b) [of section 611.0045] may limit a patient's rights to his or her own records, subsection (b) can also limit a parent's or third party's right to a patient's records when the third party or parent stands in the patient's stead." Abrams, 35 S.W.3d at 626. Furthermore, "[i]f a professional does deny a parent access to part of a child's records, the parent has recourse under section 611.0045(e).... First, the professional denying access must allow examination and copying of the record by another professional selected by the parent acting on behalf of the patient to treat the patient for the same or a related condition. Second, a parent denied access to a child's records has judicial recourse." Id. (citations omitted) (citing section 611.005(a) which provides that "[a] person aggrieved by the improper disclosure of or failure to disclose confidential communications or records in violation of this chapter may petition the district court of the county in which the person resides for appropriate relief, including injunctive relief"). See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 611.005 (Vernon Supp. 2002). Thus, on the one hand, section 26.004 of the Education Code grants a parent access to all school "counseling records" regarding his or her child. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 26.004 (Vernon 1996). On the other hand, under section 611.0045 of the Health and Safety Code, a "professional" may deny such access if he or she "determines that release... would be harmful to the patient's physical, mental, or emotional health." Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 611.0045 (Vernon Supp. 2002).<br /><br />Before we attempt to reconcile these statutes, we note that section 611.0045 does not necessarily apply to every individual designated a "school counselor." We must consequently inquire into the nature of that designation.<br /><br />Chapter 21 of the Education Code creates the State Board for Educator Certification (the "Board"), whose duty it is to "regulate and oversee all aspects of the certification, continuing education, and standards of conduct of public school educators." Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.031 (Vernon 1996). The Board is required to "propose rules that, " inter alia, "specify the classes of educator certificates to be issued, including emergency certificates, " and "specify the requirements for the issuance and renewal of an educator certificate." Id. § 21.041(b)(2), (4). In addition, "[t]he board shall propose rules establishing the training requirements a person must accomplish to obtain a certificate, enter an internship, or enter an induction- year program, " and "shall specify the minimum academic qualifications required for a certificate." Id. § 21.044. Rules adopted by the Board must, in general, be approved by the State Board of Education. Id. § 21.042.<br /><br />With regard to school counselors, the Board has adopted specific requirements:<br /><br />These specific requirements are applicable in addition to the undergraduate criteria outlined in Subchapter G of this chapter (relating to Certification Requirements for Classroom Teachers).<br /><br />(1) The guidance program (at least three semester hours). This area provides an understanding of the principles, philosophy, organization, and )<br /><br />services of the guidance program.<br /><br />(2) The pupil served (at least six semester hours). This area is devoted to intensive study that develops an understanding of the physical, intellectual, social, and emotional development of children and youth, and the influences of the school program on development.<br /><br />(3) Resource areas (at least 21 semester hours).<br /><br /> (A) The preparation program shall help the prospective counselor achieve a balanced program of teacher education by giving attention to related resource areas. The amount of emphasis given to an area shall depend on the student's undergraduate preparation and experience.<br /><br /> (B) These advanced level studies are not necessarily represented by a sequence of semester hour courses. They are planned programs to meet the needs of the individual student. They are intended to ensure professional competence.<br /><br /> (C) Upon completion of the program, the prospective counselor shall have developed skills in guidance techniques that assure an ability to use the instruments of measurement and evaluation necessary for understanding, appraising, and counseling individuals and groups. The student shall be skilled in the use of occupational and educational information and materials appropriate for the guidance of youths. Also, the student shall have developed, through study and supervised practice, an ability to work with groups of youths and adults and to counsel with individuals.<br /><br />(4) The certificate. The counselor certificate shall require:<br /><br /> (A) a valid provisional or standard teaching certificate; and<br /><br /> (B) three creditable years, as defined in Subchapter Y of this Chapter (relating to Definitions), of classroom teaching experience.<br /><br />19 Tex. Admin. Code § 230.307 (2001). It is significant, however, that these rules do not require an individual designated a "school counselor" to obtain any other professional license issued by the State of Texas.<br /><br />Chapter 503 of the Occupations Code applies to a "licensed professional counselor, " which is defined as "a person who holds a license issued under this chapter" and who:<br /><br /> (A) represents the person to the public by any title or description of services incorporating the words "licensed counselor" and offers to provide professional counseling services to any individual, couple, family, group, or other entity for compensation, implying that the person offering the services is licensed and trained, or expert in counseling; or<br /><br /> (B) engages in any practice of counseling.<br /><br />Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 503.002(4) (Vernon 2002) (emphasis added). The "practice of professional counseling" is defined as "the application of mental health, psychotherapeutic, and human development principles to:<br /><br /> (1) facilitate human development and adjustment through life;<br /><br /> (2) prevent, assess, evaluate, and treat mental, emotional, or behavioral disorders and associated distresses that interfere with mental health;<br /><br /> (3) conduct assessments and evaluations to establish treatment goals and objectives; and<br /><br /> (4) plan, implement, and evaluate treatment plans using counseling treatment interventions that include:<br /><br /> (A) counseling;<br /><br /> (B) assessment;<br /><br /> (C) consulting; and<br /><br /> (D) referral.<br /><br />Id. § 503.003(a). Moreover, to qualify for a license under chapter 503 of the Occupations Code, a person must have a master's or doctoral degree in counseling or a related field, complete 36 months or 3,000 hours of supervised experience working in a counseling setting, and meet other rigorous requirements set forth in section 503.302 of the Occupations Code. See id. § 503.302. Although section 503.051 states that "[t]his chapter does not apply to an activity, service, or use of an official title by a person employed as a counselor by a... public or private educational institution if the person is performing counseling or counseling-related activities within the scope of the person's employment, " section 503.059 declares that "[a] person otherwise exempt under this subchapter who obtains a license under this chapter is subject to this chapter to the same extent as any other person licensed under this chapter." Id. §§ 503.051,.059.<br /><br />It cannot reasonably be argued that a person who is merely certified as a "school counselor" by the State Board for Educator Certification is "a person licensed or certified by this state to diagnose, evaluate, or treat any mental or emotional condition or disorder." If an individual holds both a "school counselor" certification and a license as a "professional counselor, " he or she may be entitled to claim the benefit of section 611.0045 of the Health and Safety Code. If the person holds only a certificate from the Board designating him or her as a "school counselor, " the person is not so entitled.<br /><br />On the other hand, it seems clear that a "licensed professional counselor" fits within the definition of "professional" for purposes of section 611.001 of the Health and Safety Code, as "a person licensed or certified by this state to diagnose, evaluate, or treat any mental or emotional condition or disorder." Thus, if a person licensed as a "professional counselor" in the State of Texas serves as a "school counselor, " he or she may be entitled, under section 611.0045, to deny access to the parent of a student's counseling records if he or she "determines that release... would be harmful to the [student's] physical, mental, or emotional health."<br /><br />As to those individuals who are both certified school counselors and licensed "professionals" under chapter 611 of the Health and Safety Code, we must attempt to reconcile section 26.004 of the Education Code, which grants to a parent access to all "written... counseling records, " with subsection 611.0045(b) of the Health and Safety Code, which permits a "professional, " as defined therein, to deny such access. Rules of statutory construction require that statutes be harmonized if there is any reasonable way to do so. See La Sara Grain Co.v.First Nat'l Bank, 673 S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex. 1984); Acker v. Tex. Water Comm'n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990). In our view, these two seemingly conflicting statutes may be harmonized by construing section 611.0045 as an exception to section 26.004, in the relatively narrow circumstance in which the school counselor also happens to fall within the definition of "professional" in section 611.001 of the Health and Safety Code. The result is that, under Texas law, a parent has an unrestricted access to all written counseling records regarding his or her child, except when the records are those created by a "professional" as defined in section 611.001.<br /><br />We must also address the Federal Family Educational and Privacy Rights Act of 1974, often referred to as the Buckley Amendment. That statute provides, in relevant part:<br /><br /> (a)(1)(A) No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy of denying, or which effectively prevents, the parents of students who are or have been in attendance at a school of such agency or at such institution, as the case may be, the right to inspect and review the education records of their children.<br /><br />20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A) (1994). "Education records" are defined as "those records, files, documents, and other materials which - (i) contain information directly related to a student; and (ii) are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution." Id. § 1232g(a)(4)(A). The term does not include, inter alia, "(i) records of instructional, supervisory, and administrative personnel and educational personnel ancillary thereto which are in the sole possession of the maker thereof and which are not accessible or revealed to any other person except a substitute." Id. § 1232g(a)(4)(B). Regulations adopted under this provision have slightly modified this exception:<br /><br /> Education records.<br /><br /> ....<br /><br /> (b) The term does not include:<br /><br /> (1) Records that are kept in the sole possession of the maker, are used only as a personal memory aid, and are not accessible or revealed to any other person except a temporary substitute for the maker of the record.<br /><br />34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2001).<br /><br />If an educational institution under 20 U.S.C. § 1232g "wishes to continue receiving federal funding, it must permit its students [or parent or guardian if the student is under the age of 18] to inspect and review their education records." Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-431 (1985) at 2. See also Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-154 (1984) (private school may lose federal funds if it fails to accord inspection rights under Family Educational and Privacy Rights Act). Thus, to the extent a school district receives federal funding, the Buckley Amendment is paramount in the matter of parental access to education records of a minor child. It is clear that, under federal law, a public school that receives federal funds may withhold counseling records from a parent of a minor student only if those records "are kept in the sole possession of" the counselor, "are used only as a personal memory aid, and are not accessible or revealed to any other person except a temporary substitute" for the counselor. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2001).<br /><br />We may now summarize our answer to your question. Generally, all student records are available to parents. Because federal law, to the extent a school district receives federal funding, is paramount in the matter of parental access to education records of a minor child, a public school may withhold counseling records from a parent only if the records are kept in the sole possession of the counselor, are used only as the counselor's personal memory aid, and are not accessible or revealed to any other person except a temporary substitute for the counselor. Within this circumscribed category, state law permits the counselor to withhold the records only if the counselor is a "professional, " as defined in section 611.001(2) of the Health and Safety Code, and further, if the counselor "determines that release" of such record "would be harmful to the patient's physical, mental, or emotional health." If the counselor does not fall within the category of licensed professional under section 611.001 of the Health and Safety Code, section 26.004 of the Education Code prevails, and the parent "is entitled to access to all written records" of the school district "concerning the parent's child, including... counseling records."<br /><br />Finally, we note that section 261.101 of the Family Code provides that "[a] person having cause to believe that a child's physical or mental health or welfare has been adversely affected by abuse or neglect by any person shall immediately make a report as provided by this subchapter." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 261.101(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002). Subsection (b) thereof declares:<br /><br /> If a professional has cause to believe that a child has been abused or neglected or may be abused or neglected, or that a child is a victim of an offense under Section 21.11, Penal Code, and the professional has cause to believe that the child has been abused as defined by Section 261.001, the professional shall make a report not later than the 48th hour after the hour the professional first suspects that the child has been or may be abused or neglected or is a victim of an offense under Section 21.11, Penal Code. A professional may not delegate to or rely on another person to make the report....<br /><br />Id. § 261.101(b). "Professional" is defined for purposes of subsection (b) as "an individual who is licensed or certified by the state or who is an employee of a facility licensed, certified, or operated by the state and who, in the normal course of official duties or duties for which a license or certification is required, has direct contact with children. The term includes teachers, nurses, doctors, day-care employees, employees of a clinic or health care facility that provides reproductive services, juvenile probation officers, and juvenile detention or correctional officers." Id. Furthermore, "[t]he requirement to report" under section 261.101 "applies without exception to an individual whose personal communications may otherwise be privileged, including an attorney, a member of the clergy, a medical practitioner, a social worker, a mental health professional, and an employee of a clinic or health care facility that provides reproductive services." Id. § 261.101(c). It is clear that, because any school counselor is necessarily "certified by the state, " the requirements of section 261.101 apply to any school counselor.<br /><br />SUMMARY<br /><br />Generally, all student records are available to parents. Only under very narrow and unusual circumstances may a minor child's school counseling records )<br /><br />be withheld from a parent. Under the Federal Family Educational and Privacy Rights Act, a public school may withhold a minor child's counseling records from a parent only if the records are kept in the sole possession of the counselor, are used only as the counselor's personal memory aid, and are not accessible or revealed to any other person except a temporary substitute for the counselor. Within this circumscribed category, state law permits the counselor to withhold a minor child's records only if the counselor is a "professional, " as defined in section 611.001(2) of the Health and Safety Code, and further, if the counselor "determines that release" of such record "would be harmful to the patient's physical, mental, or emotional health." If the counselor does not fall within the category of licensed professional under section 611.001(2) of the Health and Safety Code, section 26.004 of the Education Code prevails, and the parent "is entitled to access to all written records" of the school district "concerning the parent's child, including... counseling records."<br /><br />Yours very truly,<br /><br />John Cornyn<br />Attorney General Of Texas<br /><br />Howard G. Baldwin, Jr.<br />First Assistant Attorney General<br /><br />Nancy Fuller<br />Deputy Attorney General - General Counsel<br /><br />Susan Denmon Gusky<br />Chair<br />Opinion Committee<br /><br />Rick Gilpin<br />Assistant Attorney General<br />Opinion Committeedannoynted1http://www.blogger.com/profile/14945400306838778051noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22129949.post-83446800708617135082007-11-15T00:11:00.000-08:002007-11-15T00:11:29.027-08:00South Texas Judicial Watch Dog Authority: A Bill for the Creation of a Robstown Nueces County Constitutional Judge?<span style="font-weight: bold;">Now, Dick Cheney can shoot who he pleases and whenever he chooses to; after all was not Bo Hubert (John John's <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consanguinity">Consanguinity</a>) one of the ones who covered the incident up for the inebriated Dick ?</span><br /><br /><a href="http://stxwatchdog.blogspot.com/2007/11/bill-for-creation-of-robstown-nueces.html">South Texas Judicial Watch Dog Authority: I submit the legislation to be illegal, unconstitutional and in violation of election codes, government codes and a circumvention of trickery to spite the failed legislation that attempted (and failed) to create a new Judicial district in Kleberg & Kenedy Counties.</a><span style="font-family:verdana,helvetica,arial;"><span style="font-size:130%;"><b><br /><br />Sen Bill 1951 of the 80th Leg: 1 District Court with 2 District Attorneys no where else but the 105 </b></span><br /><span style="">Posted on November 14, 2007 at 11:52:34 PM by Jaime Kenedeno<br /></span><br /><img style="width: 524px; height: 679px;" src="http://haftegi.7rooz.com/images/Alfred%20E.%20Neuman%20milk.jpg" /><br /><br />Isn't that like having 2 Attorney Generals for the same state.<br /><br />Can a County elect 2 County Attorneys<br /><br />Can a County have 2 County Attorneys for the same county.<br /><br />ADA's & ACA's are not elected nor are they appointed to serve by the Governor.<br /><br />I submit the legislation to be illegal, unconstitutional and in violation of election codes, government codes and a circumvention of trickery to spite the failed legislation that attempted to create a new district in Kleberg & Kenedy Counties.<br /><br />The legislation that created the New District Attorney Position in Kleberg & Kenedy County must be challenged.<br /><br />There is only one district.<br /><br />There can only exist 1 District Attorney per District.<br /><br /><i>"Anything else, would be uncivilized"</i><br /><br /><a href="http://423judicialdistrict.blogspot.com/">Senate Bill 1951 of the 80th Legislature</a><br /><br /></span><span style="font-family:verdana,helvetica,arial;"><span style="font-size:130%;"><b>Political Bigomy After All Karl Rove is From Utah</b></span><br /><span style="">Posted on November 15, 2007 at 00:41:33 AM by Jaime Kenedeno<br /></span><br /><img src="http://www.thesmokinggun.com/graphics/art3/1020051delay1.jpg" /><br /><br />Is it not illegal for two to be espoused to one?<br /><br />Think we can legislate another Congressional Rep for the 27th Cong Dist to help Solomon with the "backlog" of legislation in the applicable counties.<br /><br />The precedent has been created get busy and start exploiting it.<br /><br />A Robstown Nueces County Constitutional Judge?<br /><br />Create a County Constitutional Judge's office for both Robstown & Calallen/Annavile, and get Gov. Rick Perry to give the nod to Patti or Randolph Boothe or Sam Keech as first County Constitutional Judge of Robstown & Calallen/Annaville.<br /></span><br /><span style="font-family:verdana,helvetica,arial;"><br /></span><span style="font-family:verdana,helvetica,arial;"><span style="font-size:130%;"><b>Political Bigomy After All Karl Rove is From Utah</b></span><br /><span style="">Posted on November 15, 2007 at 00:41:33 AM by Jaime Kenedeno<br /></span><br /><img src="http://www.thesmokinggun.com/graphics/art3/1020051delay1.jpg" /><br /><br />Is it not illegal for two to be espoused to one?<br /><br />Think we can legislate another Congressional Rep for the 27th Cong Dist to help Solomon with the "backlog" of legislation in the applicable counties.<br /><br />The precedent has been created get busy and start exploiting it.<br /><br />A Robstown Nueces County Constitutional Judge?<br /><br />Create a County Constitutional Judge's office for both Robstown & Calallen/Annavile, and get Gov. Rick Perry to give the nod to Patti or Randolph Boothe or Sam Keech as first County Constitutional Judge of Robstown & Calallen/Annaville.<br /><br /><br /></span><span style="font-family:verdana,helvetica,arial;"><span style="font-size:130%;"><b></b></span><span style="font-size:130%;"><b></b></span><blockquote style="font-style: italic;"><span style="font-size:130%;"><b>Potential Juror 26........</b></span><br /><span style="">Posted on November 15, 2007 at 00:59:29 AM by d1<br /></span><br />was told "Just trying to stay out of trouble"....LIAR...because If you were "you lied"!<br /><br />Go back to Iraq where they need your kind of prosecution......I forgot your Farsi/Arabic sucks.<br /><br />"Your Honor, I'm gonna have to spend the rest of the summer in the library"<br /><br />More like the rest of your life......Your hate is well documented as you can READ English, do you understand/comprehend English?<br /><br />TLR/Totally Live Recognition........Now, Dick Cheney can shoot who he pleases and whenever he choices to.<br /><br />With you in his pocket....no need to utilize Jaime Powell.</blockquote></span><span style="font-family:verdana,helvetica,arial;"><span style="font-size:130%;"><b>WATT is the Number of the Judicial District for this so called District Attorney</b></span><br /><span style="">Posted on November 15, 2007 at 01:21:39 AM by Jaime Kenedeno<br /></span><br />Sec. 43.182. DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR KLEBERG AND KENEDY<br />COUNTIES. (a) The voters of Kleberg and Kenedy Counties elect a<br />district attorney. The district attorney has the same powers and<br />duties as other district attorneys and serves the district courts<br />of Kleberg and Kenedy Counties.<br />(b) The district attorney shall attend each term and session<br />of the district courts of Kleberg and Kenedy Counties and shall<br />represent the state in criminal cases pending in those courts. The<br />district attorney has control of any case heard on petition of writ<br />of habeas corpus before any district or inferior court<b> <span style="color: rgb(204, 0, 0);font-size:130%;" >in the<br />district.</span><br /></b> (c) The commissioners courts of the counties comprising the<br />district may supplement the state salary of the district attorney.<br />The amount of the supplement may not exceed $12,000 a year. The<br />supplemental salary must be paid proportionately by the<br />commissioners court of each county according to the population of<br />the county. The supplemental salary may be paid from the officers'<br />salary fund of a county. If that fund is inadequate, the<br />commissioners court may transfer the necessary funds from the<br />general fund of the county.</span><br /><span style="font-family:verdana,helvetica,arial;"><br /></span><span style="font-family:verdana,helvetica,arial;"><span style="font-size:130%;"><b>The Legislation Failed but if you notice the language is the same</b></span><br /><span style="">Posted on November 15, 2007 at 01:26:39 AM by Jaime Kenedeno<br /></span><br /><img src="http://www.geocities.com/KarenSpecial/images/comics/nowheretogo.jpg" /><br /><br />Sec.i24.567.ii423RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT (KENEDY AND KLEBERG COUNTIES). (a) The 423rd Judicial District is composed of Kenedy and Kleberg Counties.<br /><br />(b)iiThe 423rd District Court shall give preference to criminal cases.<br /><br />(c)iiIn addition to other jurisdiction provided by law, the 423rd District Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the county courts in Kenedy and Kleberg Counties and the statutory county court in Kleberg County over all matters of civil and criminal<br /><br />3832 79th Legislature — Regular Session 79th Day<br /><br />jurisdiction, original and appellate, in cases over which a county court has jurisdiction under the constitution and laws of this state. Matters and proceedings in the concurrent jurisdiction of the 423rd District Court and the county court or county court at law may be filed in either court and all cases of concurrent jurisdiction may be transferred between the 423rd District Court, the county court, and the county court at law. However, a case may not be transferred from one court to another without the consent of the judge of the court to which it is transferred, and a case may not be transferred unless it is within the jurisdiction of the court to which it is transferred.<br /><br />(b)iiSection 24.207, Government Code, is amended to read as follows:<br /><br />Sec.i24.207.ii105TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ([KENEDY, KLEBERG, AND] NUECES COUNTY [COUNTIES]). (a) The 105th Judicial District is composed of [Kenedy, Kleberg, and] Nueces County [counties]. The court shall give preference to criminal cases.<br /><br />(b)iiThe terms of the 105th District Court begin[:<br /><br />[(1)iiin Kenedy County on the first Mondays in June and December;<br /><br />[(2)iiin Kleberg County on the first Mondays in April and October; and<br /><br />[(3)iiin Nueces County] on the first Mondays in February and August.<br /><br />(c)iiThe judge, with the approval of the commissioners court, may appoint an official interpreter of the court [in Nueces County] who serves at the will of the judge. The official interpreter shall take both the constitutional oath of office and an oath that he will faithfully interpret all testimony in the district court as official interpreter. The oath is sufficient for his service as official interpreter in all cases in the court [in Nueces County] during the interpreter's term of office. The judge may also assign the official interpreter to assist the court's probation officer in the discharge of the probation officer's duties.<br /><br />(c)iiThe heading to Section 43.148, Government Code, is amended to read as follows:<br /><br />Sec.i43.148.iiKENEDY, KLEBERG, AND NUECES COUNTIES [105TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT].<br /><br />(d)iiSubsections (a) and (c), Section 43.148, Government Code, are amended to read as follows:<br /><br />(a)iiThe voters of Kenedy, Kleberg, and Nueces counties [the 105th Judicial District] elect a district attorney. The district attorney has the same powers and duties as other district attorneys and serves all the district, county, and justice courts of Nueces County and the district courts of Kleberg and Kenedy counties.<br /><br />(c)iiThe commissioners courts of Kenedy, Kleberg, and Nueces [the] counties [comprising the district] may supplement the state salary of the district attorney. The amount of the supplement may not exceed $12,000 a year. The supplemental salary must be paid proportionately by the commissioners court of each county according to the population of the county. The supplemental salary may be paid from the officers' salary fund of a county. If that fund is inadequate, the commissioners court may transfer the necessary funds from the general fund of the county.<br /><br />(e)iiThe local administrative district judge shall transfer all cases from Kenedy and Kleberg Counties that are pending in the 105th District Court on September 1, 2005, to the 423rd District Court.<br /><br />Thursday, May 26, 2005 SENATE JOURNAL 3833<br /><br />(f)iiWhen a case is transferred as provided by Subsection (e) of this section, all processes, writs, bonds, recognizances, or other obligations issued from the 105th District Court are returnable to the 423rd District Court as if originally issued by that court. The obligees on all bonds and recognizances taken in and for the 105th District Court and all witnesses summoned to appear in the 105th District Court are required to appear before the 423rd District Court as if originally required to appear before that court.<br /><br />(g)iiThe 423rd Judicial District is created September 1, 2005.<br /><br />SECTIONi7.ii(a)iiEffective January 1, 2007, Subchapter C, Chapter 24, Government Code, is amended by adding Section 24.569 to read as follows:<br /><br /><a href="http://tlo2.tlc.state.tx.us/sjrnl/79r/html/sj05-26-f.htm">Failed Creation of the 423rd District</a><br /><br /></span><span style="font-family:verdana,helvetica,arial;"><span style="font-size:130%;"><b>Why did they try to create the 423rd Judcial District?</b></span><br /><span style="">Posted on November 15, 2007 at 01:36:58 AM by Jaime Kenedeno<br /></span><br /><img src="http://www.sevenstories.com/html/custom/images/Paradise.jpg" /><br /><br />Sounds like how Hitler thought<br /><br />Did they think they needed a new Judicial District to create the new District Attorney position?<br /><br />We have here in this situation a District Attorney without a Judicial District.<br /><br />Tell me I am wrong and back it up, any takers? </span><br /><span style="font-family:verdana,helvetica,arial;"><br /></span><span style="font-family:verdana,helvetica,arial;"><br /><blockquote></blockquote></span>Jaime Kenedeñohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12787459880135027366noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22129949.post-85621391436230632672007-05-15T00:06:00.000-07:002007-05-15T00:12:24.316-07:00who are making obscene profits in the tens of billions of dollars ?Democrats slam Big Oil over $3 gasoline prices<br /><br />By Tom Doggett Tue May 8, 4:46 PM ET<br /><br />WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. Senate's top Democrat on Tuesday accused big oil companies of shutting down refineries temporarily to raise gasoline prices and rake in"obscene profits."<br />ADVERTISEMENT<br /><br />Gasoline prices have topped $3 a gallon at service stations across the country because several oil refineries are offline due to maintenance or accidents, reducing gasoline production and making fuel supplies tight.<br /><br />"It's outrageous ...Isn't it interesting every year about this time, a refinery goes down for repairs," said Senate Democratic Leader Harry Reid (news, bio, voting record) of Nevada.<br /><br />"Is that coincidental? Or is it part of a plan that these multinational, huge companies who are making obscene profits in the tens of billions of dollars -- is this part of their game to keep the profits going?" Reid said.<br /><br />House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (news, bio, voting record) on Tuesday announced seven congressional hearings in coming weeks on soaring energy prices and plans to put together a proposed package of energy bills by July 4 to address the issue.<br /><br />"With Memorial Day travel and the start of summer driving only a few weeks away, drivers are paying a heavy price for the Bush administration's failure to enact a comprehensive energy strategy," said Pelosi.<br /><br />"Years of Bush administration policies that have favored Big Oil over the consumers have resulted in record dependence on foreign oil," the California Democrat added.<br /><br />The Energy Department's forecasting arm warned on Tuesday that gasoline inventories would remain low throughout the summer, putting upward pressure on fuel prices.<br /><br />"The gas prices that we see across the country today are, for lack of a better description, awful," said Reid, who wants to roll together three bipartisan bills already approved by Senate committees that deal with energy problems.<br /><br />The bills would cut future U.S. gasoline demand and improve the fuel economy of cars and trucks.<br /><br />Pelosi said House committees will seek ways to combat gasoline price gouging and develop clean alternative fuels. They also will examine the broad economic impact of foreign oil dependence and look at technology to boost energy efficiency.<br /><br />Pelosi said the coming energy package would provide economic incentives to develop and use clean alternative fuels. It also will encourage innovation to create new jobs and help small businesses and enhance technology-driven efficiency.<br /><br />Republicans criticized Democrats for promising relief while not doing much to tackle high energy costs.<br /><br />House Republican Leader John Boehner (news, bio, voting record) said Democrats have opposed "common sense energy solutions" such as blocking legislation to open Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil drilling.dannoynted1http://www.blogger.com/profile/14945400306838778051noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22129949.post-33260115120539649172007-05-13T02:34:00.000-07:002007-05-13T02:44:32.027-07:00what we so proudly hailLiberty or death, what we so proudly hail<br />Once you provoke her, rattling of her tail<br />Never begins it, never, but once engaged...<br />Never surrenders, showing the fangs of rage<br /><br />Dont tread on me<br /><br />So be it<br />Threaten no more<br />To secure peace is to prepare for war<br />So be it<br />Settle the score<br />Touch me again for the words that youll hear evermore...<br /><br />Dont tread on me<br /><br />Love it or live it, she with the deadly bite<br />Quick is the blue tongue, forked as lighting strike<br />Shining with brightness, always on surveillance<br />The eyes, they never close, emblem of vigilance<br /><br />Dont tread on me<br /><br />So be it<br />Threaten no more<br />To secure peace is to prepare for war<br />So be it<br />Settle the score<br />Touch me again for the words that youll hear evermore...<br /><br />Dont tread on me<br /><br />So be it<br />Threaten no more<br />To secure peace is to prepare for war<br /><br />Liberty or death, what we so proudly hail<br />Once you provoke her, rattling on her tail<br /><br />So be it<br />Threaten no more<br />To secure peace is to prepare for war<br />So be it<br />Settle the score<br />Touch me again for the words that youll hear evermore...<br /><br />Dont tread on medannoynted1http://www.blogger.com/profile/14945400306838778051noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22129949.post-1175231624227473922007-03-29T23:11:00.000-07:002007-03-29T23:13:44.376-07:00Does Texas allow "interference with economic opportunity separate and apart from causes of action..."?Send this document to a colleague Close This Window<br /><br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> NUMBER 13-00-104-CV<br /><br /> COURT OF APPEALS<br /><br /> THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS<br /><br /> CORPUS CHRISTI B EDINBURG<br /><br /> <br /><br />EXXON CORPORATION, ET AL., Appellants,<br /><br /> v.<br /><br />LAURIE T. MIESCH, ET AL., Appellees.<br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> On appeal from the 135th District Court<br /><br /> of Refugio County, Texas.<br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br /> O P I N I O N<br /><br /> <br /><br /> Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Hinojosa and Castillo<br /><br /> <br /><br /> Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez<br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br />This appeal follows a jury trial in an oil and gas case. Emerald Oil & Gas, L.C. (AEmerald@), a subsequent lessee, and intervening royalty interest owners[1] brought suit against Exxon Corp. and Exxon Texas, Inc., as successor in interest to Humble Oil & Refining Co. (AExxon@), for wrongful conduct in the development and abandonment of oil and gas wells in the Mary Ellen O=Connor Field, near Refugio, Texas. The trial court granted Exxon=s motion for directed verdict and entered a take-nothing judgment against Emerald.[2] The jury found in favor of the royalty interest owners on their causes of action against Exxon for waste and breach of contract and awarded the intervenors both actual and punitive damages. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. All parties have appealed. The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. <br /><br /> I. Background<br /><br />Exxon leased the mineral interests on several thousand acres, the Mary Ellen O'Connor Field, near Refugio, Texas. Exxon's interest in the property spanned four decades beginning in the 1950's and was derived from four separate leases.[3] The leases are atypical of many oil and gas leases in some respects. They include, for instance, an unusually high fifty percent royalty obligation and stringent surrender clauses.<br /><br />Beginning in the early 1970s, Exxon attempted to negotiate a reduction in its fifty percent royalty obligation on the field. Exxon owned an interest in a contiguous tract operated by Quintana, and its royalty obligation on that tract was substantially lower and thus more favorable for Exxon. Exxon told the royalty interest owners that the Mary Ellen O=Connor Field was no longer economical to operate, although Exxon continued production on the adjacent tract operated by Quintana. <br /><br />In considering Exxon=s request for a reduction in royalty interest, the royalty owners requested that Exxon provide them information and documentation regarding the productivity of the field. Under the terms of the leases, the lessors were entitled to Afull information@ covering all operations, including logs, reports, analyses, data, and information concerning oil and gas potentialities for the field. <br /><br />Exxon initially refused to provide the royalty interest owners information on grounds that it was proprietary, then that the information would be too difficult to locate and retrieve, and finally, that the information would be made available only if a confidentiality agreement were signed. Nevertheless, Exxon ultimately provided the royalty interest owners a Areading room@ containing documentation on the field. The reading room, however, did not contain all information on the field: Exxon did not include any interpretive data and did not include all of the well logs for the field. Some data on the field was not produced until discovery in the instant lawsuit, and some data, including calculations made by Exxon employee Joel Wylie regarding the productivity of the field and some of the well logs, was missing even at the time of trial.<br /><br />The royalty interest owners suggested several options in renegotiating the terms of the lease. One of the options was a lower royalty obligation that would increase if productivity on the field increased. Exxon refused. After the failure of additional negotiations, the royalty interest owners began looking for a new lessee for the field. Exxon initially refused to allow another operator to take over the lease without a release. All negotiations ultimately proved unsuccessful. Accordingly, Exxon plugged and abandoned the wells. <br /><br />Emerald became interested in leasing a portion of the tract originally leased by Exxon. Emerald examined the economic viability of assuming operations on the property by reviewing Exxon=s public filings on the field with the Texas Railroad Commission. In so doing, Emerald reviewed the Texas Railroad Commission Form W-3 Plugging Reports, which specify the methodology used to plug and abandon the wells. Emerald ultimately leased a portion of the field originally held by Exxon.<br /><br />Upon acquiring the lease and starting the reentry process, Emerald encountered numerous unexpected obstacles in its redevelopment of the field. Emerald discovered tubing, refuse, and junk in some of the wellbores. Emerald also discovered cut casing,[4] unidentified plugs, or plugs located at intervals differing from those identified on the Form W-3s, and other obstructions in the wells. Various wells contained tank bottoms or other environmental contaminants. Ultimately, Tommy Lynch of Emerald estimated that eighty to ninety percent of the Form W-3s failed to accurately describe the plugging methodology utilized for the wells and failed to accurately describe the physical status of the wells. <br /><br />Emerald retained several different experts in the field of reentering plugged wells to assist it in the reentry process. Nevertheless, the problems were not isolated and the wells were uniformly difficult and disproportionately expensive, or impossible, to reenter. Emerald also requested, but failed to receive, the well records directly from Exxon. Emerald ultimately obtained several of Exxon=s well logs for the field from Quintana. The plugging procedures delineated in these well logs differed in salient respects from those described in Exxon=s public filings regarding the same wells. After reviewing these documents, speaking with its experts, and talking with several individuals who had performed some of the plugging at Exxon=s direction, Emerald concluded that Exxon had engaged in a deliberate pattern of sabotaging the wells in the Mary Ellen O=Connor Field to prevent reentry, while continuing to profit from operations on the contiguous tract. Emerald and the royalty owners brought suit against Exxon for, inter alia, common law waste, statutory waste, negligence per se, and tortious interference. Based on field analyses produced by Exxon during discovery, the royalty owners further brought suit against Exxon for breach of contract by failing to fully develop the field.<br /><br /> II. Exxon=s Appeal<br /><br /> A. Introduction<br /><br />The jury found against Exxon and in favor of the royalty owners on all issues submitted. The jury found that Exxon committed waste on property or production in which the royalty owners owned an interest, and that, in plugging the wells, Exxon failed to act as a reasonably prudent operator would have under the same or similar facts and circumstances. The jury found that the intervenors discovered, or, in the exercise of due diligence, should have discovered the waste on January 24, 1995. The jury awarded the intervenors $5,000,000 for the cost to drill new wells, the value of the minerals that could not be recovered, and the loss of bonus payments. The jury also found that Exxon acted with malice and awarded the intervenors $10,000,000 in exemplary damages.<br /><br />The jury further found that Exxon failed to comply with the development provision in the leases that required Exxon to Aprosecute diligently a continuous drilling and development program until said tract is fully developed for oil and gas,@ and that Exxon fraudulently concealed its failure to develop the field. The jury found that the intervenors knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known that Exxon fraudulently concealed its failure to fully develop under the leases in February of 1999. The jury awarded the intervenors $3,600,000 for Exxon=s breach of contract, as the amount that the intervenors Awould have received for the minerals produced had Exxon fully developed the Oil and Gas Leases less the costs of operation and production and any royalty received from Emerald Oil & Gas L.C.@<br /><br />The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict and awarded the intervenors $8,600,000 in actual damages, $10,000,000 in punitive damages, and $2,795,000 in prejudgment interest. Exxon appeals this judgment by eleven issues and numerous subissues.<br /><br /> B. Statute of Limitations for Waste<br /><br />In several issues, Exxon contends that the statute of limitations bars the intervenors= waste claim. In its first issue, Exxon argues that limitations bars the intervenors from recovering on their waste claim because they filed suit against Exxon more than two years after Exxon completed its plugging operations. In its second issue, Exxon contends that the trial court erred in allowing the intervenors to rely on the discovery rule to delay the running of limitations on their Aotherwise time-barred@ waste claim. In subissues, Exxon argues that the discovery rule is inapplicable (a) when the intervenors have taken the position that their waste claim is merely for temporary injury to real property; (b) when, in a typical waste case, the nature of the injury is readily discoverable from a wide variety of sources, including public documents and an inspection of the premises; and (c) when the evidence of any damages is necessarily the subject of an expert swearing match that precludes the evidence from being objectively verifiable. In a fourth subissue, Exxon claims that, even if the discovery rule arguably applies to the waste claim, the intervenors are precluded from relying on the discovery rule because the evidence Aconclusively@ shows that they knew or reasonably should have known of their injury more than two years before filing suit.<br /><br />Statutes of limitations are intended to compel plaintiffs to assert their claims Awithin a reasonable period of time while the evidence is fresh in the minds of the parties and witnesses.@ Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 734 (Tex. 2001) (citing Computer Assocs. Int=l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. 1996)). Generally, when a cause of action accrues is a question of law. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 221 (Tex. 2003). We review questions of law de novo, without deference to the trial court's conclusions. State v. Heal, 917 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. 1996).<br /><br />As a general rule, a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when facts come into existence that authorize a party to seek a judicial remedy. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 128 S.W.3d at 221. In most cases, a cause of action accrues when a wrongful act causes a legal injury, regardless of when the plaintiff learns of that injury or if all resulting damages have yet to occur. Id.; see S.V. v. R.V, 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996).<br /><br />The discovery rule exception to the statute of limitations operates to defer accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff knows or, by exercising reasonable diligence, should know of the facts giving rise to the claim. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d at 734.<br /><br />The injury at issue in the instant case is the waste of hydrocarbons. The statute of limitations for waste is two years. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 16.003(a) (Vernon 2002). The jury found that the intervenors discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence, should have discovered the waste on January 24, 1995. Intervenors first brought suit against Exxon in August and September of 1996, less than two years after the date found by the jury. <br /><br />Exxon contends that the statute of limitations bars the intervenors= recovery for waste given that the intervenors filed suit against Exxon more than two years after Exxon completed its plugging operations in the field. According to the evidence adduced at trial, Exxon plugged and abandoned all of the wells in the field by August 16, 1991. We agree that the statute of limitations would bar intervenors= cause of action for waste unless the discovery rule applies to defer accrual of this cause of action. <br /><br />Exxon first contends that the discovery rule is not applicable because the intervenors claim that their waste claim is a temporary injury to real property, as opposed to a permanent injury to real property. The supreme court has recognized, but not addressed, the issue regarding whether the categorization of an injury as permanent or temporary affects the running of limitations. See HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 885-86 (Tex. 1998) (ATo resolve the issues in this case, we need not decide whether the injury . . . was permanent or temporary and the effect, if any, that distinction may have on limitations.@). Compare Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Bartlett, 958 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tex. App.BFort Worth 1997, writ denied) (discussing discovery rule when injury to water well was found to be permanent injury to real property) with Apache Corp. v. Moore, 891 S.W.2d 671, 679-80 (Tex. App.BAmarillo 1994, writ denied) (holding that injury to royalty interest was a temporary injury), vacated on other grounds, 517 U.S. 1217 (1996).<br /><br />As recently articulated by the Texas Supreme Court, there are three distinct consequences that result from categorizing an injury as permanent or temporary: (1) whether damages are available for future or only past injuries; (2) whether one or a series of suits is required; and (3) whether claims accrue, and thus limitations begin, with the first or each subsequent injury. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 275 (Tex. 2004) (discussing the law of nuisance). In terms of limitations, a permanent nuisance claim accrues when injury first occurs or is discovered; a temporary nuisance claim accrues anew upon each injury. See id. at 270.<br /><br />Exxon=s argument that recovery is barred is untenable for a number of reasons. <br /><br />First, Exxon seizes upon argument made by counsel at trial, outside the presence of the jury, in support of its assertion that intervenors claim theirs was a temporary injury. However, Exxon=s argument ignores the fact that the intervenors submitted and received favorable jury findings awarding damages for the cost to drill new wells, the value of the minerals that cannot be recovered, and the loss of bonus payments. Accordingly, we cannot say that the intervenors have wholly characterized their damages as temporary. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 48 (parties may plead alternative or hypothetical theories and allege claims or defenses that are inconsistent); Tex. R. Civ. P. 47 (plaintiff may ask for relief in the alternative or of several different types). More importantly, the determination whether an injury is categorized as temporary or permanent is either made by the court, as a matter of law, or is a question of fact for the jury. See Schneider, 147 S.W.3d at 281. The parties= own characterization of the claims at issue is not controlling.<br /><br />Second, contrary to Exxon=s position, the discovery rule may apply whether the injury is permanent or temporary. See id. at 291 n.138; see generally Bayouth v. Lion Oil Co., 671 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. 1984); cf. Burke v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 138 S.W.3d 46, 60 (Tex. App.BTexarkana 2004, pet. denied) (AIn actions for damage to property, Texas courts have consistently applied the discovery rule.@).<br /><br />Third, and finally, we question the applicability of the distinction between temporary and permanent damage to land, traditionally applied in nuisance cases, to a case involving waste of oil and gas and breach of contract. The injuries in the instant case do not readily fall within either temporary or permanent categories, and in fact display aspects of both. Exxon next contends that the discovery rule does not apply in this case because the alleged waste was neither inherently undiscoverable nor objectively verifiable. The discovery rule applies if (1) the injury is inherently undiscoverable, and (2) the evidence of the injury is objectively verifiable. HECI Exploration Co., 982 S.W.2d at 886; Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Winograd, 956 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex. 1997).<br /><br />An injury is inherently undiscoverable if it is, by its nature, unlikely to be discovered within the prescribed limitations period despite due diligence. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d at 734-35; Altai, 918 S.W.2d at 456. We determine whether an injury is inherently undiscoverable on a categorical basis because such an approach Abrings predictability and consistency to the jurisprudence.@ Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, 41 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Tex. 2001). Accordingly, the question here is not whether the intervenors discovered their injury during the limitations period, but whether the intervenors= injury is Athe type of injury that generally is discoverable by the exercise of reasonable diligence.@ HECI, 982 S.W.2d at 886.<br /><br />As owners of mineral interests, intervenors had some obligation to exercise reasonable diligence in protecting their interests. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d at 735. Intervenors could turn to the lessee for information and could look to records publicly filed with the Railroad Commission. However, neither source would indicate waste of hydrocarbons. Damage to subsurface wellbores cannot be determined by visual inspection or even a review of publicly available records. We note that intervenors need not prove that the injury was impossible to discover, but only that it was difficult to learn of the injury. See S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 7. We hold that waste as alleged in this case is, by its nature, unlikely to be discovered within the prescribed limitations period despite due diligence. <br /><br />We next consider whether the injury is objectively verifiable. An injury is objectively verifiable if the presence of injury and the producing wrongful act cannot be disputed, and the facts upon which liability is asserted are demonstrated by direct, physical evidence. Altai, 918 S.W.2d at 455; S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 6‑7; Hay v. Shell Oil Co., 986 S.W.2d 772, 777 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1999, pet. denied). While expert testimony alone does not suffice, recognized expert opinion on a particular subject could be so near consensus that, in conjunction with objective evidence, it could provide the verification required. Hay, 986 S.W.2d at 777; see S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 15.<br /><br />In the instant case, the record is replete with physical evidence pertaining to the intervenors= injury, that is, cut casing, shifted casing, refuse and other junk in the wellbores, and unexpected plugs and obstacles in the wellbores. Experts testified that the wells were damaged. It is undisputed that Exxon was the party responsible for plugging and abandoning the wells in the field. Accordingly, intervenors= injury is objectively verifiable. Compare Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. 1967) (presence of sponge in plaintiff's body and how it got there were undisputable) with Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 21‑22 (Tex. 1977) (negligent diagnosis is subject to proof only by expert hindsight, and therefore discovery rule does not apply).<br /><br />We conclude that the intervenors= injury is inherently undiscoverable and the evidence of injury is objectively verifiable. Accordingly, the discovery rule applies. HECI Exploration Co., 982 S.W.2d at 886<br /><br /> In its fourth subissue, Exxon claims that, even if the discovery rule applies, the intervenors are precluded from relying on the discovery rule because the evidence Aconclusively@ shows that they knew or reasonably should have known of their injury more than two years before filing suit. Exxon focuses its argument on a June 1994 letter from Tom Taylor at Emerald to the intervenors, explaining the progress of reentry on some of the wells. Specifically, Exxon points to language in the letter indicating that casing had been cut on the B-11, B-1, and A-3 wells and that junk had been found in the A-10 well. In a trial on the merits, the party seeking the benefit of the discovery rule to avoid limitations has the burden of pleading and proving the discovery rule. Woods v. William M. Mercer, 769 S.W.2d 518, 518 (Tex. 1988). Inquiries involving the discovery rule usually entail questions for the trier of fact. Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31, 44 (Tex. 1998). However, the commencement of the limitations period may be determined as a matter of law if reasonable minds could not differ about the conclusion to be drawn from the facts in the record. Id. <br /><br /><br />In the instant case, the jury found that the intervenors discovered or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered the waste, if any, by Exxon, on January 24, 1995. According to the testimony adduced at trial, this is the date on which representatives from Emerald met with the intervenors and informed them about the full extent of damage to the wells and the numerous discrepancies between the public reports on the pluggings and Emerald=s actual findings regarding the wells. By this time, Emerald had consulted with many reentry specialists. According to Glenn Lynch of Emerald, the royalty interest owners had asked for a status on the lease, and at this time he felt it was important to disclose to the royalty interest owners the condition of their mineral interests. At this January meeting, Lynch told the royalty interest owners that the problems with the wells were not isolated but were pandemic and that the problems were unusual and atypical. We conclude that the 1994 letter does not establish discovery of the waste as a matter of law. Instead, the discovery rule tolls limitations until the intervenors knew of enough damage to know that the problems regarding the wells were not isolated. PPG Indus. v. JMB/Houston Ctrs. Ltd. P'ship, 146 S.W.3d 79, 94 (Tex. 2004). There were 121 wells on the field, and the letter references reentry or the commencement of reentry on only 14 wells as of June 8, 1994. Based on the testimony at trial, it would not be unexpected to encounter a few difficulties in reentering some of the wells. In short, we are not willing to say that finding a few isolated problems on a small number of the wells that had been reentered to date establishes field-wide knowledge regarding systemic damage to some numerous wells as a matter of law. See id.; Cornerstones Mun. Util. Dist. v. Monsanto Co., 889 S.W.2d 570, 576‑77 (Tex. App.BHouston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (discovery rule does not end when the first leak is discovered; nor does it continue until all the leaks are known; instead, it ends when an owner knows of enough leaks to indicate the problem is not isolated); Bayou Bend Towers Council of Co‑Owners v. Manhattan Constr. Co., 866 S.W.2d 740, 742‑43 (Tex. App.BHouston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (holding same with respect to leaking windows and roof). Thus, the earliest point at which intervenors can be properly charged with knowledge of the damage is, as the jury found, January 1995, which is less than two years before they filed suit in September 1996.<br /><br />We overrule Exxon=s first two issues and its numerous subissues regarding the statute of limitations for waste.<br /><br /> C. Statutory and Common Law Waste<br /><br />In its third issue, Exxon argues that the trial court erred in granting judgment in favor of the intervenors on the basis of the jury=s finding that Exxon committed waste. In subissues, Exxon argues that: (a) the intervenors are precluded from recovering for statutory waste when section 85.321 of the Texas Natural Resources Code does not create a private cause of action for waste, and only prohibits waste in certain contexts; (b) the intervenors= cause of action for common law waste sounds only in contract and not in tort; (c) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the term Awaste@ may include Awhatever dictates of reason, fairness, and good judgment under all the facts would lead one to conclude was wasteful,@ when that definition is not found in the Texas Natural Resources Code; (d) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a finding that Exxon committed common law waste or statutory waste; and (e) the Dunn and O=Connor intervenors are precluded from recovering under a theory of common law waste because they failed to plead such a theory.<br /><br /> 1. Statutory Waste<br /><br />We first address Exxon=s contention that there is not a statutory cause of action for waste. We have previously addressed this issue in a companion case, Emerald Oil & Gas, L.C. v. Exxon Corp., No. 13-99-757-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 591 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi Jan. 27, 2005, pet. filed), and we now reiterate our conclusion that there is a private cause of action for statutory waste. See id. at *12-*14. Although Exxon argues to the contrary, section 85.321 of the Texas Natural Resources Code provides a statutory cause of action for waste. Section 85.321 of the code states that:<br /><br />A party who owns an interest in property or production that may be damaged by another party violating the provisions of this chapter that were formerly a part of Chapter 26, Acts of the 42nd Legislature, 1st Called Session, 1931, as amended, or another law of this state prohibiting waste or a valid rule or order of the commission may sue for and recover damages and have any other relief to which he may be entitled at law or in equity. Provided, however, that in any action brought under this section or otherwise, alleging waste to have been caused by an act or omission of a lease owner or operator, it shall be a defense that the lease owner or operator was acting as a reasonably prudent operator would act under the same or similar facts and circumstances.<br /><br /> <br /><br />Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. ' 85.321 (Vernon 2001). This language is clear and unambiguous, and we will interpret it as written. Our reading of the statute is in accord with other cases referencing the effect of section 85.321. See HECI Exploration Co., 982 S.W.2d at 890 (AWhen a mineral or royalty interest owner is damaged by a violation of the conservation laws of this state or a Railroad Commission rule or order, section 85.321 of the Texas Natural Resources Code . . . expressly provides for a damage suit against the offending operator.@); In re Apache Corp., 61 S.W.3d 432, 435 (Tex. App.BAmarillo 2001, orig. proceeding) (through section 85.321, Athe legislature unmistakably declared its intent to allow those owning an interest in realty who have suffered injury due to a violation of some rule or order of the TRC to sue for and recover damages and other relief.@); H.G. Sledge, Inc. v. Prospective Inv. & Trading Co., 36 S.W.3d 597, 606 n.10 (Tex. App.BAustin 2000, pet. denied) (acknowledging that section 85.321 Aprovides jurisdiction for suits for damages@); see also Turnbow v. Lamb, 95 F.2d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1938) (construing predecessor statute).<br /><br />Contrary to these authorities, Exxon relies on Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Blankenship, 85 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1936), for the proposition that the predecessor to section 85.321 Adid not grant a new, private cause of action for damages or other relief not previously available to a property owner or producer.@ See id. at 556. We conclude that such reliance is misplaced, however, because the Fifth Circuit=s decision in 1936 concerned the enforcement of a Railroad Commission order rather than a matter of civil litigation between private parties. See id. Furthermore, we are guided by the precedent of the Texas Supreme Court and our sister appellate courts, who have addressed the issue as discussed above.<br /><br />Our conclusion is also supported by the fact that other provisions of the natural resources code also recognize private causes of action. See, e.g., Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. ' 111.095 (Vernon 2001); id. ' 134.182 (Vernon 2001). Moreover, such an interpretation is consistent with the overall legislative intent to prevent waste and preserve natural resources. See, e.g., Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. ' 89.001 (Vernon 2001) (stating that the Aconservation and development of all natural resources of this state are declared to be a public right and duty@). In this regard, we reiterate that the preservation of our natural resources is an issue of constitutional dimension. See Tex. Const. art. 16, ' 59 (stating that Athe preservation and conservation of all such natural resources of the State are each and all hereby declared public rights and duties; and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as may be appropriate thereto@).<br /><br />Exxon next argues that the natural resources code only prohibits waste in the Aproduction, storage, or transportation@ of oil or gas. See Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. ' 85.045 (Vernon 1993). According to Exxon, the intervenors do not complain about production, storage, or transportation of oil or gas, but instead complain only that Exxon committed waste in plugging. We disagree with Exxon=s narrow reading of the natural resources code. See Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. ' 85.045 (offering various definitions of waste); R.R. Comm=n v. Shell Oil Co., 146 Tex. 286, 206 S.W.2d 235, 240 (1947) (discussing similar language in precursor statute regarding production, storage, or transportation as Asweeping language . . . by which all waste in the handling of oil and gas was declared unlawful@). Based on the plain language of the code and long-standing precedent from the Texas Supreme Court, we conclude that the code prohibits all waste of oil or gas, including the type of waste caused by Exxon in the instant case. See Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. ' 85.045; Shell Oil Co., 26 S.W.2d at 240. <br /><br /> 2. Contract or Tort Law<br /><br />Exxon further contends that the intervenors may not recover for common law waste because the intervenors= cause of action sounds in contract rather than tort law. According to Exxon, its duties and responsibilities were governed wholly by the lease.<br /><br />A party=s actions can breach duties in tort, contract, or both. See Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1986). In determining the type of action brought, we look to the substance of the cause of action rather than the manner in which the party pleaded the cause of action. Id. at 617-18. In determining whether a plaintiff=s cause of action can be characterized as a breach of contract or a tort, the courts (1) look to the source of the defendant=s duty to act, and (2) consider the nature of the remedy or damages sought by the plaintiff. Southwestern Bell v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 494-95 (Tex. 1991).<br /><br />We reject Exxon=s contention. In the instant case, the source of Exxon=s duty to act arises not only from the lease, but also from the common law. Texas law has long recognized that a cause of action for negligent waste or destruction of minerals may be maintained by a mineral or royalty owner. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 583, 210 S.W.2d 558, 563 (1948); see Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 572 (Tex. 1981). Exxon=s duty to avoid waste is grounded in prohibitions against waste so fundamental that they are enshrined in the Texas constitution. See Tex. Const. art. 16, ' 59. We reach the same result when we consider the nature of the remedy or damages sought by the plaintiff. Southwestern Bell, 809 S.W.2d at 494-95. The injury is not merely the economic loss to the subject matter of the contract itself, but damaged or destroyed wellbores and ultimately, the loss of oil and gas reserves. Moreover, in some sense, the damage enures to citizens of the state and all who are injured by the loss of fuel. <br /><br />Exxon seeks to support its argument with Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 571 (Tex. 1981), Abraxas Petroleum Corp. v. Hornburg, 20 S.W.3d 741, 753 (Tex. App.BEl Paso 2000, no pet.), and Harrison v. Bass Enters. Prod. Co., 888 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1994, no writ). These cases are distinguishable. The duties and injuries in each of these cases sound in contract alone, and the injured parties were seeking the benefit of their bargains as provided by the contracts between the parties. In contrast, in this case, the evidence adduced at trial indicates a tort separate and apart from the contractual agreement, that is, the intentional destruction of wellbores and the intentional prevention of reentry in wells. Intervenors= claims based on this destruction are independent from and unrelated to any contractual relationship between the parties.<br /><br /> 3. Jury Instructions<br /><br /> Exxon next contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the term Awaste@ may include Awhatever dictates of reason, fairness, and good judgment under all the facts would lead one to conclude was wasteful@ when that definition is not found anywhere in Chapter 85 of the Texas Natural Resources Code, which contains the statutory definition of waste.[5] However, at trial, Exxon=s objection to this definition was that subpart (d) was Aunconstitutionally vague and fails to provide the jury any guidance in answering the question.@ To preserve an issue for appeal, the objecting party must distinctly point out the objectionable matter and the specific grounds of the objection. Tex. R. Civ. P. 274; Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Otherwise, the objection is waived. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Where the objection at trial is not the same as the complaint presented on appeal, the complaint is not preserved for appellate review. A.G.E., Inc. v. Buford, 105 S.W.3d 667, 678 (Tex. App.BAustin 2003, pet. denied); Borden Inc. v. Guerra, 860 S.W.2d 515, 525 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1993, writ dism'd by agr.); Exxon Corp. v. Allsup, 808 S.W.2d 648, 655 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1991, writ denied).<br /><br /> 4. Legal and Factual Sufficiency of Waste<br /><br />Exxon further argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a finding of common law waste or statutory waste.<br /><br />When a party not bearing the burden of proof on an issue challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's finding, disregarding all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Tex. 2002). If more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the finding exists, we uphold the finding. Id. When reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge, we examine the entire record to determine whether the evidence supporting the finding is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).<br /><br />We examine the record for evidence regarding the physical or economic waste or loss of hydrocarbons. See Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. ' 85.045(3), (6), (11); R.R. Comm=n v. Rowan Oil Co., 152 Tex. 439, 259 S.W.2d 173 (1953); Shell Oil Co., 206 S.W.2d at 240. In the instant case, the majority of the wells plugged by Exxon were difficult or impossible to reenter, and the costs associated with reentry were accordingly much higher than would have ordinarily been expected. The difficulties in reentry resulted from junk and other debris in the wellbores and from cut, rather than perforated, casings. Based on our review of the record evidence, numerous items were discovered in the wellbores, including wrenches, drilling bits, a packer, nuts, bolts, tubing, pieces of pipe, and assorted nondrillable junk. On at least one of the wells, Abuckets@ of debris were removed. On others, nondrillable materials in the wellbore prevented or hampered reentry. At trial, Exxon=s witnesses did not dispute that (1) there was junk in the wells, (b) Exxon was the only party who could have put the junk in the wells, or (c) junk in the wells made reentry difficult or impossible.<br /><br />At trial, the evidence indicated that the Mary Ellen O=Connor Field was the only instance in which Exxon determined to plug and abandon an entire field, including producing wells. Matt Soulant, Exxon=s division operation manager over South Texas, and other Exxon employees, acknowledged and agreed that cutting the casing, as opposed to perforating it, would make it impossible or at least more difficult to reenter a well. However, Soulant testified that the degree of difficulty required to reenter a well is not a consideration in plugging the well. From his perspective as an operations manager in the South Texas area, once a well was plugged and abandoned, he had no future concern with what occurred to that wellbore.<br /><br />Other Exxon employees and former employees testified that cutting and leaving the casing was contrary to Exxon=s usual practices in plugging and abandoning wells. Some testimony indicated that it was both more costly and more time-consuming to cut and abandon the casing.<br /><br />Lonnie Vickery, who worked for Exxon during the plugging procedures, questioned his supervisor, Joe Gilpin, regarding why Exxon was cutting casing rather than perforating it on the Mary Ellen O=Connor Field, and Ahis answer to me was, it was a deterrent,@ and AExxon felt like they drilled these wells, they bought the casing that ran in these wells, these were their wells, and they would plug them any way they wanted to, and they didn=t want anybody going back into them.@ Gilpin denied this exchange at trial. Vickery also testified that he plugged producing wells on the Mary Ellen O=Connor Field. At the instructions of Jerry Schave, Vickery pumped approximately 1,000 to 1,500 barrels of tank bottoms into a producing well over the course of two to three days. According to Vickery, Ayou=ve got to know, when you=re doing that, you=re destroying that formation. I mean you=re doing some severe damage to that gas formation. There=s no ifs, ands or buts about that.@ Other experts testified that the plugging procedures used in the Mary Ellen O=Connor Field were singular, violative of standard practices, and definitely Avindictive.@ With respect to resultant economic and physical waste, Emerald declined a second lease on the field specifically because of the damage to the wellbores. The royalty interest owners and their expert George Hite testified that the intervenors would be unlikely to obtain a lease on the portion of the original Exxon lease not already leased by Emerald. Reentry costs on the wells far exceeded the norm. Some wells could not be reentered. There was testimony that Emerald was unable to reenter productive zones due to the condition of the casing. According to Hite, reserves were lost which could not be recovered. <br /><br />Although there was conflicting testimony, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury's. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003) (AThe jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.@). We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury=s finding that Exxon committed waste.<br /><br /> 5. Sufficiency of the Pleadings<br /><br />Exxon argues that the Dunn and O=Connor intervenors are precluded from recovering under a theory of common law waste because they failed to plead such a theory. In the instant case, Emerald=s petition against Exxon included a specific paragraph including the phrase Acommon law waste@ as part of its title; however, the petition in intervention filed by the Dunn and O=Connor intervenors lacked any such specific title or caption. <br /><br />We disagree with Exxon=s contention. <br /><br />A judgment must be based upon pleadings, and a plaintiff may not sustain a favorable judgment on an unpleaded cause of action, in the absence of trial by consent. Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682‑83 (Tex. 1979); Oil Field Haulers Ass=n, Inc. v. R.R. Comm=n, 381 S.W.2d 183, 191 (Tex. 1964). The general rules concerning pleadings apply with equal force to an intervenor. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 61.<br /><br />Texas follows a Afair notice@ pleading standard, which looks to whether the opposing party can ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy and what testimony will be relevant at trial. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000). A pleading will be liberally construed in favor of the pleader and is sufficient if it gives fair and adequate notice of the facts upon which the pleader bases his claim. Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. 1977); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 45, 47. A court should uphold the petition as to a cause of action that may be reasonably inferred from what is specifically stated, even if an element of the cause of action is not specifically alleged. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 601 (Tex. 1993).<br /><br />In the instant case, the Dunn and O=Connors= fourth amended petition includes numerous factual allegations regarding Exxon=s actions with regard to waste, that is, the negligent waste or destruction of oil and gas. This petition specifically references the petition filed by Emerald and includes sections that expressly discuss Exxon=s failure to act as a reasonably prudent operator and Exxon=s negligence, both of which establish elements of the claim of waste. The petition states that ADefendants= conduct in the plugging and abandonment of the subject wells breaches the statutory duty to plug and abandon wells according to the Railroad Commission and the duty to not commit waste of natural resources@(emphasis added). The fourth amended petition is identical to that filed by the other intervenors with regard to the factual allegations of waste and, in comparison, only lacks a caption regarding common law waste. See Brown v. Henderson, 941 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1996, no writ) (petition does not need to set forth formal title of the DTPA or indicate the specific sections in order to allege a DTPA claim). Construing the pleadings liberally, we conclude that the petition in intervention gave Exxon fair notice of the cause of action at issue. <br /><br />Furthermore, even if we were to conclude that the common law waste claim was not included in the petition, we would conclude the issue was effectively tried by the implied consent of the parties. Tex. R. Civ. P. 67. In such instances, the issues shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. See id. The failure to amend the pleadings shall not affect the result of the trial on these issues. Id. <br /><br />Finally, if a petition omits an element of a cause of action or fails to state it with sufficient clarity, the defendant must specially except to the petition or he has waived his complaint. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 90; Harlingen Irrigation Dist. v. Caprock Communications Corp., 49 S.W.3d 520, 534 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2001, pet. denied). We note that Exxon filed a motion for leave to file an amended answer, including special exceptions, to the fourth amended petition; however, the record neither indicates that the court allowed Exxon to file its amended answer nor includes any ruling regarding the special exceptions therein. Further, Exxon=s proposed special exceptions do not address the cause of action for waste. <br /><br />We overrule Exxon=s third issue and various subissues concerning waste.<br /><br /> D. The Reasonably Prudent Operator<br /><br />In its fourth issue, Exxon argues that the evidence conclusively establishes Exxon=s defense that it acted as a reasonably prudent operator. According to Exxon, cutting the casing on the wells was the best way for it to ensure that no oil or gas could leak into the groundwater or otherwise cause environmental contamination. Exxon requested and obtained a jury question on its reasonably prudent operator defense. The jury found that Exxon had not acted as a reasonably prudent operator.<br /><br />Section 85.321, allowing for a suit for damages, provides, in part:<br /><br />[I]n any action brought under this section or otherwise, alleging waste to have been caused by an act or omission of a lease owner or operator, it shall be a defense that the lease owner or operator was acting as a reasonably prudent operator would act under the same or similar facts and circumstances.<br /><br /> <br /><br />Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. ' 85.321. We would note that the reasonably prudent operator standard incorporated in the statute has long been recognized by the common law. See, e.g., Alexander, 622 S.W.2d at 568; Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684, 690 (1959); Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961, 967‑68 (Tex. 1945). Every claim of improper operation by a lessor against a lessee should be tested against the general duty of the lessee to conduct operations as a reasonably prudent operator in order to carry out the purposes of the oil and gas lease. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d at 568. The reasonably prudent operator standard is comprised of three elements: (1) to act in good faith; (2) with competence; and (3) with due regard to the interest of the lessor as well as its own interest. Hurd Enters. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101, 109 n.10 (Tex. App.BSan Antonio 1992, writ denied). <br /><br />George Hite testified that Exxon did not comply with Railroad Commission requirements or industry standard in cutting casing without intending to pull it. Rock Thomas, hired as a consultant to Emerald, testified that he had reentered between six and seven thousand wells, and the Mary Ellen O=Connor Field is the only place he had ever heard of where cut casing was left in the wellbore. Malcom Tudor, who worked for Exxon for more than thirty years and was the district operations superintendant, testified that he did not recall any operations involving cutting casing without attempting to pull it, and he could not think of a reason to cut the casing without attempting to pull it. All witnesses testified that cut casing and debris in the wellbores made reentry more difficult or impossible. Based on the foregoing, there was evidence that Exxon=s plugging procedures on the Mary Ellen O=Connor field both varied from those it utilized at other fields and conflicted with industry standards and commission rules. This is inconsistent with the definition of a reasonably prudent operator. The evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury=s finding, and accordingly, we overrule Exxon=s fourth issue.<br /><br /> E. Actual Damages for Waste<br /><br />In its fifth issue, Exxon argues that the trial court erred in awarding the intervenors $5,000,000 in actual damages for waste. In four subissues, Exxon specifically argues that: (a) the value of unrecovered minerals is an improper measure of damages for waste, Asuch that there is no evidence of the proper measure of damages;@ (b) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to permit the intervenors to recover any damages for the cost of drilling new wells when no one ever testified at trial that the intervenors would actually incur any of the costs of drilling new wells; (c) an award of damages for lost bonus payments is impermissibly speculative when there is no evidence that the intervenors actually would have entered into any agreement which would have allowed them to receive a bonus; and (d) an award of $5,000,000 in actual damages for waste is excessive when the maximum amount of damages supported by the intervenors= expert=s testimony was $2,712,500.<br /><br />With regard to the jury=s finding of waste, the trial court asked the jury to consider only three elements of damages for waste: (1) the cost to drill new wells; (2) the value of the minerals that cannot be recovered; and (3) the loss of bonus payments. The jury found that $5,000,000 would Afairly and reasonably@ compensate the plaintiff-intervenors. <br /><br /> 1. Unrecovered Minerals<br /><br />In its first subissue, Exxon contends that the value of unrecovered minerals is an improper measure of damages for waste, Asuch that there is no evidence of the proper measure of damages.@ According to Exxon, the proper measure of damages is the difference in the fair market value of the property immediately before and after the wasteful actions.<br /><br />While Texas cases have not delineated the correct measure of damages for the loss or destruction of minerals, they have considered the correct measure of damages for the removal of minerals from a plaintiff=s land. In such a situation, the correct measure of damages depends on whether the defendant removed the minerals in good faith. See Bender v. Brooks, 127 S.W.168, 169-70 (Tex. 1910). When the removal of minerals is done in good faith, the plaintiff may recover the minerals= value in situBthat is, the value of the minerals in the ground. Dahlstrom Corp. v. Martin, 582 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref=d n.r.e.). These damages are sometimes referred to as net profit damages. See Maxvill-Glasco Drilling Co. v. Royal Oil & Gas Corp., 800 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1990, writ denied). This measure is the fair market value of the minerals less the defendant=s cost of bringing them to the surface and to market. Bender, 127 S.W. at 170. In contrast, when minerals are removed in bad faith, the plaintiff can recover damages for the minerals= enhanced value. Karell v. West, 616 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Tex. App.BFort Worth 1981, writ ref=d n.r.e., 628 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam); Dahlstrom Corp., 582 S.W.2d at 161. We see no reason why this law should not apply to ascertain the damages for waste. <br /><br />To support its argument, Exxon cites Hamman v. Ritchie, 547 S.W.2d 698, 705 (Tex. App.BFort Worth 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.) (AOn a waste question the measure of damages would be the difference in market value immediately before and after action as applied to any particular parcel of land upon which waste was alleged to have been committed.@). Hamman is distinguishable from the instant matter because it does not concern loss of a mineral estate. Moreover, after Hamman was decided, the Texas Supreme Court clarified the law of waste: <br /><br />Waste is defined as >permanent harm to real property, committed by tenants for life or for years, not justified as a reasonable exercise of ownership and enjoyment by the possessory tenant and resulting in a reduction in value of the interest of the reversioner or remainderman.<br /><br /> <br /><br />The common law theory of waste must not be confused with an action for negligent waste or destruction of minerals which may be maintained by a mineral or royalty owner. A royalty or royalty interest, whether created by grant or reservation or by lease, is an interest in real property and is a fee simple interest in land<br /><br /> <br /><br />This is not a waste case. There has been no >waste= as defined in section 85.046(a) of the Texas Natural Resource Code. There has been no negligent waste or destruction as occurred in Elliff, supra. Nor has there been an ultimate loss by a reversionary or remainder interest. The problem is the operation, by a common lessee, of some leases to the detriment of others.<br /><br /> <br /><br />Alexander, 622 S.W.2d at 572. Accordingly, Hamman does not control this issue. The value of the unrecovered minerals is a proper measure of damages for waste.<br /><br /> 2. Costs for New Wells<br /><br />Exxon argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to permit intervenors to recover damages for the cost of drilling new wells when no one testified at trial that intervenors would actually incur the cost of drilling new wells. Ludt v. McCollum, 762 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Tex. 1988) (purchaser of home could recover for foundation repair even though foundation had not yet been repaired and costs were not yet incurred); Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Tex. 1984) (plaintiff may recover for loss of use as an element of damage even where no monetary loss had been incurred by actually renting a replacement vehicle).<br /><br />The law is clear that if a destroyed well can be reproduced and the reproduction costs do not exceed the value of the well, the plaintiff can recover damages for the cost of reproducing and equipping the well. Atex Pipe & Sup. v. Sesco Prod. Co., 736 S.W.2d 914, 917 (Tex. App.BTyler 1987, writ denied); Am. Glycerin Co. v. Kenridge Oil Co., 295 S.W. 633, 636-37 (Tex. App.BEastland 1927, no writ). Hite testified that seven new wells would have to be redrilled at a cost of $1.73 million. <br /><br />Exxon argues that this cost would have been born by Emerald and not by the intervenors as lessors. However, trial testimony indicated that Emerald declined a second lease on the property and that intervenors would be unable to procure a new lessee for the field given the manner in which the wells had been plugged. Further, Exxon=s argument fails to consider that the Emerald lease only encompassed a small portion of the total land leased by Exxon. Allowing the jury to consider that the intervenors would have to bear some of the costs for drilling new wells accords with the evidence adduced at trial.<br /><br /> 3. Lost Bonus Payment <br /><br />Exxon argues that the award of damages for lost bonus payments is improper because it is speculative. There can be no recovery for damages which are speculative or conjectural. Lefton v. Griffith, 136 S.W.3d 271, 277 (Tex. App.BSan Antonio 2004, no pet.); Cone v. Fagadau Energy Corp., 68 S.W.3d 147, 159 (Tex. App.BEastland 2001, pet. denied). <br /><br />According to testimony at trial, Emerald had agreed to pay intervenors a bonus of $600,000 for a second lease. The proposed lease, reflecting the $600,000 bonus payment, was in evidence. Glenn Lynch, for Emerald, testified that Emerald reached an agreement with all royalty owners to lease the deep rights to a large portion of the property, but Lynch decided not to go through with the proposed lease because of workover and reentry problems. Michael O=Connor testified that intervenors would have entered into the lease but for the fact that Emerald did not pursue it. Both parties to the proposed lease directly traced the failure of the lease to the damages caused by Exxon.<br /><br />Based on the foregoing testimony, we find no merit in Exxon=s arguments that the intervenors= lost bonus damages are not recoverable because they are too speculative. 4. Sufficiency of the Evidence<br /><br />Exxon contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support an award of $5,000,000 in actual damages for waste. The standard of review for an excessive damages complaint is factual sufficiency of the evidence. Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex. 1998); Brownsville Pediatric Ass=n v. Reyes, 68 S.W.3d 184, 191 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2002, no pet.); N. Am. Refractory Co. v. Easter, 988 S.W.2d 904, 912 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1999, pet. denied). We examine all of the evidence to determine whether the award is supported by sufficient evidence and order remittitur only if the award is so against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., 116 S.W.3d at 771; Sw. Tex. Coors, Inc. v. Morales, 948 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tex. App.BSan Antonio 1997, no writ). If sufficient probative evidence exists supporting the jury=s verdict, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. J. Wigglesworth Co. v. Peeples, 985 S.W.2d 659, 666 (Tex. App.BFort Worth 1999, pet. denied).<br /><br />When the jury is asked to award a single amount of damages, but is told that it may consider various elements in arriving at that amount, a challenge to the damages award must address all of the elements that could have been considered by the jury in making its total, single-amount award. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., 116 S.W.3d at 771. AIf there is just one element that is supported by the evidence, the damages award will be affirmed if it is supported by the evidence.@ Id. (quoting Greater Houston Transp. Inc. v. Zrubeck, 850 S.W.2d 579, 589 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1993, writ denied)). <br /><br />Based on our review, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury=s award for waste. According to George Hite, there were $4,765,626 worth of reserves remaining under the portion of the field that had not been leased by Emerald, and, given the damage evident on the Emerald tract, it would be unlikely that intervenors would be able to lease that property in the future. He further testified that there were $535,000 in non-recoverable reserves under the portion of the field that had been leased by Emerald. The lost bonus payment comprised $600,000. We conclude the jury=s award was supported by sufficient evidence and the award was not so against the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., 116 S.W.3d at 771. Accordingly, Exxon=s fifth issue is overruled in its entirety.<br /><br /> F. Punitive Damages<br /><br />In its sixth issue, Exxon argues that the trial court erred in awarding the intervenors $10,000,000 in punitive damages on their waste claim. Exxon specifically argues that (a) the trial court improperly overruled Exxon=s objection to a question which asked if Exxon acted with malice, when that question failed to connect Exxon=s state of mind to the specific cause of action for which the intervenors sought punitive damages, and (b) chapter 85 of the Texas Nature Resources Code, by its absence of any language authorizing an award of punitive damages, precludes the intervenors from recovering punitive damages on their claim for statutory waste.<br /><br /> 1. The Charge<br /><br />Exxon contends that the trial court erred by submitting the Amalice@ question to the jury because it failed to connect Exxon=s state of mind to the specific cause of action for which the intervenors sought punitive damages. The standard of review for alleged jury charge error is abuse of discretion. Tex. Dep=t of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990); Rosell v. Cent. W. Motor Stages, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tex. App.BDallas 2002, pet. denied). To determine whether alleged jury charge error is reversible, we consider the parties= pleadings, the evidence presented at trial, and the charge in its entirety. See Hyundai Motor Co. v. Rodriguez, 995 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. 1999). Error in the jury charge is reversible only if it probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment or probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a); Timberwalk Apts. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Tex. 1998). <br /><br />In order to analyze Exxon=s complaint, we must look at the structure of the charge. The first question submitted to the jury inquired whether Exxon committed waste. The second question, conditioned on an affirmative finding of waste, asked if Exxon acted as a reasonably prudent operator under the same or similar facts and circumstances. The third question, conditioned on the jury=s finding that Exxon did not act as a reasonably prudent operator, asked when the plaintiff-intervenors discovered or should have discovered the waste. The fourth question, conditioned on the jury=s findings that Exxon committed waste and did not act as a reasonably prudent operator, inquired about damages Aif any, that resulted from such conduct.@ The fifth question, conditioned on the jury=s finding that Exxon did not act as a reasonably prudent operator, asked if Exxon acted with malice. The jury found that Exxon acted with malice. <br /><br />Considering the court=s charge as a whole, we conclude that the jury charge adequately connected the malice question with the underlying tort of waste. The question concerning malice was predicated on findings concerning waste, and occurred sequentially in a cluster of questions regarding waste. See Samedan Oil Corp. v. Intrastate Gas Gathering, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 425, 443-44 (Tex. App.BTyler 2001, pet. granted, jdgmt. vacated w.r.m.); Bradford v. Vento, 997 S.W.2d 713, 730 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1999), rev=d on other grounds, 48 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001). Accordingly, we reject Exxon=s argument that the trial court erred in its submission of malice to the jury.<br /><br /> 2. Punitive Damages for Statutory Waste<br /><br />In attacking the award of punitive damages for waste, Exxon further contends that plaintiff-intervenors are precluded from recovering punitive damages for statutory waste. According to Exxon=s argument, because chapter 85 of the Texas Nature Resources Code does not expressly authorize the recovery of punitive damages, punitive damages may not be awarded for a finding of statutory waste. <br /><br />As an initial matter, we note that the waste question submitted to the jury combined statutory and common law waste. Therefore, punitive damages may have been predicated on a finding of common law waste. See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., 116 S.W.3d at 771. Moreover, we disagree with Exxon=s contention that the natural resources code does not allow punitive damages for waste.<br /><br /> Our goal in construing a statute is to give effect to the Legislature=s intent as expressed in the language of the statute. See Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 34 S.W.3d at 892. The plain language of section 85.321 of the natural resources code allows a party to recover Adamages and have any other relief to which he may be entitled at law or in equity.@ See Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. ' 85.321. Based on the specific expansive language used by the legislature in section 85.321, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend to preclude punitive damages as a remedy for statutory waste. See Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp, 34 S.W.3d at 892 (discussing whether punitive damages can be awarded under statute providing for Acivil liability for damages@). Moreover, this conclusion comports with analyses of other statutes that do not expressly address the award of exemplary damages. See, e.g., Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 734 S.W.2d 667, 668-69 (Tex. 1987) (considering Adamages@ in retaliatory discharge statute to include punitive damages); Castleberry v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 283 S.W. 141, 142 (Tex. Comm=n App. 1926, judgm=t adopted) (Adamages,@ unless limited, included exemplary damages under workers compensation act). Accordingly, we overrule Exxon=s sixth issue.<br /><br /> G. Statute of Limitations for Breach of Contract<br /><br />In its seventh issue, Exxon argues that the statute of limitations bars intervenors from recovering on their breach of contract claim when the intervenors filed suit against Exxon more than four years after Exxon abandoned the Mary Ellen O=Connor Field. In its eighth issue, Exxon contends that the trial court erred in allowing the intervenors to rely on fraudulent concealment to toll the running of limitations. In three subissues, Exxon argues that: (a) the evidence conclusively shows that the intervenors knew or reasonably should have known of their cause of action more than four years before they filed suit against Exxon; (b) the trial court improperly instructed the jury, over Exxon=s objection, on the elements of fraud by nondisclosure instead of the elements of fraudulent concealment; and (c) the jury=s answer to question nine of the charge was immaterial because the jury merely determined the date by which the intervenors allegedly learned of the fraudulent concealment rather than the date by which the intervenors reasonably should have known of their cause of action.<br /><br /> 1. Fraudulent Concealment<br /><br />Fraudulent concealment defers an action=s accrual period until the plaintiff learns of, or should have discovered, Athe deceitful conduct or facts giving rise to the cause of action.@ Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Tex. 1999). Fraudulent concealment is an equitable doctrine that provides a defense to the bar of limitations. Sauceda v. Kerlin, 164 S.W.3d 892, 917 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2005, pet. granted); Santanna Natural Gas Corp. v. Hamon Operating Co., 954 S.W.2d 885, 890 (Tex. App.BAustin 1997, pet. denied). Under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, the accrual of the plaintiff's cause of action is deferred because a defendant cannot be permitted to avoid liability for its actions by deceitfully concealing wrongdoing until the statute of limitations has run. Sauceda, 164 S.W.3d at 917. The essence of fraudulent concealment is (1) actual knowledge that a wrong has occurred, and (2) a fixed purpose to conceal the facts necessary for the plaintiff to know that the cause of action has accrued. Id.; Arabian Shield Dev. Co. v. Hunt, 808 S.W.2d 577, 584 (Tex. App.BDallas 1991, writ denied).<br /><br />The elements of fraudulent concealment are: (1) the existence of an underlying tort; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the tort; (3) the defendant's use of deception to conceal the tort; and (4) the plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the deception. Sauceda, 164 S.W.3d at 917; Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Bartlett, 958 S.W.2d 430, 439 (Tex. App.BFort Worth 1997, pet. denied); Arabian Shield Dev. Co., 808 S.W.2d at 585. To establish the affirmative claim of fraudulent concealment, the plaintiff has the burden of putting forth proof that raises an issue of fact with respect to that claim. Sauceda, 164 S.W.3d at 917; Santanna Natural Gas Corp., 954 S.W.2d at 890.<br /><br />Exxon contends that the evidence Aconclusively@ shows that intervenors knew or reasonably should have known of their breach of contract claim more than four years before they filed suit against Exxon.[6] Exxon contends that intervenors were aware of their contract claim when they initially filed suit for waste.<br /><br />When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807-08 (Tex. 2005).<br /><br />We conclude that the evidence supports the jury=s finding that Exxon fraudulently concealed its failure to develop the property and that intervenors neither discovered, nor in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered Exxon=s failure to develop until February 1999. According to the trial testimony, intervenors first learned that Exxon failed to develop two productive zones in 1999 when Exxon first produced certain of its well logs for the field during discovery in the instant lawsuit. <br /><br />Exxon representative Johnny Cortez testified that, during negotiations with intervenors regarding the terms of the leases, he refused to answer intervenors= questions about the field=s remaining reserves. Despite having a contractual requirement to provide intervenors with all information about its operations and the oil and gas potentialities of the Mary Ellen O=Connor Field,[7] Exxon provided intervenors with raw data about the field, but consciously and deliberately chose not to provide intervenors with interpretive data on the field. According to Cortez, when Exxon finally agreed to furnish documents to the intervenors in the form of a reading room in 1990, Exxon did not tell the intervenors that they were not providing them with the interpretive data on the field. <br /><br />Based on all the trial testimony, it is abundantly clear that intervenors took an active and inquiring role regarding development of their property and Exxon=s proposed abandonment of the lease. The intervenors specifically queried Exxon about future prospects for the field, remaining reserves, and future development possibilities. <br /><br />Morgan Dunn O=Connor testified that her understanding was that the reading room contained Aeverything@ that Exxon had pertaining to the lease. T. Michael O=Connor testified that while Exxon had initially refused to provide what it called Aproprietary@ information about the field=s potential, the reading room was to contain all information about the lease. The intervenors retained an expert to examine the documentation in the reading room to ascertain the prospects for the field.<br /><br />George Hite testified that the reading room did not include information about productive zones H12 and FS75, and that information was not produced or available to intervenors until it was produced during discovery in 1999. Exxon=s employee, Joe Wylie, who performed a reservoir analysis on the field, told the jury that his interpretive data on the field was missing. Wylie testified that it would require analysis of well files for all 121 wells on the field in order to determine which zones were productive. Exxon did not dispute that some of the well files were missing even at the time of trial. Interestingly, some of the missing well files for the field were provided to Emerald=s representatives from Quintana, Exxon=s partner in production on an adjacent field. <br /><br />We reject Exxon=s contention that the evidence Aconclusively@ shows that intervenors were aware of the breach of the development clause more than four years before they initially brought suit. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not, based on Exxon=s own documentation, the field contained additional productive zones which Exxon did not develop. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807. Exxon consciously withheld that documentation from intervenors until the instant lawsuit was filed.<br /><br /> 2. Jury Charge on Fraudulent Concealment<br /><br />We next review Exxon=s complaint about the charge. Exxon contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury, over Exxon=s objection, on the elements of fraud by nondisclosure instead of the elements of fraudulent concealment.<br /><br />In the instant case, the jury was asked if Exxon fraudulently concealed Aits failure to develop in accordance with the terms of the Oil and Gas Leases@ from the intervenors, and was instructed that:<br /><br />Fraudulent concealment occurs when B<br /><br /> <br /><br />1. a party conceals or fails to disclose a material fact within the knowledge of that party,<br /><br /> <br /><br />2. the party knows that the other party is ignorant of the fact and does not have an equal opportunity to discovery [sic] the truth,<br /><br /> <br /><br />3. the party intends to induce the other party to take some action by concealing or failing to disclose the fact, and<br /><br /> <br /><br />4. the other party suffers injury as a result of acting without knowledge of the undisclosed fact.<br /><br /> <br /><br />The jury found that Exxon fraudulently concealed its failure to develop in accordance with the terms of the oil and gas lease.<br /><br />At trial, Exxon objected to the submission of this issue as follows:<br /><br />Exxon objects to the submission of Question No. 8, because the evidence conclusively establishes that the Intervenors knew or should have known of the alleged failure to develop claim more than four years before this cause of action was brought.<br /><br /> <br /><br />Exxon further objects to the submission of Question No. 8 because this theory of recovery should not have been submitted, because the obligation is not as Plaintiffs have defined it; and if given the proper instruction, the evidence B proper construction, forgive me, the evidence conclusively establishes that Exxon fully developed the leases in question.<br /><br /> <br /><br />Exxon further objects to the submission of Question No. 8, because there is no evidence that any material fact, as opposed to an opinion, has been concealed by Exxon or Exxon has failed to disclose such to the Intervenors.<br /><br /> <br /><br />Exxon does also request in connection with Question No. 8 an appropriate submission defining fraudulent concealment. It objects that the definition given is a definition that is consistent with a fraud cause of action as opposed to a fraudulent concealment cause of action, and also requests that the Court tender the following instruction to the jury in connection with Question No. 8 if it overrules Exxon=s objections; that instruction being, fraudulent concealment ends when the party learns of facts or circumstances that would cause a reasonable person either to be aware of the existence of a cause of action or would cause a reasonable person to make inquiry that would lead to the discovery of the cause of action if pursued.<br /><br /> <br /><br />And I would like the record to reflect that I=m tendering that to the Court at this time.<br /><br /> <br /><br />I=m also tendering a correct instruction defining fraudulent concealment; that being, fraudulent concealment occurs only when a defendant has a duty to make disclosure and each of the following elements are established: A, there exists an underlying wrong; B, the Defendant has knowledge of the wrong; C, the Defendant concealed the wrong with the intent to deceive the Plaintiff; and D, the Plaintiff reasonably relies on the deception.<br /><br /> <br /><br />The instruction, or requested instruction, also continues, a duty of disclosure does not exist merely by the relationship between a royalty owner and an oil and gas lessee.[8]<br /><br /> <br /><br />Exxon relies on Advent Trust Co. v. Hyder, 12 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. App.BSan Antonio 1999, pet. denied), in arguing that the trial court improperly instructed the jury, over Exxon=s objection, on the elements of fraud by nondisclosure instead of the elements of fraudulent concealment. In Advent, however, the jury question asked whether the defendant committed fraud, not whether the defendant fraudulently concealed its tort. See id. at 541-42. The same cannot be said in the instant case. Because the question adequately addresses the relevant issue, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. See Tex. Dep=t of Human Servs., 802 S.W.2d at 649.<br /><br />Moreover, Exxon=s requested definition is not substantially correct insofar as it fails to apprise the jury that fraudulent concealment requires either the active suppression of truth or the failure to disclose when there is a duty to speak. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 278; Placensio v. Allied Indus. Int=l, Inc., 724 S.W.2d 20, 21 (Tex. 1987). The instruction also unduly limits the duty to disclose, which can arise in several situations: (1) when there is a fiduciary or confidential relationship; (2) when one voluntarily discloses information, the whole truth must be disclosed; (3) when one makes a representation, new information must be disclosed if that new information makes the earlier representation misleading or untrue; and (4) when one makes a partial disclosure and conveys a false impression. Hoggett v. Brown, 971 S.W.2d 472, 487 (Tex. App.BHouston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied). Moreover, the duty to disclose arises when one party knows that the other party is ignorant of the true facts and does not have an equal opportunity to discover the truth. Miller v. Kennedy & Minshew, Prof'l Corp., 142 S.W.3d 325, 345 (Tex. App.BFort Worth 2003, pet. denied). And, ultimately, as a fundamental matter, we conclude that, whether or not there was error in the charge, in considering the parties' pleadings, the evidence presented at trial, and the charge in its entirety, any such alleged error probably did not cause the rendition of an improper judgment. See Hyundai Motor Co., 995 S.W.2d at 663.<br /><br /> 3. Materiality of Question Nine<br /><br />Finally, Exxon contends that the jury=s answer to question nine is immaterial because the question asked when the intervenors learned that Exxon fraudulently concealed its failure to develop rather than asking when intervenors learned of their cause of action against Exxon. Question nine, predicated on an affirmative answer to question eight, asked the jury: ABy what date, if any, did Plaintiff-Intervenors know or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known that Exxon fraudulently concealed its failure to fully develop under the Oil and Gas leases?@ According to the jury=s response, plaintiff-intervenors knew or should have known of the failure to fully develop by February 1999.<br /><br />In discussing the relevant accrual date in fraudulent concealment cases, the Texas Supreme Court has utilized language similar to that submitted to the jury in the instant case. Shah v. Moss, 67 S.W.3d 836, 841 (Tex. 2001) (fraudulent concealment tolls limitations until the plaintiff discovers or could have discovered Athe fraud@); Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Tex. 1999) (fraudulent concealment tolls the running of limitations until such time as the plaintiff learned of, or should have discovered, Athe deceitful conduct or the facts giving rise to the cause of action@); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 750 (Tex. 1999) (limitations does not begin to run until the claimant, using reasonable diligence, discovered or should have discovered Athe injury@); Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 352 n.1 (Tex. 1990) (defendant is estopped from relying on the defense of limitations until the party learns of Athe right of action@). Accordingly we overrule this issue.<br /><br /> H. Breach of Contract<br /><br />In its ninth issue, Exxon argues that, Aas a matter of law,@ it complied with the unambiguous terms of its leases. In its first subissue, Exxon argues that the intervenors= interpretation of the leases= development clauses Aimproperly@ continued to impose a duty of development on Exxon even after the leases terminated in 1990. In a second subissue, Exxon further contends that the intervenors= interpretation of the leases ignores the legal effect of the habendum clauses, which provide that the leases would remain in effect only for so long as Exxon produced oil or gas in paying quantities. Finally, in its third subissue, Exxon contends that the intervenors= interpretation of the leases improperly ignores the legal effect of the surrender clauses, which allowed Exxon to surrender its rights back to the intervenors at any time.<br /><br />In construing an unambiguous oil and gas lease our task is to ascertain the parties' intentions as expressed in the lease. Heritage Res. v. Nationsbank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996); Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 727‑28 (Tex. 1981). To achieve this goal, we examine the entire document and consider each part with every other part so that the effect and meaning of one part on any other part may be determined. Heritage Res., 939 S.W.2d at 121; Steeger v. Beard Drilling Co., 371 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Tex. 1963). We presume that the parties to a contract intend every clause to have some effect. Heritage Res., 939 S.W.2d at 121; Ogden v. Dickinson State Bank, 662 S.W.2d 330, 331 (Tex. 1983). We give terms their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning unless the instrument shows that the parties used them in a technical or different sense. Heritage Resources, 939 S.W.2d at 121; Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 Tex. 559, 261 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. 1953). We will enforce an unambiguous document as written. Sun Oil Co., 626 S.W.2d at 728.<br /><br />Exxon=s argument under this issue and subissues focuses not on the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence but on the relationship between three contractual clauses in the leases: the development clauses, the habendum clauses, and the surrender clauses.[9]<br /><br />The development clauses provide, in part, if a well were completed as a producer of oil or gas in paying quantities, that Athe lessee covenants and agrees to prosecute diligently a continuous drilling and development program until said tract is fully developed for oil or gas.@ Under the leases, a tract is deemed to be fully developed when at least one well has been drilled and completed in each horizon or stratum capable of producing in paying quantities for each specified spacing protocol.<br /><br /> A lease's habendum clause defines the mineral estate's duration. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Southland Royalty Co., 496 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex. 1973). For instance, a typical habendum clause states that the lease lasts for a relatively short fixed term of years (primary term) and then "as long thereafter as oil, gas or other mineral is produced" (secondary term). See, e.g., Reid, 337 S.W.2d at 269 n.1; see also 1 Smith & Weaver, Texas Law of Oil & Gas ' 4.3 (1996). In Texas, a habendum clause requires actual production in paying quantities. Reid, 337 S.W.2d at 269‑70; Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. 1942). The term Aproduction@ is substantially equivalent to Aproduction in paying quantities@ even though the lease does not define production in those precise terms. Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684, 690 (1959).<br /><br />In Texas, parties to an oil and gas lease may validly include a provision allowing the lessee to surrender all or part of the lease. Ridge Oil Co. v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 152‑53 (Tex. 2004). The surrender clauses in the instant leases provide:<br /><br />Lessee may at any time surrender and relinquish any part or portion of the lands covered by this lease . . . by executing and delivering to lessor a legally sufficient instrument of release . . . . Such release shall, upon the date of its delivery, terminate this lease as to the lands and sands therein released, but the lessee shall not thereby in any way be relieved or released of any past due charges or of performing any obligations which may have accrued under this lease prior to time of delivery of such release . . . . Neither can lessee by such release to lessor relieve themselves of all of the obligations assumed by lessee in Article 3 [the development clause] of this lease.<br /><br /> <br /><br />Exxon contends that, as a matter of law, it did not breach the unambiguous terms of its leases. According to Exxon, the intervenors contend that Exxon should have recompleted some of its wells in commercially productive zones even after Exxon could no longer profitably produce any oil and gas from the field, and this interpretation of the lease ignores the legal effect of the habendum and surrender clauses. Exxon points to the testimony of its reservoir engineer, Joel Wylie, who testified that Exxon could no longer produce oil or gas profitably from the field by the summer of 1990. <br /><br />We disagree with Exxon=s contentions. As a fundamental matter, Exxon=s contentions fail to account for and harmonize the surrender clauses, which expressly prohibit surrender of the leases unless the tracts have been fully developed. According to Exxon, it had the right to surrender any area whether there was a producing well on it or not and regardless of the capacity of any well that might be on it. See Rhoads Drilling Co. v. Allred, 123 Tex. 229, 70 S.W.2d 576, 585 (Tex. 1934). However, the surrender clauses at issue in this case are made expressly subject to the development obligation, and we harmonize these provisions and give effect to both. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Tex. 1999).<br /><br />According to the testimony at trial, the tracts had not been fully developed for all productive zones. Moreover, while Exxon contends that the lease was no longer capable of producing in paying quantities, this issue was a matter that was hotly disputed at trial. Hite testified that the leases were capable of producing in paying quantities until 1999. Testimony further indicates that Exxon did not drill and complete wells in two productive horizons, H12 and FS75.<br /><br />Although the habendum clause generally controls the mineral estate's duration, other clauses may extend the habendum clause's term. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, 94 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex. 2002); Southland Royalty, 496 S.W.2d at 552. When a lease terminates Ais always a question of resolving the intention of the parties from the entire instrument.@ Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 94 S.W.3d at 554; Southland Royalty, 496 S.W.2d at 552. Based on the leases as a whole, we conclude that the habendum and surrender clauses here were controlled by the development requirement, which Exxon failed to meet. Therefore, we overrule Exxon=s ninth issue and subissues.<br /><br /> I. Double Recovery<br /><br />In its final two issues, Exxon argues that the trial court=s judgment improperly awards the intervenors a double recovery. First, in issue number ten, Exxon argues that questions four and ten of the court=s charge violate the single satisfaction rule by allowing the intervenors to recover twice for the alleged loss of the same reserves. In its eleventh and final issue, Exxon argues that the trial court=s award of $18,600,000 amounts to an impermissible double recovery for the intervenors.<br /><br />A party is generally entitled to sue and to seek damages on alternative theories. Waite Hill Servs., Inc. v. World Class Metal Works, Inc., 959 S.W.2d 182, 184 (Tex. 1998). A party is not, however, entitled to a double recovery, which exists when a plaintiff obtains more than one recovery for the same injury. See id. Under the one satisfaction rule, a plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery for any damages suffered. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 390 (Tex. 2000); Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1991); see Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99, 84 S.W.2d 703, 705 (1935). This rule applies when multiple defendants commit the same act as well as when defendants commit technically different acts that result in a single injury. Crown Life Ins. Co., 22 S.W.3d at 390. Thus, notwithstanding an alternative theory of liability, a double recovery will result if multiple damage awards are the result of one injury. Birchfield v. Texarkana Mem'l Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 367 (Tex. 1987). When the prevailing party fails to elect between alternative measures of damages, the court should render the judgment affording the greatest recovery. Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 441 (Tex. 1995).<br /><br />Exxon contends that the damage awards for waste in question four and breach of contract in question ten are duplicative. The jury awarded $5,000,000 for waste, considering as elements of damages the cost to drill new wells, the value of the minerals that could not be recovered, and the loss of bonus payments. With regard to the breach of contract claim, in question ten the jury found that Exxon failed to comply with the contractual requirement that A. . . Lessee covenants and agrees to prosecute diligently a continuous drilling and development program until said tract is fully developed for oil and gas.@ The jury awarded $3,600,000 as the amount, Ain reasonable probability, the Plaintiff-Intervenors would have received for the minerals produced had Exxon fully developed the Oil and Gas Leases less the costs of operation and production and any royalty received from Emerald Oil & Gas L.C.@<br /><br />Exxon argues that these damage awards overlap because they award damages for the same reserves, that is, those minerals which Exxon failed to produce before plugging its wells and those which remained in the ground after Emerald unsuccessfully tried to reenter the wells. <br /><br />When a plaintiff pleads alternate theories of liability, judgment awarding damages on more than one theory may stand if the theories of liability arise from separate and distinct injuries and separate and distinct damage findings are entered on each theory of liability. See Birchfield, 747 S.W.2d at 367; Baribeau v. Gustafson, 107 S.W.3d 52, 60 (Tex. App.BSan Antonio 2003, pet. denied).<br /><br />Cases holding that a judgment based on both alternate grounds of recovery is an impermissible double recovery involve situations in which there is only one injury, the theories of liability are mutually exclusive, or there are not separate damage findings based on the alternate theories of liability. Borden, Inc. v. Guerra, 860 S.W.2d 515, 528‑29 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1993, writ dism=d); see Southern Cty. Mut. v. First Bank & Trust, 750 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. 1988); Birchfield, 747 S.W.2d at 367; Auto Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Davila, 805 S.W.2d 897, 902 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1991, no writ).<br /><br />In the instant case, the intervenors= damages were separate and distinct, that is (1) damages for the failure to develop under the leases, and (2) damages for the destruction of the wellbores and the consequent loss of reserves. The theories of breach of contract and waste are not mutually exclusive. We conclude that the jury properly awarded separate and distinct damage awards based on each theory. We overrule this issue.<br /><br />Having overruled all of Exxon=s issues on appeal, the judgment against Exxon and in favor of the intervenors is affirmed.<br /><br /> III. Intervenors= Appeal<br /><br />Intervenors request that this Court affirm the trial court=s judgment awarding damages for waste and breach of contract; however, if this Court Atakes any other action on this appeal,@ intervenors request that we reverse the trial court=s order granting a directed verdict against intervenors and remand for trial intervenors= claims against Exxon for (1) tortious interference with economic opportunity, (2) negligence and gross negligence, (3) negligence per se, (4) fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and (5) breach of regulatory duty. <br /><br />Because we affirm the trial court=s judgment in favor of intervenors, we need not reach these additional issues. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. <br /><br /> IV. Emerald=s Appeal<br /><br />Emerald appeals the trial court=s granting of a directed verdict on its remaining common-law causes of action. In three issues, Emerald argues that the trial court erred in granting Exxon=s motion for a directed verdict on Emerald=s causes of action for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and tortious interference with economic opportunity. <br /><br />A directed verdict is proper when: (1) a defect in the opponent=s pleading makes the pleading insufficient to support a judgment; (2) the evidence conclusively proves a fact that establishes a party=s right to judgment as a matter of law; or (3) the evidence offered on a cause of action is insufficient to raise an issue of fact. Encina P=ship v. CORENERGY, L.L.C., 50 S.W.3d 66, 68 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2001, pet. denied). In reviewing a directed verdict, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the party suffering the adverse judgment and we decide whether there is any evidence of probative value to raise an issue of material fact on the question presented. Bostrom Seating, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., 140 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. 2004).<br /><br /> A. Fraud<br /><br />To prevail on its claim for fraud, Emerald must prove that: (1) Exxon made a material representation that was false; (2) it knew the representation was false or made it recklessly as a positive assertion without any knowledge of its truth; (3) it intended to induce Emerald to act upon the representation; and (4) Emerald actually and justifiably relied upon the representation and thereby suffered injury. Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2001).<br /><br />One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is liable to the persons or class of persons whom he intends, or has reason to expect, to act in reliance upon the misrepresentation for pecuniary loss suffered by them through their justifiable reliance, in the type of transaction in which he intends or has reason to expect their conduct to be influenced. Id. at 578. Even an obvious risk that a misrepresentation might be repeated to a third party is not enough to satisfy the reason‑to‑expect standard; rather, the alleged fraudfeasor must have information that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that there is Aan especial likelihood that it will reach those persons and will influence their conduct.@ Id. at 580. Further, mere foreseeability will not meet the reason‑to‑expect standard; instead, the claimant's reliance must be Aespecially likely@ and justifiable, and the transaction sued upon must be of the type contemplated by the defendant. Id.<br /><br />Emerald argues that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on its cause of action for fraud because there is evidence that Exxon intended that Emerald rely on Exxon=s representations in the public filings with the Railroad Commission. Exxon responds that it could not have intended to induce Emerald to act in reliance on Exxon=s filings at the Commission when Emerald did not exist at the time those filings were made. Exxon also argues that evidence that Exxon should have known that remote subsequent operators might rely on representations in its Commission filings does not satisfy the intent requirement for a viable fraud cause of action. Exxon finally argues that there was no evidence that Exxon actually knew that a class of remote subsequent operators might rely on representations contained in Exxon=s Commission filings.<br /><br />We disagree with Exxon=s contentions. Examining the evidence at trial in the light most favorable to Emerald, we believe that there is some evidence of probative value sufficient to raise an issue of material fact on Emerald=s fraud claim. Bostrom Seating, Inc., 140 S.W.3d at 684. Exxon made material misrepresentations on its W-3 reports regarding many of the wells at issue in this proceeding. There was substantial testimony from the trial witnesses, including Exxon=s own witnesses, that Exxon knew subsequent lessees and operators would rely on such filings to make business decisions regarding the wells. Exxon also knew that Emerald=s predecessor was interested in leasing the property. We conclude that the foregoing is adequate evidence to satisfy the element of intent. See Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Tex. 1986) (circumstantial evidence of fraud may also be used to support a finding of fraudulent intent). Emerald leased the property, relying on Exxon=s public filings with the Railroad Commission, to its financial detriment. Accordingly we sustain Emerald=s first issue.<br /><br /> B. Negligent Misrepresentation<br /><br />To prevail on a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must demonstrate four elements: (1) the defendant made a representation in the course of his business or in a transaction in which the defendant has a pecuniary interest; (2) the defendant supplied false information for the guidance of others in their business; (3) the defendant did not exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information; and (4) the plaintiff suffered pecuniary loss by justifiably relying on the defendant=s representation. Fed. Land Bank Ass=n of Tyler v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1991); Allied Vista, Inc. v. Holt, 987 S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex. App.BHouston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).<br /><br />Exxon argues that the statute of limitations bars Emerald=s causes of action for negligent misrepresentation because the evidence conclusively establishes that Emerald knew of its alleged injury more than two years before it filed suit against Exxon. However, we have already determined that the discovery rule applies, and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Emerald, there is probative evidence that Emerald did not discover Exxon=s tortious conduct until January 1995 when Lynch received Exxon documents from Quintana Petroleum, Exxon=s partner in another lease. Because Emerald filed suit less than two years after receiving these documents, the statute of limitations was not violated. <br /><br />Exxon also contends that there is no evidence that Exxon made the representations in its Form W-3s for the purpose of guiding Emerald in the conduct of its business. Liability under section 552 is limited to those providers of information who (1) intend to supply the information to, or know the recipient of the information intends to supply the information to, a particular person or limited group, and (2) intends the person or limited group to rely on the information, or knows the person or limited group intends to rely on the information, for a particular or substantially similar transaction. Restatement (Second) of Torts ' 552(2) (1977); McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. F.E. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 794 (Tex. 1999).<br /><br />In the instant case, as previously discussed, it was virtually undisputed that operators routinely and as a matter of course rely on the public filings with the Railroad Commission in making decisions regarding operations. Exxon knew this. Exxon thus supplied information to a limited group and anticipated that it would be relied upon by that group. Id. Accordingly, we sustain Emerald=s second issue.<br /><br /> C. Tortious Interference with Economic Opportunity<br /><br />In its third issue, Emerald argues that Exxon was not entitled to a directed verdict on Emerald=s cause of action for tortious interference with contract or economic opportunity. In reply, Exxon argues that there is no evidence that it interfered with an existing contract or with Emerald=s prospective business or contractual relations. Finally, Exxon argues that Emerald=s claims for tortious interference with economic opportunity is barred by the statute of limitations.[10] As an initial matter, we note that we have already resolved the issue of limitations against Exxon and need not further discuss it herein. <br /><br />Exxon correctly contends that tortious interference with contract requires an existing contract. The elements of tortious interference with an existing contract are: (1) an existing contract subject to interference; (2) a willful and intentional act of interference with the contract; (3) that proximately caused the plaintiff's injury; and (4) caused actual damages or loss. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Review Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. 2000). <br /><br />As determined by the pleadings, however, Emerald did not contend that Exxon interfered with an existing contract. Emerald=s live pleading includes a section entitled Atortious interference with economic opportunity.@ The text of this section states that Exxon=s acts constituted intentional sabotage of the wells and the acts were calculated to cause damage to Emerald or any subsequent lessee who sought to develop or redevelop the field. The text concludes, in part, that Exxon=s actions made Emerald=s performance under its lease Amore burdensome, difficult or impossible or of a less or no value . . . .@ <br /><br />Texas law protects existing as well as prospective contracts from interference. Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex. 1989). The tort of interference with contracts embraces all intentional invasions of contractual relations, including any act interfering with the performance of a contract, regardless of whether breach of contract is induced. Samedan Oil Corp. v. Intrastate Gas Gathering, 78 S.W.3d 425, 446 (Tex. App.BTyler 2001, pet. dism=d by agr.); Tippett v. Hart, 497 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tex. Civ. App.BAmarillo 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). It follows that where the intentional acts of a person serve to frustrate the purpose of another's contract with a third party, thereby causing damage, such acts constitute the requisite interference. Samedan Oil Corp., 78 S.W.3d at 447; Hughes v. Houston Nw. Med. Ctr., 680 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Tex. App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Interference includes any act which retards, makes more difficult, or prevents performance. Seelbach v. Clubb, 7 S.W.3d 749, 757 (Tex. App.BTexarkana 1999, pet. denied).<br /><br />As early as July 1989, Exxon knew that Pace Production Company, a predecessor of Emerald, was interested in leasing the property in question. Exxon=s conduct in filing false Form W-3 plugging reports and in effectively sabotaging the wells to prevent or hamper reentry interfered with Emerald=s performance under its lease with the intervenors. Emerald sustained costs far in excess of those that would have been reasonable and necessary costs for the redevelopment of the Mary Ellen O=Connor Field. Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to Emerald, we conclude that there is evidence of probative value raising an issue of material fact on the question presented. Bostrom Seating, Inc., 140 S.W.3d at 684. We sustain Emerald=s third issue. <br /><br />Having sustained Emerald=s issues, we reverse the trial court=s order granting a directed verdict on Emerald=s causes of action for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and tortious interference, and remand those issues for the jury's determination.<br /><br /> V. Conclusion<br /><br />The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. Having overruled Exxon=s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in favor of the royalty interest owners. We sustain Emerald=s issues on appeal and reverse and remand its causes of action to the trial court. <br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br />Rogelio Valdez,<br /><br />Chief Justice<br /><br /> <br /><br /> <br /><br />Opinion delivered and filed<br /><br />this 29th day of November, 2005.<br /><br />[1] The royalty interest owners are Laurie T. Miesch, Molly Miesch Allen, Michael Miesch, Jack Miesch, Janie Miesch Robertson, Morgan Frances Dunn O=Connor, Brien O=Connor Dunn, Kelly Patricia Dunn Schaar, Bridey Kathleen Dunn Greeson, T. Michael O=Connor and Nancy O=Connor.<br /><br />[2] Prior to trial, the trial court granted Exxon's motion for summary judgment on Emerald's statutory causes of action and severed the summary judgment. Emerald appealed the summary judgment. This Court reversed the trial court=s judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Court=s opinion. See Emerald Oil and Gas, L.C. v. Exxon Corp., No. 13-99-757-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 591, *16 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi Jan. 27, 2005, pet. filed). <br /><br />[3] The leases are substantially similar. Any relevant distinctions between the leases will be discussed herein as necessary.<br /><br />[4] Exxon plugged the wells at the field by cutting, but not pulling or removing, the well casing. According to testimony at trial, the standard plugging procedure was to perforate casing and leave it in place, rather than cutting it, during plugging. If casing were to be cut during the plugging process, it would ordinarily be pulled from the wellbore. Cut casing, as opposed to perforated casing, was a continuing impediment to reentry because of its propensity to shift in the wellbore and the high probability of future loss of the wellbore or a portion of the well.<br /><br />[5] Question one asked:<br /><br /> <br /><br />Did Exxon commit waste on property or production in which the Plaintiff‑Intervenors own an interest?<br /><br /> <br /><br />"Waste" means, among other things, B<br /><br /> <br /><br />a. underground waste or loss, however caused; or<br /><br /> <br /><br />b. physical waste or loss incident to or resulting from drilling, equipping, locating, spacing, or operating a well or wells in a manner that reduces or tends to reduce the total ultimate recovery or oil or gas from any pool; or<br /><br /> <br /><br />c. surface or subsurface waste of hydrocarbons, including the physical or economic waste or loss of hydrocarbons; or<br /><br /> <br /><br />d. whatever dictates of reason, fairness, and good judgment under all the facts would lead one to conclude is wasteful.<br /><br /> <br /><br />Subsections a, b, and c closely track the statutory language of section 85.045 subsections 3, 6, and 11. Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. ' 85.045(3), (6), (11). Subsection d follows the common law rule of waste as dictated by the Texas Supreme Court in R.R. Comm=n v. Shell Oil Co., 206 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1947); see R.R. Comm=n v. Rowan Oil Co., 152 Tex. 439, 259 S.W.2d 173 (1953).<br /><br />[6] We note that Exxon=s contention herein drastically differs from its position when it filed a motion for continuance of the trial based on intervenors= amended petition including the breach of development claim. At that time, Exxon stated that the Apredominant theory of the case appears to have changed substantially.@ According to Exxon=s motion, the case had been based on AExxon=s alleged improper plugging of the wells . . . and alleged waste of the hydrocarbons@ on the leases, but the amended petition raised Exxon=s Aalleged failure to develop those leases before it surrendered them in 1991.@<br /><br />[7] The leases provide: ALessor shall at all times be entitled to full information covering all of lessee=s operations on the leased premises or otherwise pertinent to lessor=s interests. To this end, lessor, through her representative or representatives duly designated from time to time in writing, shall have free access to all operations conducted by lessee upon the leased premises and, at all reasonable times, to all of lessee=s records and data pertaining thereto. Further, lessee shall furnish lessor, or lessor=s duly accredited agent, copies of all logs, geological and geophysical reports, core analyses and all other such data and information available to lessee pertaining to the leased premises, their oil and gas potentialities and the investigating, exploration, development and producing operations conducted thereon by lessee, and all such instruments and information and data shall become the property of lessor.@<br /><br />[8] On appeal, Exxon argues that the submitted question omits the element of reliance; however, Exxon did not raise this objection at trial and accordingly we will not consider it on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.<br /><br />[9] The four leases are not identical; however, the differences do not affect the analysis herein.<br /><br />[10] On appeal, Exxon argues that Texas law does not recognize a cause of action for interference with economic opportunity separate and apart from causes of action for tortious interference with an existing contract or with known prospective business or contractual relations. Exxon did not raise this issue in its motion for directed verdict and did not reference it in argument to the trial court. Accordingly, we need not consider it here. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.dannoynted1http://www.blogger.com/profile/14945400306838778051noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22129949.post-1160124202180856052006-10-06T01:24:00.000-07:002006-10-06T01:43:22.263-07:00This is the html version of the file <a href="http://www.csa-dc.org/documents/Oct.2005mag.pp.1-30_000.pdf">http://www.csa-dc.org/documents/Oct.2005mag.pp.1-30_000.pdf</a>.G o o g l e automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web.To link to or bookmark this page, use the following url: http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:uYFvCbZDu0EJ:www.csa-dc.org/documents/Oct.2005mag.pp.1-30_000.pdf+%22hcrs%22+laurel+maryland&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=10<br />Google is neither affiliated with the authors of this page nor responsible for its content.<br />These search terms have been highlighted:<br />hcrs<br />laurel<br />maryland<br />Page 1<br />Contract Services Association<br />Service Contractor/Fall 2005<br />/ 1<br />TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S<br />A Publication of the<br />Contract Services Association<br />1000 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1800<br />Arlington, VA 22209<br />Phone: 703-243-2020<br />Fax: 703-243-3601<br />Website: www.csa-dc.org<br />All Rights Reserved<br />Publisher<br />Chris Jahn<br />Editor<br />Cathy Garman<br />Advertising Manager<br />Jenny Adlakha<br />2<br />President's Page<br />4<br />Ethics and Compliance:<br />A Perfect Storm of<br />Scandal<br />11<br />CSA’s DAY on<br />Capitol Hill<br />12<br />Looking Ahead to Win<br />More Business<br />13<br />International Business<br />in Defense<br />15<br />New Frontier of Defense<br />Consolidations<br />17<br />Investing: Size Matters<br />21<br />HR and Labor Laws:<br />CSA Training and<br />Certification Program<br />23<br />Leadership and Ethics:<br />A Personal View<br />26<br />Membership Directory<br />31<br />A Split in the Unions<br />32<br />Health and Welfare Cost<br />Increases<br />35<br />Public Policy Corner:<br />GSA Reorganizes!<br />37<br />Tension between IDIQ<br />and Terminations<br />40<br />CSA’s Platinum Sponsors<br />42<br />Meet A New Member –<br />Fluor<br />43<br />Meet A Long Time<br />Member – IAP Worldwide<br />Services<br />45<br />Schedule of Events<br />47<br />Board of Directors<br />49<br />Member News<br />51<br />CSA’s Strategic Partners<br />52<br />Executive Committee<br />Members<br />Advertiser Index<br />F a l l 2 0 0 5 / P u b l i s h e d b y t h e C o n t r a c t S e r v i c e s A s s o c i a t i o n<br />Page 2<br />2 /<br />Service Contractor / Fall 2005<br />Contract Services Association<br />MEMO FROM THE PRESIDENT<br />F<br />or the first time ever, CSA is publishing a membership<br />directory for public distribution. As the nation’s largest<br />and oldest association of Government service contractors,<br />it is past time CSA publicized the good works of our mem-<br />bership and what they do for our country. CSA members<br />are providing a broad range of support services to our mili-<br />tary serving in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the globe as<br />well as helping to defend the homeland – and in this latest<br />tragedy, helping to rebuild the communities devastated by<br />Hurricane Katrina. Unfortunately, the positive impact of<br />this work is overshadowed by isolated contracting abuses –<br />a mere handful of cases out of over 30 million contracting<br />actions and $300 billion in spending on goods and services<br />by the Federal government. The fact is, without service<br />contractors’ leadership and support, the Government<br />would cease to function. This trend will accelerate over the<br />next five to ten years as nearly half of Federal employees are<br />eligible to retire.<br />That is why it is sometimes so disheartening to hear<br />the rhetoric coming from Capitol Hill. As this magazine<br />goes to print, CSA is working to fight back efforts to legis-<br />late by anecdote in reaction to the so-called contracting<br />abuses that would severely damage the Federal acquisition<br />process. This misguided legislation includes:<br />• A proposal being considered in the Senate to stop what<br />proponents claim is the ability of prime contractors to<br />“game the system” to earn excessive profits. The<br />Government uses Time & Material contracts when<br />outcomes are open-ended and, therefore, difficult to<br />price accurately. The Senate proposal would require<br />prime contractors to “pass through” subcontractor rates<br />to the Government, with no allowance for risk or<br />overhead. Small and medium-sized firms could be par-<br />ticularly hurt by the proposal.<br />• A proposal in the Senate version of the FY06 Defense<br />Authorization bill to consolidate the acquisition of all<br />DOD services above the simplified acquisition thresh-<br />old ($100,000) in four new Contract Support<br />Acquisition Centers—one for each of the military<br />departments and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).<br />However, removing authority for the acquisition of<br />services from the program offices would distance<br />contracting officials from the DOD end users they,<br />and the contractor, are expected to support. The four<br />centers would operate as an additional layer of admin-<br />istrative bureaucracy between Government program<br />managers, and the defense contractor working on<br />management and technical services, information tech-<br />nology, and perhaps even lead systems integrator-type<br />contracts for a specific program office.<br />• A provision adopted by the House that would terminate<br />a contract awarded to the private sector to operate FAA<br />flight service centers. The 10-year $1.9 billion contract<br />is expected to produce better service and over $2.2 bil-<br />lion in savings over the period. Terminating the contract<br />would mean the loss of those savings, plus the<br />Government would be required to pay the contractor<br />substantial termination fees.<br />• A provision adopted by the House that would termi-<br />nate the GSA e-Travel program. Contrary to claims,<br />the program is expected to eliminate waste, fraud,<br />abuse, and redundancy while consolidating and stream-<br />lining travel polices to bring anticipated savings of over<br />$450M in the first 10 years for taxpayers.<br />• Provisions included in the House version of the FY06<br />defense authorization and appropriations bills that<br />would sharply curtail the Defense Department’s ability<br />to undertake competitive sourcing initiatives to achieve<br />needed savings.<br />On a more positive note, CSA is supporting legislation<br />that would repeal legal restrictions on outsourcing at the<br />Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). There are over<br />50,000 positions and $5 billion of commercial work from<br />low tech to high tech that is off-limits to the private sector<br />due to existing law. These restrictions are tragic not only<br />because of the better services our nation’s veterans would<br />receive but also the savings the private sector could gener-<br />ate at the VA could be put to use to help the men and<br />women who have served this country so selflessly.<br />As part of CSA’s advocacy program on these important<br />legislative issues, in July, we held our first ever “Day on<br />Capitol Hill.” CSA members came to sweltering<br />Washington, DC to turn up the heat on their members of<br />Congress regarding issues important to Federal services<br />contractors, including competitive sourcing and funda-<br />mentally reforming the acquisition process. CSA members<br />held dozens of meetings with Senators, Congressmen and<br />their staffs. As Congress continues to legislate (some would<br />say micro-manage) the procurement process, it is vital that<br />they hear from constituents that those changes in law<br />impact. CSA has a top-notch staff fighting for your inter-<br />ests, but nothing moves legislation like hearing from the<br />folks at home. I hope that I will see you at next year’s “Day<br />on Capitol Hill.”<br />Page 3<br />Since 1965, CSA has served as the leading advocate for Federal service contractors in Washington,<br />DC. Want to know how you can benefit from CSA’s public policy access and influence? Please<br />contact us today at 703-243-2020 or by email at info@csa-dc.org for more information.<br />SA serves as the government services industry’s voice<br />in Washington, DC. And when CSA speaks on its<br />members' behalf, leaders, Congress, the White House and<br />Federal agencies listen. What’s more, CSA sets its public-<br />policy positions by regularly polling members and acting on<br />their advice. As a member of CSA, you can trust that your<br />voice will be heard.<br />Relyonanadvocatewith<br />a proven track record<br />“CSA has been<br />a champion for the<br />service contract<br />industry on Capitol Hill<br />and throughout the<br />Federal government.”<br />—Representative<br />Todd Tiahrt (R-KS),<br />key member of the House<br />Appropriations Committee<br />C<br />Page 4<br />4 /<br />Service Contractor / Fall 2005<br />Contract Services Association<br />Page 5<br />T<br />hese are tumultuous times for<br />contractor compliance. The<br />recent storm of procurement<br />scandals ran headlong into a<br />wave of Sarbanes-Oxley con-<br />cerns with corporate governance. At the<br />same time, as the Government has repeat-<br />edly stressed, “with revenue comes respon-<br />sibility,” [see, www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/<br />GetItRight_ final.ppt#10], and Federal<br />officials are likely to put more pressure on<br />contractors to bear responsibility for ensur-<br />ing integrity. On a third front, and to<br />finish this “perfect storm,” recent changes<br />to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines have<br />raised the bar for all corporate compliance<br />programs, across the private sector, and<br />Federal procurement regulations are likely<br />to follow in the Guidelines’ path. Whether<br />to strengthen compliance programs in<br />Federal procurement will be a relatively<br />easy decision. The harder question will<br />be whether, for the first time, Federal<br />contractors should be required to imple-<br />ment compliance programs.<br />A good deal of guidance already exists<br />on how Federal contractors can erect<br />compliance systems to ensure that their<br />personnel follow the law. Current Federal<br />procurement regulations and the U.S.<br />Sentencing Commission’s Organizational<br />Sentencing Guidelines, discussed below,<br />sketch out the basic elements of a compli-<br />ance system. The Defense Industry<br />Initiative on Business Ethics and Conduct<br />(DII), a consortium of many of the largest<br />companies in the defense industry,<br />provides basic training materials and links<br />to a variety of resources for firms intent<br />upon establishing sound compliance<br />systems [see, www.dii.org].<br />The Druyun scandal, discussed further<br />below, offers a textbook case of a flawed<br />compliance system. Even with a formida-<br />ble compliance system in place, a contrac-<br />tor can stumble as problems work their<br />way through the cracks and fissures in any<br />compliance system. What’s frightening,<br />however, is that many contractors – partic-<br />ularly newcomers, with only a hazy under-<br />standing of Federal contracting rules –<br />have no compliance system whatsoever.<br />A.Sentencing Guidelines Reforms<br />Raise the Bar<br />Most well-established contractors, as<br />publicly traded companies, are required to<br />set up internal compliance systems under<br />the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Those<br />compliance systems, however, generally go<br />to financial compliance and do not reach<br />contractors’ special obligations under the<br />Federal procurement laws, including, most<br />importantly, contractors’ procurement<br />integrity requirements. [See generally<br />Elizabeth W. Fleming, Sarbanes-Oxley:<br />New Considerations for Corporate Counsel,<br />38 P<br />ROCUREMENT<br />L<br />AW<br />. 7 (Winter 2003)].<br />The Defense Federal Acquisition<br />Regulation Supplement (DFARS) and<br />several other FAR supplements call for<br />nonmandatory compliance systems (e.g.,<br />DFARS 203.70010). [See generally<br />Christopher R. Yukins, Ethics in<br />Procurement: New Challenges After a<br />Contract Services Association<br />Service Contractor/Fall 2005<br />/ 5<br />by Christopher R.Yukins<br />Associate Professor of Government Contract Law<br />The George Washington University Law School,<br />Washington,D.C.<br />1<br />Ethics and Compliance:<br />A Perfect Storm<br />of Scandal<br />1<br />This piece was adapted from a copyrighted paper presented by the author and Professor Steven Schooner at Thomson West’s Government Contracts Year in Review in<br />February 2005. This reproduction has been made with the permission of West, a Thomson business, 901 15th Street, NW, Suite 230, Washington, D.C. 20005 (202-<br />337-7000). Further reproduction or use without the permission of West, a Thomson business is prohibited.<br />Page 6<br />6 /<br />Service Contractor / Fall 2005<br />Contract Services Association<br />Decade of Reform, P<br />ROCUREMENT<br />L<br />AW<br />., 3<br />(Spring 2003)]. These rules instruct con-<br />tractors to establish compliance systems<br />with the following elements: a code of<br />ethics, training, audit and reporting sys-<br />tems, discipline for employee misconduct,<br />reporting of failures, and cooperation with<br />any Government investigation.<br />Traditionally, most major contractors<br />follow the compliance recommendations<br />for organizations published by the<br />Sentencing Commission, through the<br />Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In the<br />past, the compliance system contemplated<br />by these Sentencing Guidelines largely<br />mirrored the compliance system suggested<br />by the DFARS. This was by design, so that<br />contractors could simultaneously comply<br />with both regulatory regimes. [See general-<br />ly Richard Bednar, Emerging Issues in<br />Suspension and Debarment: Some<br />Observations from an Experienced Head,<br />2004 P<br />UB<br />. P<br />ROC<br />. L. R<br />EV<br />. 223, 225-26].<br />The Sentencing Guidelines were<br />recently strengthened, however, to impose<br />much stricter requirements for organiza-<br />tional (e.g., corporate) compliance systems.<br />The chart below compares the newly<br />revised Sentencing Guidelines to the<br />traditional DFARS recommendations:<br />As the chart reflects, the revised<br />Sentencing Guidelines trigger at least three<br />potential areas of new compliance obliga-<br />tions, not specifically addressed under the<br />existing DFARS guidance [see U.S.<br />Sentencing Commission, Federal<br />Sentencing Guidelines §8B2.1, Effective<br />Compliance and Ethics Program, effective<br />Nov. 1, 2004, (hereinafter “Federal<br />Sentencing Guidelines”), available at<br />www.ussc.gov/2004guid/8b2_1.htm]:<br />• Knowledgeable Leadership:<br />Corporate leadership must, under the<br />revised Sentencing Guidelines, be<br />fully briefed on how the corporation’s<br />compliance effort is addressing a spe-<br />cific compliance threat. Corporate<br />leaders are responsible for ensuring<br />that their firms have effective compli-<br />ance programs in place. Lower-level<br />personnel may be tasked with imple-<br />menting those programs, but senior<br />corporate leaders should be briefed<br />regularly. Because the effectiveness of<br />a contractor’s compliance program<br />will turn, in part, on the contractor’s<br />ability to remold its compliance strat-<br />egy to accommodate lessons from the<br />recent scandals (see below), corporate<br />leaders likely will be looking to opera-<br />tional personnel for answers on<br />whether, and how, their corporations’<br />compliance programs are accommo-<br />dating the new challenges.<br />• Excluding Personnel Who Raise<br />Compliance Risks: As part of an<br />effective compliance program, a corpo-<br />ration is now expected to exclude from<br />its senior ranks those who might pose<br />a risk of criminal activity. This new<br />obligation to exclude “risky” senior<br />personnel may have special ramifica-<br />tions. The Druyun scandal grew out of<br />Druyun’s gradually expanding reliance<br />on Boeing for favorable treatment and<br />employment: for her future son-in-law,<br />her daughter, and then, finally, for her-<br />self. The lesson here seems to be that a<br />contractor should, if possible, track<br />these types of personal links between<br />key Government personnel and the<br />company, so that the company can, on<br />a recurring basis, assess, and reassess the<br />potential integrity risks that the<br />Government personnel pose.<br />• Adjusting Program to Risk: Under<br />the revised Sentencing Guidelines, a cor-<br />poration’s leaders must ensure that the<br />firm’s compliance program accommo-<br />dates new risks, both internally and in<br />the marketplace. The Guidelines’ imple-<br />menting commentary calls for corpora-<br />tions to readjust their compliance poli-<br />cies through periodic reassessments of<br />risk, based upon (1) the types of crimi-<br />Revised Sentencing Guidelines<br />DFARS 203.7001<br />1. Standards and procedures<br />Code of Ethics<br />2. Knowledgeable leadership<br />3. Exclude risky personnel<br />4.Training<br />Training<br />5. Monitor, evaluate, reporting hotline<br />Periodic review; audits; hotline<br />6. Incentives and discipline<br />Discipline<br />7.Adjust program to risk<br />8. Self-reporting<br />Timely reporting to Government; cooperation<br />Page 7<br />Contract Services Association<br />Service Contractor/Fall 2005<br />/ 7<br />nal conduct that may occur, including<br />an assessment of the severity of potential<br />criminal conduct, and (2) the likelihood<br />of criminal conduct, based upon the<br />company’s own history, its industry, and<br />the nature of the company’s work in that<br />industry. Logically this means that com-<br />panies in a similar line of business –<br />other major defense contractors, in other<br />words – should consider adjusting their<br />compliance programs to accommodate<br />the risks made apparent by the Druyun<br />scandal. To make sense of this review,<br />we can look to the remedial steps that<br />outside counsel, former senator Warren<br />Rudman, recommended to Boeing, dis-<br />cussed below.<br />B. The Rudman Report:<br />Compliance Lessons from the Top<br />In a February 26, 2004 report to<br />Boeing’s board of directors – issued<br />before Druyun’s and Michael Sears’<br />guilty pleas – Warren Rudman’s team<br />recounted a review of Boeing’s compli-<br />ance system. The report focused on<br />Boeing’s greatest area of risk in light of<br />the Druyun scandal: legal requirements<br />and procedures for hiring senior-level<br />Government executives. [See Warren<br />Rudman et al., A Report to the Chairman<br />and Board of Directors of The Boeing<br />Company Concerning the Company’s<br />Policies and Practices for the Hiring of<br />Government and Former Government<br />Employees (Feb. 26, 2004), available at<br />www.boeing.com/news/releases/2004/q1/<br />rudman_030904.pdf; see Developments:<br />Boeing Reviews Company Hiring Ethics,<br />Finds No Widespread Problems, 46 GC<br />¶ 121 (Mar. 17, 2004); see also Warren<br />Rudman et al., A Report to the Chairman<br />and Board of Directors of The Boeing<br />Company Concerning the Company’s Ethics<br />Program and Its Rules and Procedures for<br />the Treatment of Competitors’ Proprietary<br />Information (Nov. 3, 2003) (report on<br />Boeing’s ethics program), available at<br />www.boeing.com/news/releases/2003/q4/ru<br />dman.pdf].<br />In assessing Boeing’s efforts to ensure<br />compliance with the key “revolving door”<br />statutes, including the Procurement<br />Integrity Act and 18 U.S.C. § 208 (the<br />conflict-of-interest statute), the Rudman<br />report noted, at pages 18-19 and 26, that:<br />• The Boeing procedures did not address<br />the possibility of pre-interview employ-<br />ment discussions, which could, for<br />example, trigger recusal requirements<br />under the Procurement Integrity Act.<br />• The Boeing procedures did not make<br />it clear that separate conflict-of-inter-<br />est reviews are required pre-interview<br />and pre-hire. Because additional infor-<br />mation may emerge during the period<br />between interview and hire, and<br />because the prospective job responsi-<br />bilities of the applicant may shift dur-<br />ing this period, successive reviews<br />would be appropriate.<br />• The Boeing procedures did not distin-<br />guish between (a) the conflict-of-inter-<br />est issues that should be considered<br />before employment discussions begin<br />(e.g., disqualification of Federal offi-<br />cials), and (b) those that should be con-<br />sidered after an offer letter is issued<br />(e.g., limitations on the types of repre-<br />sentations that the employee may make<br />before his or her previous agency, and<br />other post-employment restrictions).<br />• There historically has been almost no<br />formal process for conflict-of-interest<br />reviews when foreign nationals are<br />hired by Boeing, including those who<br />may be hired from foreign govern-<br />ment service.<br />The Rudman report cited other seri-<br />ous gaps in Boeing’s internal compliance<br />program, including: Boeing’s heavy<br />reliance on Government employees, past<br />and present, to comply with the law [id.<br />at 29]; Boeing’s failure to treat “revolving<br />door” hiring as a high-risk activity [id. at<br />30]; “erratic” human resources records<br />management at Boeing [id. at 33]; a lack<br />of internal training and data on the<br />topic; and, an undisciplined process for<br />conflict-of-interest reviews [id. at 29-34].<br />The Rudman report recommended a<br />number of reforms [id. at 36-41];<br />Boeing, and other large contractors with<br />similar gaps in their compliance systems,<br />are likely to take up those recommenda-<br />tions in the coming months.<br />C.Compliance for Everyone Else<br />Implementing the Rudman report’s<br />recommendations is relatively simple; it is<br />largely a matter, for Boeing and other<br />major contractors, of repairing gaps in<br />already well-established compliance sys-<br />tems. The harder question is how to deal<br />with those contractors that have no com-<br />pliance systems to repair.<br />Under the current legal structure, it<br />is entirely possible for contractors to<br />have no compliance systems in place.<br />Multitudinous privately held small and<br />medium-sized contractors fall outside the<br />Page 8<br />8 /<br />Service Contractor / Fall 2005<br />Contract Services Association<br />Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s requirements for<br />financial compliance systems. Although<br />the Sentencing Guidelines’ mandatory<br />requirements for compliance systems<br />cover all companies, large and small, the<br />Guidelines come into play only when a<br />corporation is caught in a criminal<br />violation. Only then will a compliance<br />system, if in place, soften the corpora-<br />tion’s criminal penalty. Thus, if a<br />contractor can avoid criminal prosecu-<br />tion, no outsider may ever know that<br />the contractor had no compliance system<br />in place. Nor does the FAR require a<br />compliance system, and, as noted, the<br />DFARS and the other supplements speak<br />only in terms of the compliance systems<br />that contractors “should” have in place.<br />Should regulators require contractors<br />to erect compliance systems? The argu-<br />ments against mandating compliance are<br />obvious: compliance systems are expen-<br />sive. Mandatory compliance systems<br />would pose a significant barrier against<br />potential entrants to the Federal market.<br />This, in turn, could raise prices, hurt<br />quality, and have other anti-competitive<br />effects. Worse yet, if a contractor’s inade-<br />quate compliance system could trigger<br />bid protests or enforcement actions,<br />mandating compliance systems could<br />launch new waves of litigation or entire<br />new sub-bureaucracies.<br />There are, however, compelling argu-<br />ments for requiring compliance systems.<br />Compliance systems reduce risks for<br />going concerns [see John S. Pachter, The<br />New Era of Corporate Governance and<br />Ethics: The Extreme Sport of Government<br />Contracting, 2004 P<br />UB<br />. P<br />ROC<br />. L. R<br />EV<br />.<br />247], and, per the Sentencing<br />Guidelines, reduce compliant firms’ sen-<br />tencing exposure in the event of a crimi-<br />nal breach. Savvy companies also recog-<br />nize that moving ahead of their competi-<br />tors in embracing compliance reforms, if<br />done properly, can yield strategic advan-<br />tages. [See Simon Zadek, The Path to<br />Corporate Responsibility, H<br />ARV<br />. B<br />US<br />. R<br />EV<br />.,<br />Dec. 2004, at 125]. Furthermore, man-<br />dating compliance systems would track a<br />growing trend in U.S. business: to<br />demand internal controls to ensure that<br />those running a firm are accountable to<br />stakeholders outside the firm. [Cf. Marcia<br />Madsen, The Government’s Debarment<br />Process: Out of Step With Current Ethical<br />Standards, 2004 P<br />UB<br />. P<br />ROC<br />. L. R<br />EV<br />. 252<br />(discussing growing emphasis on corpo-<br />rate governance and internal controls)].<br />Requiring contractor compliance sys-<br />tems would be a logical extension of the<br />Sentencing Guidelines. When a company<br />finds itself ensnared in sentencing under<br />the Guidelines, the severity of that sen-<br />tencing will turn, in part, on the compa-<br />ny’s efforts to establish an effective com-<br />pliance system – and the compliance sys-<br />tem is mandatory. So too, one could<br />argue, when a company finds itself<br />enmeshed in the highly regulated pro-<br />curement system, there is nothing unrea-<br />sonable about requiring the firm to<br />establish a compliance system to ensure<br />procurement integrity. Indeed, Federal<br />law already demands compliance systems<br />to ensure contractors’ compliance with<br />many Federal laws that govern contrac-<br />tors’ hiring practices. [See, e.g.,<br />www.dol.gov/elaws/ ofccp.htm (checklist of<br />Federal laws enforced by the Department<br />of Labor’s Office of Federal Contractor<br />Compliance)].<br />If Federal regulators do bring the FAR<br />into line with the Sentencing Guidelines<br />by mandating compliance systems, the<br />question will be how to enforce that<br />requirement. Tossing enforcement of<br />mandatory compliance systems to a<br />Federal bureaucracy would be unwieldy<br />and inefficient: given the huge cultural<br />and organizational differences between<br />contractors, it would be almost impossi-<br />ble for any enforcement agency to define<br />and enforce standards for compliance<br />systems in procurement integrity.<br />There may be an alternative approach<br />to enforcement already buried in the<br />FAR. Much as the Sentencing<br />Guidelines take a more lenient approach<br />to a corporation’s criminal sentence if the<br />corporation has a sound compliance pro-<br />gram in place, so too does the FAR take<br />a more lenient approach to debarment –<br />in effect, the corporation’s “contractual”<br />sentence – if the contractor has an<br />effective compliance system. [FAR<br />9.406-1(a)(1); see Richard Bednar, supra,<br />2004 P<br />UB<br />. P<br />ROC<br />. L. R<br />EV<br />. at 225-26].<br />Since debarment is only an expanded<br />finding of non-responsibility, [see FAR<br />9.402(a)], it would not take much to<br />incorporate compliance systems into the<br />general responsibility determinations.<br />Indeed, FAR 9.104-1 already says that,<br />when a contracting officer is assessing a<br />prospective contractor’s responsibility,<br />the CO should assess whether the<br />contract has a “satisfactory record of<br />integrity and business ethics” (paragraph<br />(d)), and the “necessary organization . . .<br />and operational controls” (paragraph<br />(e)). Adding an element to the responsi-<br />bility determination – instructing the<br />CO to assess whether the prospective<br />contractor’s compliance system accords<br />with the Sentencing Guidelines’ stan-<br />dards – would not be a radical step.<br />Page 9<br />Contract Services Association<br />Service Contractor/Fall 2005<br />/ 9<br />D.Conclusion<br />For contractors, the recent storm of<br />compliance scandals offer some obvious<br />next steps. First, contractors should<br />recognize that failure to have a sound<br />compliance system may render them<br />non-responsible in the Government’s<br />eyes. A strong internal compliance sys-<br />tem – one that keeps senior management<br />fully apprised of compliance failures – is,<br />therefore, absolutely essential. Second,<br />although Boeing’s troubles show that<br />even a very sophisticated compliance system<br />is not foolproof, contractors should<br />ensure that their compliance systems<br />meet the state-of-the-art requirements<br />of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s<br />corporate guidelines. Simply meeting the<br />Defense Department’s dated guidelines<br />is no longer enough. Third, and in keep-<br />ing with the Sentencing Commission’s<br />current guidelines, contractors should be<br />ready to adjust their compliance systems,<br />to accommodate new and emerging risks<br />in the Government marketplace.<br />Professor Yukins joined<br />the Law School faculty<br />from the law firm of<br />Holland & Knight,<br />where, as a partner, his<br />practice focused on<br />high technology com-<br />panies that serve the<br />government. Prior to<br />his work in private practice, he was a trial attor-<br />ney with the U.S. Department of Justice. He<br />teaches on Government contract formations and<br />performance issues, Contract Disputes Act litiga-<br />tion, and comparative issues in public procure-<br />ment, and focuses especially on emerging public<br />policy questions in U.S. procurement. Professor<br />Yukins is an advisor to the U.S. delegation to the<br />working group on reform of the United Nations<br />Commission on International Trade Law<br />(UNCITRAL) Model Procurement Law, and<br />he teaches and speaks often on issues of compara-<br />tive and international procurement law.<br />He obtained his B.A. from Harvard University,<br />and J.D. from the University of Virginia.<br />America is faced<br />with a critical<br />challenge following<br />Hurricane Katrina.<br />Go to CSA’s website at<br />http://www.csa-dc.org/<br />news/katrina.asp<br />to see how YOU might help in the<br />rebuilding and recovery efforts.<br />Page 10<br />Page 11<br />Contract Services Association<br />Service Contractor/Fall 2005<br />/ 11<br />CSA’s First Annual<br />Day on Capitol Hill – A Success!<br />F<br />or 40 years, CSA has been the voice of Federal contract<br />service providers. But being on the side of “truth, justice<br />and the American Way” may not always be enough to get<br />the vote or decision needed to protect our members’ inter-<br />ests. What else does it take?<br />Quite frankly, it takes YOU! It’s just human nature for<br />an elected official to pay closer attention to the point of view<br />of someone who represents hundreds or thousands of con-<br />stituents – the people who put them in office.<br />That is why, on a sweltering day in July, CSA members<br />came to Washington, DC to turn up the heat on their mem-<br />bers of Congress regarding issues important to Federal service<br />contractors, including competitive sourcing and recommen-<br />dations to reform the acquisition process. CSA members<br />held dozens of meetings with Senators, Congressmen, and<br />their staffs.<br />The day started off with a staff briefing from Mary Ellen<br />Fraser and Jeff Green, both from the House Armed Services<br />Committee. The attendees were able to get an inside look<br />on the political dynamics of how the defense authorization<br />bill is put together – and how issues such as competitive<br />sourcing are handled on the Armed Services Committee.<br />Both Mary Ellen and Jeff stressed the importance of contact-<br />ing members of Congress to educate them about issues<br />affecting services contractors.<br />After the congressional staff briefing and a quick lobby-<br />ing etiquette lesson, the attendees were sent off to their meet-<br />ings. The meetings allowed the attendees to introduce them-<br />selves to their congressional representatives, and to speak<br />about CSA’s Service Contracting Review report as well as the<br />impact that attacks against competitive sourcing have on<br />service contractors.<br />In the words of one participant, “I was impressed with<br />the attention we received from legislative staffers and thank<br />CSA for organizing the event. I found it very worthwhile<br />and would encourage other businesses to do the same.” [Ms.<br />Heidi W. Gerding, President/CEO of HeiTech Services).<br />CSA’s Day on Capitol Hill was aimed at getting more<br />CSA members involved in the political process. The many<br />attacks and bad press that our industry has endured, it is<br />essential that CSA members take action.<br />That same morning, the CSA-PAC sponsored a success-<br />ful fundraiser for Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA), a long-<br />time CSA friend. Currently, Representative Weldon is the<br />Vice-Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee as<br />well as Vice-Chairman of the Homeland Security<br />Committee.<br />HASC staffers Mary Ellen Fraser and Jeff Green brief CSA members<br />HASC staffers Mary Ellen Fraser and Jeff Green discuss FY06 Defense Authorization bill<br />Rep. Curt Weldon (center) with CSA members Vic Avetissian and John Aldridge<br />Page 12<br />12 /<br />Service Contractor / Fall 2005<br />Contract Services Association<br />A<br />s the Marketing, Sales, or the New<br />Business Development Manager<br />responsible for consistently identifying and<br />closing new contracts for your company,<br />you have to be in touch with the future.<br />However, it is very difficult to look too far<br />in the future when the pressure is on you to<br />win contracts today. In addition, the daily<br />demands of meetings, maintaining the rela-<br />tionship with Contracting Officers, meet-<br />ing with the bid team about details on cur-<br />rent bids in progress, and other short-term<br />issues, prevent you from developing a long-<br />term strategy to identify new opportunities.<br />One of the keys to ensure you have a<br />well qualified sales pipeline, is to gain visibil-<br />ity to long lead time re-compete contracts.<br />The very successful and rapidly grow-<br />ing contractor has learned the importance<br />of planning ahead by identifying opportu-<br />nities that will come due in three major<br />time horizons: 18 months, 36 months<br />and 72 months. Unfortunately, too many<br />new business development managers only<br />focus on the 18-month horizon. As a<br />result they are constantly spending their<br />valuable time in reactive mode, rather<br />than in a pro-active mode. By developing<br />a long-term road map that gives you visi-<br />bility beyond 18 months, you are in a<br />better position to move your company<br />into a pro-active winning position.<br />For example, during the next five years,<br />epipeline is tracking and researching several<br />hundred contracts that represent over $100<br />billion for Facilities and Support Services,<br />Engineering Services, Security Guards,<br />Professional, Scientific, Technical Services,<br />Research, and Development in Physical<br />Engineering Services. The table provides<br />the value for each NAICS code over the<br />next 18, 36 and 72 months*.<br />As you can see from the table, there is<br />over $9 billion of contract value in the 19<br />to 36 month period and over $16 billion<br />beyond 37 months. For IT Services, not<br />shown in the table, there is over $84 billion<br />for the period October 1, 2005 to March<br />31, 2007. For the period of 19 months and<br />beyond, there is over $20 billion.<br />The Government provides a wide vari-<br />ety of resources to identify potential oppor-<br />tunities in the long-term. A smart business<br />development professional will use them all:<br />• Historical contract awards, such as<br />defense contracts over $5 million at:<br />http://www.defenselink.mil<br />• Archived solicitations, found on the<br />FedBizOpps: www.fedbizopps.gov<br />• Federal spending on active contracts,<br />published in the Federal Procurement<br />Data System (https://www.fpds.gov).<br />• Fiscal year spending in the budget:<br />http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/bud<br />get/fy2006/<br />• Acquisition forecasts, provided by<br />several civilian and defense agencies<br />The key to success is paying attention<br />to all of the details. The key to long-term<br />sustainable growth is identifying and quali-<br />fying opportunities well in advance so you<br />and your company:<br />• Can decide on the opportunities that<br />best fit the company’s business profile<br />and competencies;<br />• Develop relationships with potential<br />new contracting officers in new<br />departments and agencies;<br />• Have more time to review the depart-<br />ments/agency procurement plans and<br />budget;<br />• Have more time to learn who the<br />incumbents and competitors are;<br />• Have more time to sign the company’s<br />resources to develop a winning strategy;<br />• Have more time to find teaming<br />partners.<br />Take the time to “Look Ahead – to Win<br />More Business.”<br />Tim Walsh is the CEO/President of epipeline,<br />inc., which provides short and long lead-time<br />researched opportunities to over 7000 new busi-<br />ness development managers, sales and marketing<br />professionals. epipeline’s internet based applica-<br />tions enables the user to set up dozens of different<br />profiles over multiple time horizons that are<br />updated automatically. In addition, the user<br />receives email notifications, and can generate<br />“one click” instant reports at: www.epipeline.com<br />epipeline is a CSA Strategic Business Partner.<br />CSA members receive member-only discounts<br />on epipeline’s services.<br />* Data for this table was provided by epipeline, based on all RFPs we are tracking across our IT,AEC, and O&M<br />verticals as of 08/15/05. epipeline tracks RFPs based on select criteria; therefore not all RFPs issued by the<br />Government are reflected in this table.<br />Looking Ahead –<br />To Win More Business<br />by Tim Walsh,<br />epipeline, Inc.<br />18 Months<br />19-36 Months<br />37+ Months<br />(10/01/2005 -<br />(04/01/2007<br />NAICS<br />03/31/2007)<br />- 09/30/2008)<br />(10/01/2008 +)<br />561210: Facilities and<br />Support Services<br />$67.91 Billion<br />$3.50 Billion<br />$7.00 Billion<br />541330: Engineering Services<br />$3.50 Billion<br />$3.90 Billion<br />$5.90 Billion<br />541710: Research & Development<br />in the Physical Engineering Services<br />$1.00 Billion<br />$1.30 Billion<br />$2.50 Billion<br />561612: Security Guards<br />$0.90 Billion<br />$0.20 Billion<br />$0.90 Billion<br />541990: Professional, Scientific and<br />Technical Services<br />$0.60 Billion<br />$0.70 Billion<br />$0.20 Billion<br />Total:<br />$73.91 Billion<br />$9.60 Billion<br />$16.50 Billion<br />Page 13<br />Contract Services Association<br />Service Contractor/Fall 2005<br />/ 13<br />A<br />dvising US industry on defense busi-<br />ness involving sales to foreign govern-<br />ments is not normally a Department of<br />Defense (DoD) function. Nevertheless, the<br />defense business is becoming a global one,<br />and the DoD is increasingly engaged in<br />international issues.<br />This article will provide an overview of<br />DoD’s international cooperative activities in<br />the defense equipment realm, as well as<br />some pointers on commercial activity. Our<br />allies operate many US-developed and pro-<br />duced systems, and DoD uses many sys-<br />tems and components developed by others.<br />Collaboration and trade are increasing in<br />this realm, as has been the case with respect<br />to commercial products.<br />The DoD, in compliance with public<br />law and as a matter of policy, cooperates<br />with allied and friendly countries in acquisi-<br />tion activities spanning the entire spectrum<br />of the defense acquisition life cycle. This<br />activity includes, of course, sales of military<br />equipment, but ranges from discussion of<br />future capability needs through cooperation<br />in basic scientific research, technology<br />development, systems development, pro-<br />curement, and production to cooperative<br />logistic support, and even disposal. The<br />DoD has established a number of pro-<br />grams, and entered into a number of inter-<br />national agreements, to carry out this inter-<br />national activity.<br />Foreign Military Sales (FMS): The FMS<br />program implements the Arms Export<br />Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629), and is<br />the only legal mechanism for transferring<br />defense articles and services from the US<br />Government to allied and friendly govern-<br />ments. The DoD contracts with US indus-<br />try on behalf of the foreign customer, using<br />DoD procurement authority and proce-<br />dure. The FMS program is administered<br />by the Defense Security Cooperation<br />Agency: www.dsca.mil.<br />Foreign Comparative Test Program:<br />Facilitates testing of foreign-developed<br />equipment that might meet DoD needs.<br />Funding is provided to DoD components<br />on a competitive basis to test promising<br />foreign products. Successful tests lead to<br />procurement, and result in avoidance<br />of expensive and time-consuming<br />development programs. The Foreign<br />Comparative Test Program is managed<br />by the Director, Defense Research and<br />Engineering: www.acq.osd.mil/cto.<br />Cooperative Research, Development, Test and<br />Evaluation Agreements: Concluded with<br />allied and friendly defense ministries to<br />facilitate cooperative activities, including<br />the co-development of systems. Authorized<br />under various statutes, including the AECA<br />and 10USC2350.<br />Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements:<br />Concluded with most NATO allies and<br />several other countries, these agreements<br />aim to reduce discriminatory barriers to<br />defense trade in an effort to standardize<br />equipment, rationalize defense production,<br />and promote military operational interop-<br />erability. The reciprocity provisions enable<br />the Secretary of Defense to waive the Buy<br />American Act in cases pertaining to pro-<br />curement of items from partner countries.<br />Most nations with which these agreements<br />have been concluded maintain defense<br />trade attachés in their Washington<br />embassies. These attachés actively promote<br />DoD acquisition of defense items from<br />their nations and are an excellent source<br />of information on their nation’s defense<br />industry.<br />US firms selling defense articles and<br />services to foreign governments must com-<br />ply with the AECA, which is implemented<br />through the International Traffic in Arms<br />Regulation (ITAR) under the authority of<br />the Secretary of State. The ITAR contains<br />the Munitions List that comprises the<br />controlled items. The State Department<br />manages exports through a licensing<br />process. Firms can obtain advisory opin-<br />ions or licenses from the State Department’s<br />Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.<br />The first stop should be the Web site at:<br />www.pmdtc.org.<br />The Department of Commerce (DoC)<br />is responsible for administration of the<br />Export Administration Act, and regulates<br />through the Export Administration<br />Regulations exports of dual-use items that<br />are not controlled through the ITAR.<br />The DoC supports US industry through<br />the Defense Trade Advocacy Program.<br />Commercial attachés in American<br />Embassies support this program and are an<br />excellent source of information on local<br />markets: www.bis.doc.gov<br />US Government resources available to<br />exporters of defense articles and services<br />also include military organizations located<br />in American Embassies. These “security<br />assistance” organizations are responsible for<br />liaison with the host nation’s defense estab-<br />by Bruce Bade<br />Director, Pacific Armaments Cooperation in the<br />Office of the Under Secretary of Defense<br />(Acquisition,Technology and Logistics).<br />International Business:<br />in Defense Articles and Services<br />Page 14<br />14 /<br />Service Contractor / Fall 2005<br />Contract Services Association<br />lishment for matters relating to FMS and collaborative<br />activities such as cooperative research and development.<br />Most are known as Offices of Defense Cooperation<br />(ODCs). The ODCs can provide support to U.S. compa-<br />nies in efforts to do business with host nation defense<br />establishments, and it is advisable to coordinate activities<br />with them. An excellent source of advice on local condi-<br />tions, the ODC should be the first stop on a visit to any<br />foreign country.<br />Opportunities to provide defense articles and serv-<br />ices, and to team with foreign firms to satisfy both for-<br />eign and US defense requirements, are plentiful in an<br />increasingly globalized environment. DoD systems<br />incorporate many foreign-developed components and<br />the foreign supplier usually needs a US partner.<br />Likewise, components developed in the US (including<br />software) are used in the defense products of many<br />other nations. Entry into this market requires an<br />understanding of the export control laws and regula-<br />tions, a willingness to expend the effort necessary to<br />understand another market, and the resources to be<br />persistent in what can be a lengthy endeavor.<br />Bruce C. Bade is Director, Pacific Armaments Cooperation in<br />the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,<br />Technology and Logistics). His Directorate supports the Under<br />Secretary of Defense as the Department of Defense focal point<br />for cooperation in defense equipment acquisition with nations<br />in Asia, the Pacific, the Americas, Africa, and the Middle East.<br />Mr. Bade is a member of the Senior Executive Service and<br />is retired from the US Navy. He has served in his present posi-<br />tion since 1994 and in international defense equipment-related<br />positions in the Pentagon since 1978. Mr. Bade is a distin-<br />guished graduate of the Naval Destroyer School and the Navy<br />Tactical Action Officer School, and his military decorations<br />include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Navy<br />Commendation Medal (with Combat “V”), the Combat Action<br />Ribbon, and the Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross (First<br />Class) with Palm.<br />Bruce Bade discusses international business with Vic Avetissian, CSA’s Public Policy<br />Council Chairman.<br />“<br />”<br />“As a small business,having CSA repre-<br />sentus on the Hill is valuable because<br />this is something wewouldn’totherwise<br />be able toachieve alone.”<br />TroyThames,C&D Security Management,Inc.<br />Page 15<br />Contract Services Association<br />Service Contractor/Fall 2005<br />/ 15<br />W<br />hat a difference a year makes. Last<br />summer I wrote about the quicken-<br />ing pace of consolidation among<br />Government services providers (GSPs) –<br />businesses that provide operations and<br />maintenance services – and dubbed it the<br />“next frontier” in defense consolidation.<br />In light of some significant merger and<br />acquisition transactions over the past 12<br />months involving high profile GSPs, it<br />appears that the race to settle this “next<br />frontier” is increasingly fierce.<br />Private Equity“Explorers”<br />Private equity groups are leading a<br />Lewis and Clark-like exploration into the<br />GSP arena. In December 2004, New<br />York-based Veritas Capital, a defense<br />focused leveraged buy-out firm, complet-<br />ed the purchase of DynCorp<br />International, LLC from Computer<br />Sciences Corporation. With this transac-<br />tion, Veritas established itself as a leader in<br />the Government services marketplace vir-<br />tually overnight. The DynCorp business<br />they acquired has more than $1.7 billion<br />in annual revenues. Given Veritas’ com-<br />mitment to fuel the growth of its platform<br />companies via acquisition, look for<br />DynCorp’s already significant revenue<br />base to expand rapidly in the near future.<br />Following closely on the heels of the<br />DynCorp transaction was the acquisition<br />of Johnson Controls World Services by<br />IAP Worldwide Services, a company<br />backed by Cerberus Capital. This combi-<br />nation created another billion dollar par-<br />ticipant in the GSP arena. Given the sig-<br />nificant financial resources of Cerberus, its<br />unique insight into the Federal market-<br />place (former Vice President Dan Quayle<br />is a partner and on the Board of IAP),<br />and experienced management team, the<br />growth prospects for IAP also are bright.<br />There is often a herd mentality among<br />private equity groups. Given that, look<br />for others to circle the wagons and aggres-<br />sively pursue consolidation strategies in<br />the GSP arena.<br />Strategic “Settlers”<br />Strategic buyers continue to be active<br />consolidators of Government services<br />providers as well, albeit on a smaller<br />scale than private equity firms. VT<br />Group, a UK-based company, continued<br />its methodical build-up with the acquisi-<br />tion of Cube Corporation in March<br />2005. This is the third GSP acquisition<br />by VT Group in four years, moving the<br />company closer to $500 million in<br />annual GSP revenue. While the half bil-<br />lion dollar revenue mark may have<br />seemed like safe territory last year, the<br />significant scale of companies such as<br />DynCorp and IAP may have raised the<br />critical mass threshold.<br />On the strategic buyer front, there was<br />a “new entrant” into the GSP gold rush.<br />In September 2004, UK-based First<br />Services purchased SKE Support Services<br />(formerly Baker Support Services). This<br />transaction further demonstrates the<br />strong interest from international buyers<br />(especially those from the United<br />Kingdom) in the US support services<br />market. While US-based strategic acquir-<br />ers have been relatively quiet in the GSP<br />consolidation as of late, I do expect to see<br />domestic acquisition activity increase in<br />the coming months.<br />Value Creation Alternatives<br />With a healthy universe of buyers,<br />prospects look bright for middle market<br />Activity Heats Up<br />In the Next Frontier of Defense<br />Consolidation<br />by John Allen,<br />Windsor Group<br />Page 16<br />16 /<br />Service Contractor / Fall 2005<br />Contract Services Association<br />sellers. Several recent transactions have<br />been completed in the 7-8 times EBITDA<br />range, which is a hefty premium (more<br />than 50% in some cases) over historical<br />merger and acquisition valuations for<br />GSPs. While these valuations are high<br />relative to historical valuations, they are<br />acceptable for buyers interested in gaining<br />access to the US defense marketplace<br />when compared to valuations for defense<br />information technology or communica-<br />tions companies (EBITDA multiples for<br />these businesses often exceed 10 times).<br />Truth be told, the GSP arena remains one<br />of the last affordable entry points into the<br />growing US defense marketplace.<br />The public equity markets appear to<br />be opening to GSP providers. Wall Street<br />is hungry for new defense plays, as evi-<br />denced by the attractive values being<br />bestowed on Federal IT and defense elec-<br />tronics/communications firms. These<br />firms currently trade at average price-to-<br />earnings (P/E), and EBITDA multiples of<br />23 and 13, respectively. Even if a GSP<br />company trades at a discount to these val-<br />uations, it is still likely to earn an attrac-<br />tive arbitrage on acquired revenue. The<br />math is simple: if you buy at 8 and sell at<br />10, you create significant value.<br />Without a doubt, these are exciting<br />times in the GSP space. Like the early<br />western settlers who secured the best<br />land, those who lead the consolidation in<br />the GSP market will likely receive the<br />greatest rewards, so load your wagons<br />and move out.<br />John Allen is Co-Head, Defense &<br />Government Services Group BB&T<br />Capital Markets Windsor Group, an<br />investment bank headquartered in<br />Reston, VA that focuses on Government<br />and defense services companies<br />“<br />”<br />Having the ability toenter intomeetings and proactive projects with the DoL<br />staff is extremely meaningful.Having them serve as an advocatein assisting us<br />in resolving our issues has been a tremendous help.<br />Al Corvigno,Lockheed Martin<br />Page 17<br />Contract Services Association<br />Service Contractor/Fall 2005<br />/ 17<br />T<br />he dominant philosophy in corporate<br />America right now seems to be that big-<br />ger is better. Walmart has become the<br />largest company in the world by offering<br />oversized products at oversized discounts.<br />Fast food companies are competing to see<br />which one can market the biggest ham-<br />burger. And despite record-high gas prices,<br />Hummer’s H2 is one of General Motors’<br />showcase vehicles.<br />Even major companies in the contract-<br />ing services industry – e.g., SAIC,<br />Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin –<br />are among the leaders in their industry, in<br />part because of the competitive advantage<br />that comes from their sheer size.<br />But many of the executives of those<br />same companies are finding that when it<br />comes to their personal investing, bigger is<br />not always better. This is particularly true in<br />the contract services industry, where many<br />executives have succeeded financially, and<br />want Wall Street firms to help them man-<br />age their now sizable assets. The problem is,<br />an individual with under $10 million in<br />investable assets is regarded as small-fry by<br />these large investment firms.<br />“I’d had enough of the big investment<br />houses when I realized that my broker<br />had almost 300 clients in addition to<br />myself,” said Larry Trammell, Chairman<br />of the Contract Services Association.<br />“Frankly, I’m a demanding person and I<br />want, and expect better attention with my<br />investments.”<br />He’s not alone. The results of a survey<br />of wealthy Americans (defined as those with<br />at least $5 million in investable assets), first<br />reported in the Wall Street Journal, indicat-<br />ed that their reliance on brokers dropped<br />about 27 percent from 2001 to 2003. The<br />percentage of those people who used a full-<br />service broker declined from 41 percent to<br />30 percent in those two years. The percent-<br />age of such investors who used independent<br />money managers instead of brokers dou-<br />bled, from 7 percent in 2001 to 14 percent<br />in 2003.<br />The growing movement away from full-<br />service brokers at huge investment houses<br />stems from the lack of trust that followed<br />the scandals of the last 5 years as well as the<br />inadequate personal service that Trammell<br />mentioned. The result is that senior execu-<br />tives are increasingly bucking the corporate<br />bigger-is-better trend, and looking for a<br />place to invest that offers the benefits of<br />Wall Street and its massive investment<br />houses, but with the personal service they<br />feel they deserve.<br />This burgeoning trend isn’t entirely a<br />new idea. Ironically, the development of a<br />smaller, boutique investment option that<br />allows for more control over personal<br />investments, and demands a higher quality<br />of service has its antecedents in some of the<br />major corporations of today.<br />At the turn of the 20th century, senior<br />executives at General Electric founded<br />ELFun, initially to promote social interac-<br />tion and intellectual stimulation. But<br />ELFun evolved into an organization<br />where these same executives could invest<br />their assets in an environment that pro-<br />vided experienced, trustworthy, dedicated<br />service with a staff that understood the<br />culture they earned that money in. In<br />1998, Michael Dell started MSD Capital<br />for the same purpose.<br />Executives in the contract services<br />industry are in very similar circumstances<br />and, as a result, some of them made a very<br />similar choice; several senior executives<br />from SAIC banded together and provided<br />the initial funding for a boutique invest-<br />ment firm: Piedmont RIA (a registered<br />investment advisor). It was created to pro-<br />vide the same sort of benefits that histori-<br />cally have come through organizations like<br />ELFun and MSD Capital – trust, under-<br />standing, experience and performance.<br />Trust<br />Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt<br />said in a 2003 PBS Frontline interview, “I<br />don’t think there’s an industry in America<br />which has more conflicts than Wall Street –<br />not illegal, but they’re there. And unless<br />investors know about them, unless investors<br />are skeptical and cynical, they’ll buy into<br />some of the same problems they’ve always<br />bought into.”<br />Investors, especially those at the execu-<br />tive level, have become all too familiar with<br />the conflicts of interest that exist between<br />commission-based stockbrokers and them-<br />selves, as the clients. That familiarity is<br />breeding a strong desire for an alternative to<br />Wall Street’s standard fare – a desire for an<br />investment culture that has a fiduciary<br />responsibility to put their interests above<br />that of the organization itself. What they<br />are finding is that independent registered<br />SIZE MATTERS –<br />Execs Find Smaller is Better for Investing<br />byWilliam J. Millitello<br />Page 18<br />18 /<br />Service Contractor / Fall 2005<br />Contract Services Association<br />investment advisors can provide that level<br />of trust.<br />Independent investment advisors estab-<br />lish this level of trust primarily through<br />transparency, especially in compensation.<br />Understanding<br />Any investor feels more comfortable<br />working with someone who understands<br />the environment they live and work in.<br />That sense of understanding was at the core<br />of organizations like ELFun, and it is no<br />less true for the contract services industry.<br />Our industry has seen consolidation<br />through mergers and acquisitions, which<br />has created significant liquidity and wealth<br />for many stockholders. Stockholders want<br />an investment option that understands<br />these developments; moreover, they want<br />advice developed with their specific circum-<br />stances in mind.<br />Experience<br />Executive-level investors may not want<br />the Wall Street corporate culture, but they<br />are still looking for Wall Street experience<br />in an investment advisor. An investor<br />shouldn’t have to give up experience or<br />competence as a price to gaining confidence<br />in the quality of advice he receives. “I want-<br />ed the experience of a larger firm without<br />the one-size-fits-all approach that unfortu-<br />nately has come to define too many of<br />those same firms,” said Dr. Martin<br />Mandelberg, a former SAIC Senior Vice<br />President. “The {RIA} registered investment<br />advisor I invest with offers a flexible, indi-<br />vidualistic approach to helping build a port-<br />folio along with the backing and protection<br />of a larger company {like Fidelity}.”<br />Performance<br />While trust and experience are vital to<br />making investors feel comfortable with an<br />independent investment advisor, at the end<br />of the day what matters most is perform-<br />ance, and many independents have risen to<br />the challenge. Unfortunately, such data are<br />largely unavailable to retail investors – they<br />cannot see which independent advisors out-<br />pace the market, and which don’t. Often<br />times, a positive referral from a co-worker<br />or associate offers the best chance of finding<br />the high-performing advisor.<br />Like those in other industries, executives<br />in the contract services industry have<br />achieved a high level of success by refusing<br />to take things as they come, and by seeking<br />out creative and advantageous solutions to<br />problems. So it’s no surprise that when it<br />came to their personal investing, they’ve<br />taken the same approach by bucking the<br />“bigger is better” trend, and creating an<br />investment option that provides them with<br />the trust, understanding, experience, and<br />performance they demand.<br />William J. Militello experienced Wall Street<br />first hand as an institutional equity trader with<br />Knight Capital Markets in New York, and cur-<br />rently serves as the Managing Principal of<br />Piedmont, a registered investment advisor. Mr.<br />Militello has consulted for the Securities &<br />Exchange Commission and is a graduate of the<br />U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD, and<br />received his MBA from Boston University.<br />Integrity<br />Expert Advice<br />Achieved Performance<br />Piedmont is a Registered Investment Advisor who adds value to the<br />investment process through our pursuit of perfection<br />in everything we do. Your critical desire for performance creates<br />a requirement for a personal financial advisor who delivers you results.<br />Whether you are considering a new company retirement plan<br />or someone to manage your personal assets, a complimentary<br />analysis is available to CSA members. Please contact our offices at:<br />(703) 842-9483, (858) 964-3219 or email: wjm@piedmontRIA.com.<br />William J. Militello, Managing Principal<br />Page 19<br />Page 20<br />Since 1965, CSA has provided technical and compliance expertise to federal service contractors<br />through professional development. Want to know how you can benefit from CSA’s programs?<br />Please contact us today at 703-243-2020 or by email at info@csa-dc.org for more information.<br />SA’s Professional Development courses are<br />designed for YOU. Many contractors today are strug-<br />gling with more than just winning more business. There is so<br />much involved in managing a contract properly, keeping your<br />books in order, and making sure you're abiding by all the<br />relevant laws and regulations. Aside from that, you still need<br />to worry about hiring and retaining the best employees. CSA’s<br />Professional Development courses help make those tasks<br />easier. CSA offers cutting-edge training programs that are<br />taught by experts in the business. These experts will assure<br />that your employees are properly trained, saving you time<br />and money.<br />Be prepared.<br />Be effective.<br />“I definitely recom-<br />mend these programs<br />for anyone considering<br />making government<br />contract work a<br />career. It takes the<br />confusion out of much<br />of the bureaucracy<br />associated with gov-<br />ernment contracting.”<br />—Douglas Magee, KBR<br />C<br />Page 21<br />Contract Services Association<br />Service Contractor/Fall 2005<br />/ 21<br />G<br />overnment services contractors know<br />the benefits of doing business with<br />the Government. It’s rewarding, prof-<br />itable, and enables contractors to have a<br />stake in the important functions of<br />numerous Federal agencies. Coupled<br />with the benefits, however, are numerous<br />regulations and laws that govern the spe-<br />cific functions of the contract. One of<br />the most complex, yet important set of<br />regulations involve the human resources<br />(HR) function, and the all critical accom-<br />panying labor laws.<br />The most significant problem Federal<br />contractors face when it comes to HR<br />problems is complying with quadruple<br />labor laws – regular Federal labor laws,<br />state and local labor laws, and specially<br />created Federal contracting labor laws.<br />According to Wanda M. Johnson,<br />president of PREEMPT, Inc., and a for-<br />mer U.S. Department of Labor attorney<br />and private practice defense counsel, con-<br />tractors have a tough job in achieving and<br />maintaining compliance:<br />“Traditional HR people, those who<br />have not been exposed to the world of<br />Federal contracting and its labor laws,<br />are unable to provide complete and<br />compliant services to a Federal con-<br />tracting company because they are<br />unfamiliar with the industry and its<br />specially created Federal contracting<br />labor laws. The typical mistakes made<br />are providing incomplete human<br />resources advice without the benefit of<br />knowing Federal contracting labor<br />laws, and the full impact of these laws<br />upon the company. For example, as<br />Federal contractors we have to know<br />and interpret Federal contracting labor<br />laws in addition to other labor laws<br />and we have to analyze the impact of<br />all these labor laws upon our compa-<br />nies as well as our Federal customer<br />who is an integral part of our human<br />resources environment.<br />“Because Federal contractors are paid<br />by the Government, Congress knows<br />that it has enormous economic power<br />to make sure that we remained com-<br />pliant with Federal contracting labor<br />laws. Therefore, Congress has created a<br />severe economic penalty in the event<br />we violate these laws, such as losing<br />millions of dollars in Federal contracts<br />as well as the possibility of debarment<br />from bidding/receiving Federal con-<br />tracts for a certain period in the<br />future.”<br />CSA realized that many of its mem-<br />bers were not as well equipped to deal<br />with these laws as they might want to be.<br />Through the input of members of the<br />Labor Relations and Professional<br />Development Committees, the newest<br />certification program was created. CSA,<br />in conjunction with PREEMPT, Inc., will<br />offer the ONLY human resources Federal<br />contracting certification program specifi-<br />cally designed to help human resources<br />professionals understand Federal contract-<br />ing labor laws so that they can keep their<br />companies in compliance.<br />“Our Government Services<br />Contracting Human Resources (GSCHR)<br />program will be composed of five courses<br />designed to keep you within the laws and<br />operating efficiently,” said Malcolm O.<br />Munro, CSA director of professional<br />development. “Coursework will include<br />focused study of the Service Contract/<br />Davis-Bacon Act, compensation and<br />benefit issues, EEO/compliance, the Fair<br />Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and Family<br />Medical Leave Act (FMLA), performance<br />management, and maintaining legal com-<br />pliance when hiring or firing employees.”<br />According to Munro, the certification<br />is just as important as the actual course-<br />work itself.<br />“Certification is a stamp of quality.<br />It means that you have attained a body of<br />knowledge and have demonstrated com-<br />petency either through an examination,<br />a residency, or through a documented<br />demonstration of performance. In our<br />program, you’ll take a series of one- and<br />two-day courses and upon completion,<br />take a challenging written examination.<br />When you successfully complete our<br />program, your company can be assured<br />that you’ve been exposed to the very latest<br />issues, laws, and trends plus have the<br />benefit of networking with other HR<br />professionals in the industry. The rules are<br />often stricter for Government contractors<br />HR and Labor Law Issues?<br />CSA to the Rescue Again!<br />by Mary J. Pietanza*<br />CSA Professional Development<br />Committee Chair<br />Page 22<br />22 /<br />Service Contractor / Fall 2005<br />Contract Services Association<br />– the consequences more severe if the<br />rules aren’t followed. CSA’s program will<br />show you how to work within the require-<br />ments, and still remain competitive and<br />successful.”<br />CSA’s GSCHR program complements<br />the successful GSCPM Project Manage-<br />ment Certification. Both programs<br />address the unique and complex needs<br />of the Federal contractor.<br />“Previous course attendees consistently<br />comment on how focused our profession-<br />al development programs are,” said<br />Munro. “Because we offer courses taught<br />by practitioners in the industry, we can<br />offer a level of knowledge not found any-<br />where else in the industry. Now with our<br />GSCHR program, we can truly say we<br />have this very unique and important<br />niche covered.”<br />For more information, including<br />course dates, times, and location, visit the<br />CSA website at www.csa-dc.org and click<br />on “Professional Development.”<br />*All views expressed in this article<br />are those of the author and do not<br />necessarily represent the views of, and<br />should not be attributed to, Science<br />Applications International Corporation<br />(SAIC), SAIC University, or SAIC’s<br />subsidiaries or affiliates.<br />Mary Pietanza is the senior<br />manager, Professional<br />Development, for SAIC<br />University, where she manages<br />professional development pro-<br />grams for Science Applications<br />International Corporation<br />(SAIC). From science to solutions, SAIC engineers and<br />scientists solve complex technical problems in national<br />security, homeland security, energy, the environment,<br />space, telecommunications, health care, and logistics.<br />With annual revenues of $7.2 billion and more than<br />43,000 employees, SAIC, founded in 1969, is the largest<br />United States employee-owned research and engineering<br />company. From offices in more than 150 cities world-<br />wide, the company, provides many of its solutions for<br />commercial and Government customers through infor-<br />mation technology, systems integration, and eSolutions.<br />“<br />”<br />CSA’s training courses are both<br />affordable and informative.Having<br />qualified instructors thatare able to<br />field questions,and are attentive to<br />the varying needs of all levels of<br />participants,makes attending these<br />courses veryworthwhile.<br />Richard Dean,Duer<br />“<br />”<br />I am proud tobe part of an<br />organization thatis truly making<br />a pronounced difference<br />Paul Serotkin,Minuteman Ventures<br />Page 23<br />Contract Services Association<br />Service Contractor/Fall 2005<br />/ 23<br />A<br />close, personal friend of mine shared<br />the following with me a few years<br />ago: “What is the difference between rep-<br />utation and character? Reputation is what<br />other people think about you. Character<br />is who you are when you are by yourself.”<br />All too true!<br />I thought it would be worthwhile to<br />explore how this applies to both our busi-<br />ness and personal lives. In so doing, I look<br />at ethical standards and whether they<br />change or stay the same throughout the<br />course of a given day, how moral decay is<br />impacting our society and how leadership,<br />and the enforcement of high ethical stan-<br />dards impact our success in business and<br />at home.<br />You are who you are 24/7<br />John C. Maxwell, author of two books<br />dealing with business principles and ethics,<br />is a pioneer in the field of business ethics.<br />He dismisses the term “business ethics” and<br />says, “There’s just ethics. Period. You either<br />have them or you don’t.” He prescribes the<br />Golden Rule: Treat Others The Way You<br />Want To Be Treated.<br />I believe that we all are ultimately<br />accountable for our actions and our deeds<br />and we eventually will be found out sooner<br />or later. It is our moral responsibility to pre-<br />vent this from happening. If a person tells<br />“little white lies” to employees, coworkers,<br />friends, and family members, that person<br />should not be surprised if those same folks<br />he lied to also tell “little white lies” to him.<br />Is it possible for someone to lie and be<br />immoral off the job and expect a different<br />behavior on the job? I think not. I personal-<br />ly don’t know any people with split person-<br />alities, although I have heard they exist. My<br />belief is that we are the same person 24/7.<br />Hopefully, we all routinely self assess<br />our performances in our homes, our com-<br />munities, and our companies. In both our<br />private and business lives, there are, or<br />should be, codes of conduct in place.<br />Families may only have verbal understand-<br />ings of what is and is not acceptable in the<br />home. But even so, there is a standard for<br />acceptable behavior.<br />Companies call them codes of ethics, or<br />policies and procedures. But, according to<br />Peter Garber in his book entitled 15<br />Reproducible Activities for Reinforcing<br />Business Ethics & Values, “In today’s business<br />climate, simply having an ethics policy in<br />place isn’t enough. You must continually<br />keep ethics up front and center to avoid the<br />ethical violations and erosion of confidence<br />seen in corporate America today.”<br />Moral decay in society is mirrored<br />in the business setting<br />I think most of us know what the prob-<br />lem is. I believe the moral decay of our<br />society has permeated the business commu-<br />nity. In short, the business community is<br />not immune to the problems of society at<br />large. Moral decay is pervasive and epidem-<br />ic in all facets of our lives, including our<br />own homes. Large-scale actions such as the<br />Enron scandal and other international<br />events on the world stage should not sur-<br />prise us, as we can clearly see the same ethi-<br />cal violations on a smaller scale in our own<br />families, communities, workplaces, and<br />Government agencies.<br />I pose the following questions to<br />prompt your thinking about this important<br />subject of ethics in the workplace:<br />Why do employees leave one company<br />due to conflict over business integrity issues<br />only to find that the same situations exist<br />with their next employer?<br />Are you or your employees turning in<br />expense reports that are padded with<br />unsubstantiated expenses?<br />Have you ever justified telling a “little<br />white lie” such as overstating your compa-<br />ny’s capabilities or inaccurately presenting<br />financial status to win a contract that will<br />surely help your company meet the corpo-<br />rate sales and profit objectives?<br />In his article entitled “Enron Scandal<br />& Public Eye on Davos Award: Unique<br />Awards Highlight Corporate Irresponsibil-<br />ity”, author Gustavo Capdevila says,<br />“We often hear people speak of business<br />integrity. It is a tragic fact that the act of<br />telling the truth is a rare occurrence –<br />and a sad consolation that those who lie<br />ultimately deceive no one more than<br />themselves.”<br />Success in business and in the<br />home is directly linked to strong<br />leadership and the establishment<br />and enforcement of high ethical<br />standards<br />Who sets the standard in your compa-<br />ny, and in your home? Who is the individ-<br />ual who is ultimately responsible for the<br />business ethics and conduct of the organiza-<br />tion whether in the workplace or the home?<br />It all starts with the “Top Dog,” the leader<br />of the organization. But, if leaders of organ-<br />izations and heads of households do not<br />embrace and enforce their codes of con-<br />Leadership and Ethics – The Backbone of Business<br />A Personal View<br />by Michael S. O’Neal<br />Page 24<br />24 /<br />Service Contractor / Fall 2005<br />Contract Services Association<br />duct, then these documents and family cre-<br />dos are only words with no impact.<br />We all know that there is no magic<br />formula on how a business becomes and<br />remains profitable, but I believe that<br />integrity and honesty – two interchange-<br />able words – are key. Paul Wong, Ph.D.,<br />in his article entitled “The Positive<br />Psychology of Climate Management” says,<br />“Treating people with respect and dignity<br />and doing everything with complete hon-<br />esty and integrity are just some of the<br />practices that will contribute to a positive,<br />meaningful work climate. But to imple-<br />ment such practices on a daily basis<br />throughout the whole organization<br />requires a clear vision and complete<br />commitment from senior management<br />and all employees.”<br />Dr. Wong continues, “Leadership<br />intangibles are also important – that is<br />having the ‘knack’ for making the right<br />decisions at the right time. Hard to<br />quantify, the knack is essentially the<br />ability to think at multiple levels and<br />keep the ‘big picture’ in mind while<br />addressing the myriad small decisions<br />that ultimately determine success<br />or failure.”<br />In conclusion, we must look at our<br />own industry of Government contract-<br />ing, and learn from the case of USAF<br />Procurement Official Darleen Druyun as<br />a glaring example of unethical behavior,<br />low moral standards, and failed leader-<br />ship. I am a proponent of the truly ethi-<br />cal workplace and, as unethical corporate<br />behavior has taken center stage in our<br />industry and our country, I challenge<br />each of you to look closely at your own<br />organizations. I am surely not one to<br />throw stones in glass houses, as none of<br />us is perfect. However, we can all strive to<br />be men and women of character at home,<br />and in the workplace.<br />Mike O’Neal is a long-<br />standing member of the<br />CSA. As President of<br />O’Neal and Associates, he<br />is currently a consultant to<br />the O&M industry provid-<br />ing business and strategic<br />planning services as well as business development,<br />and operations assessment services. Mike has been<br />an O&M professional for the past 23 years, and<br />has worked for small, medium, and large compa-<br />nies. He is retired from 20 years service with the<br />Army as a Logistician, he is a father and grandfa-<br />ther and has been happily married to Lucia for 16<br />years. He is actively engaged in lifestyle coaching,<br />and mentoring to men in his community.<br />Page 25<br />“Walk the Walk”<br />Come to the CSA Annual Meeting<br />at the Westin Riverwalk<br />in San Antonio, Texas<br />March 20-23, 2006<br />Visit our Website www.csa-dc.org/annual_mtg2006<br />for more information or to register.<br />“Walk the Walk”<br />Come to the CSA Annual Meeting<br />at the Westin Riverwalk<br />in San Antonio, Texas<br />March 20-23, 2006<br />Visit our Website www.csa-dc.org/annual_mtg2006<br />for more information or to register.<br />Page 26<br />26 /<br />Service Contractor / Fall 2005<br />Contract Services Association<br />2005 Membership Directory<br />13th Regional Corporation<br />1156 Industry Dr.<br />Seattle, WA 98188<br />A-76 Institute, LLC<br />1250 24th Street, NW, Suite 350<br />Washington, DC 20037<br />Small Business<br />AAI Corporation<br />124 Industry Ln.<br />Hunt Valley, MD 21030<br />www.aaicorp.com<br />Advanced Systems Engineering<br />Group<br />6867 Nancy Ridge Drive, Suite A<br />San Diego, CA 92121<br />www.aseg.com<br />AECOM<br />1200 Summit Ave., Suite 320<br />Fort Worth, TX<br />www.aecom.com<br />Agbayani Construction Corporation<br />88 Dixon Ct.<br />Daly City, CA 94014<br />www.agbayani.com<br />Small Business<br />Akima Corporation<br />13777 Ballantyne Corporation Place<br />Suite 530<br />Charlotte, NC 28277<br />www.akima.com<br />ANC<br />Akimeka<br />1600 Kapiolani Boulevard, Suite 530<br />Honolulu, Hi 96814<br />www.akimeka.com<br />8(a), Native Hawaiian, SDB, Veteran Owned<br />Aleut Management Services<br />5520 Tech Center Drive, #200<br />Colorado Springs, CO 80919<br />www.aleutmgt.com<br />8(a), ANC, Small Business, SDB<br />All Risks, Ltd.<br />10150 York Road, 5th Floor<br />Hunt Valley, MD 21030<br />www.allrisks.com<br />All Star Maintenance, Inc.<br />12250 El Camino Real<br />San Diego, CA 92130<br />www.all-star.com<br />Alpha Business Solutions<br />P O Box 448<br />Newalla, OK 74857<br />Woman Owned<br />Altus Associates<br />1934 Old Gallows Rd., Suite 404<br />Vienna, VA 22182<br />www.altus-associates.com<br />Alutiiq, LLC<br />3201 C Street, Suite 700<br />Anchorage, AK 99503<br />www.alutiiq.com<br />8(a), ANC, Native American<br />Small Business, SDB<br />American Cleaning Enterprises<br />241 18th St. S., Suite 506<br />Arlington, VA 22202<br />www.ace-corp.com<br />Small Business, Woman Owned<br />American Operations Corporation<br />14030 Thunderbolt Place, Suite 700<br />Chantilly, VA 20151<br />www.aocwins.com<br />American Service Contractors, L.P.<br />P.O. Box 207<br />Smithville, TN 37166<br />www.dtccom.net<br />AMERITAC, Inc.<br />P.O.Box 279<br />Danville, CA 94526<br />8(a), Small Business, SDB<br />Amtex<br />5729 Leopard Bldg. 1<br />Corpus Christi, TX 78408<br />www.amtexservices.com<br />8(a), Small Business, SDB<br />AON Risk Services, Inc.<br />199 Fremont Street, Suite 1400<br />San Francisco, CA 94105<br />www.aon.com<br />Applied Innovative Management<br />7135 W. Tidwell Road, Suite M-100<br />Houston, TX 77092<br />www.aim1998.com<br />Small Business, Veteran Owned<br />ARINC<br />2551 Riva Rd.<br />Annapolis, MD 21401<br />www.arinc.com<br />Armstrong Allen, PLLC<br />P.O. Box 14028<br />Jackson, MS 39236-4028<br />www.armstrongallen.com<br />Aronson & Company<br />700 King Farm Boulevard, Suite 300<br />Rockville, MD 20850<br />www.aronsoncompany.com<br />ATI Systems<br />8540 Moorcroft Avenue<br />West Hills, CA 91304<br />www.ati-sys.com<br />Bailey & Bailey<br />115 E. Travis St., Suite 711<br />San Antonio, TX 78205<br />Barnhill & Associates, P.C.<br />13750 San Pedro Avenue, Suite 700 A<br />San Antonio, TX 78232<br />www.barnhilllaw.com<br />BB&T Capital Markets/Windsor<br />Group LLC<br />12010 Sunset Hills Road, Suite 700<br />Reston, VA 20190<br />www.bbandt.com<br />Bearskin Aviaition<br />5502 North Dennis Weaver, Joplin Regional<br />Airport<br />Webb Sity, MO 64870<br />www.bearskinaviation.com<br />Hubzone, Native American, Small Business, SDB<br />BE&K<br />2000 International Park Dr.<br />Burmingham, AL 35243<br />www.bek.com<br />Benefits Design, Inc.<br />11130 Jollyville Rdl, Suite 400<br />Austin, TX 78759<br />www.benefitsdesign.com<br />Page 27<br />Contract Services Association<br />Service Contractor/Fall 2005<br />/ 27<br />Bering Sea Eccotech<br />4300 B St., Suite 402<br />Anchorage, AK 99503<br />www.bseak.com<br />8(a), ANC, HubZone<br />Berry Logistics<br />809 Bridgeport Dr.<br />Desoto, TX 75115<br />www.berrylogistics.com<br />Blank, Rome<br />600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.<br />Washington, DC 20037<br />www.blankrome.com<br />BMAR & Associates, Inc.<br />3999 Fort Campbell Boulevard, P.O. Box 688<br />Hopkinsville, KY 42241<br />www.bmar.net<br />The Boon Group<br />6300 Bridgepoint Parkway, Building 3, Suite 5<br />Austin, TX 78730<br />www.boongroup.com<br />Burns and Roe Services Corporation<br />2809 S. Lynnhaven Road, Suite 100<br />Virginia Beach, VA 23452<br />www.roe.com<br />Business Management Research<br />Associates<br />3949 Pender Drive, Suite 300<br />Fairfax, VA 22030<br />www.bmra.com<br />Small Business, Woman Owned<br />C and D Security Management, Inc.<br />306 Delaware Drive<br />Colorado Springs, CO 80909<br />www.canddsecurity.com<br />Woman Owned<br />C C Distributors, Inc.<br />P.O. Box 9153<br />Corpus Christi, TX 78469<br />www.ccdistributors.com<br />Cardillo & Sons, Inc.<br />433 Broadway, Suite C<br />Everett, MA 2149<br />Cardinal Maintenance Service, Inc.<br />678 Front Avenue, NW, Suite 110<br />Grand Rapids, MI 49504<br />Career Smith, Inc.<br />537 Newport Center Drive<br />Newport Beach, CA 92660<br />www.careersmith.com<br />Carris, Jackowitz Associates<br />201 East 79th Street<br />New York, NY 10021<br />The Carroll Dickson Company<br />1053 Bueva Vista<br />Fircrest, WA 98466-6706<br />Centre Consulting, Inc.<br />1953 Gallows Rd., Suite 650<br />Vienna, VA 22182<br />www.centreconsult.com<br />Woman Owned<br />CH2M Hill<br />9191 South Jamaica Street<br />Englewood, CO 80112<br />www.ch2m.com<br />Chenega Technology Services<br />Corporation<br />5971 Kingstowne Village Pkwy, Suite 100<br />Alexandria, VA 22315<br />www.ctsc.net<br />Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, LLP<br />222 Central Park Avenue, Suite 222<br />Virginia Beach, VA 23462<br />www.cbh.com<br />Chugach AK Corporation<br />560 E. 34th Avenue<br />Anchorage, AK 99503-4161<br />www.chugach-ak.com<br />8(a), ANC, Small Business, SDB<br />CIS<br />1010 WAYNE AVE STE 720<br />SILVER SPRING, MD 20910<br />www.cisglobal.com<br />CMI Management, Inc.<br />5285 Shawnee Rd., Suite 401<br />Alexandria, VA 22312<br />www.cmimgmt.com<br />Small Business, SDB<br />Coastal Environmental Systems Inc.<br />820 1st Ave. S.<br />Seattle, WA 98134<br />www.coastalenvironmental.com<br />Small Business<br />Command Decisions Systems &<br />Solutions<br />13045 Harvest Place<br />Clifton, VA 20124<br />www.cds2.com<br />Small Business, SDB, Woman Owned<br />Commerce Funding<br />1945 Old Gallows Rd., #205<br />Vienna, VA 22182<br />www.commercefunding.com<br />Compass Contracts Group<br />129 N. West Dr.<br />Easton, MD 21601<br />www.ccg-llc.com<br />ConTemporaries, Inc.<br />1010 Wayne Avenue<br />Silver Spring, MD 20910<br />www.contemps.com<br />Small Business, Woman Owned<br />Crown Management Services, Inc.<br />1501 North Guillemard Street<br />Pensacola, FL 32501<br />CSC Applied Technology Division<br />P.O. Box 921001<br />Fort Worth, TX 76121<br />www.csc.com<br />Cubic Worldwide Technical Services,<br />Inc.<br />12000 Research Parkway, Suite 408<br />Orlando, FL 32836<br />www.cubic.com<br />D.R. Street Consultants, LLC<br />5430 W. Saragosa Street<br />Chandler, AZ 85226<br />www.drsconsultants.com<br />Veteran Owned<br />Data Dimensions<br />P.O. Box 1465<br />Janesville, WI 53547-1465<br />www.ddcsolutioncenter.com<br />Defense Support Services, LLC<br />555 Lincoln Dr. W.<br />Marlton, NJ 08053<br />www.ds2.com<br />DESA, Inc.<br />P.O. Box 6805<br />Columbia, SC 29260-6805<br />www.desainc.com<br />DGR Associates, Inc.<br />1002 N. Scott Avenue<br />Belton, MO 64012<br />www.dgrassociates.com<br />8(a), SDB, Woman Owned<br />Dilks Properties<br />854 Fairlawn Court<br />Marco Island, FL 34145<br />www.dilksproperties.com<br />Diverse Technologies Corporation<br />8233 Penn Randall Place<br />Upper Marlboro, MD 20772<br />www.diversetech.com<br />Small Business, SDB<br />Doyon, Limited<br />1 Doyon Place<br />Fairbanks, AK 99707<br />www.doyon.com<br />DTSV, Inc.<br />739 Thimble Shoals Blvd., Ste 101<br />Newport News, VA 23606<br />www.dtsvinc.com<br />Woman Owned<br />DUCOM, Inc.<br />850 Sligo Avenue, Suite 700<br />Silver Spring, MD 20910<br />www.ducominc.com<br />Page 28<br />28 /<br />Service Contractor / Fall 2005<br />Contract Services Association<br />Duer Advanced Technology &<br />Aerospace, Inc.<br />450 Maple Ave. E., Suite 303<br />Vienna, VA 22180<br />www.data-inc.com<br />Woman Owned<br />Dynamic Science, Inc.<br />11436 Washington Plaza West<br />Reston, VA 20190<br />www.exodyne.com<br />DynCorp<br />P.O. Box 921001<br />Fort Worth, TX 76121<br />www.dyn-intl.com<br />Eagle Eye Publishers, Incorporated<br />10560 Main Street, PH-18<br />Fairfax, VA 22030-7182<br />www.eagleeyeinc.com<br />Small Business<br />Eastern Maintenance & Services,Inc.<br />P.O Box 669, 25 E. Main Street<br />Coats, NC 27521<br />www.eaternms.com<br />El Concorde<br />520 South Main Street, Suite 2433-B<br />Akron, OH 44311<br />www.elconcorde.com<br />EMI Services<br />301 A Street<br />Nampa, ID 83687<br />www.emiservices.com<br />Native American, Small Business<br />Enterprise Fleet Services<br />600 Corporate Park Drive<br />St. Louis, MO 63105<br />www.erac.com<br />epipeline<br />607 Herndon Parkway, Suite 103<br />Herndon, VA 20170<br />www.epipeline.com<br />Facilities Performance Group, LLC<br />3091 Governors Lake Drive, Suite 450<br />Norcross, GA 30071<br />www.fpg-llc.com<br />FCC.O&M, Inc.<br />915 West Second Avenue<br />Spokane, WA 99201<br />Field Support Services, Inc.<br />3900 C Street, Suite 803<br />Anchorage, AK 99503-5969<br />www.fssi-asrc.com<br />First Horizon<br />1650 Tysons Blvd., Suite 1150<br />McLean, VA 22102<br />www.ftb.com<br />Fluor Federal Government Group<br />100 Fluor Daniel Drive<br />Greenville, SC 29607<br />www.fluor.com<br />FOUR WINDS Services, Inc.<br />P.O. Box 49<br />Altus, OK 73522-0049<br />www.fourwindsservices.com<br />8(a), Woman Owned, Native American<br />Genco Infrastructure Solutions<br />100 Papercraft Park<br />Pittsburgh, PA 15238<br />www.genco.com<br />General Trades & Services, Inc.<br />94-070 Leokane Street, Suite 201<br />Waipahu, HI 96797<br />8(a), SDB, Veteran Owned<br />GHG Corporation<br />1100 Hercules, Suite 290<br />Houston, TX 77058<br />www.ghg.net<br />The Ginn Group, Inc.<br />3485 N. Desert Drive, Building 1<br />East Point, GA 30344-6904<br />www.theginngroup.com<br />Glimmernet<br />P.O. Box 501<br />Olney, MD 20830<br />www.glimmernet.com<br />Global<br />2465 Campus Dr.<br />Irvine, CA 92612<br />Small Business, Woman Owned<br />Government Contracting<br />Resources, Inc.<br />5445 Village Drive, Suite 103<br />Viera, FL 32955<br />Small Business, Woman Owned<br />Government Service Administrators<br />414 Main Street, Suite 103<br />Port Jefferson, NY 11777<br />www.gsanational.com<br />Granite Lodging Group, LLC<br />One Chalet Drive P.O. Box 657<br />Wilton, NH 03086<br />GWE Group, Inc.<br />1580 Makaloa Street, Suite 801<br />Honolulu, HI 96814-3220<br />www.gwegroup.com<br />SDB, Veteran Owned, Woman Owned<br />Harris Technical Services<br />Corporation<br />7799 Leesburg Pike, Suite 700<br />Falls Church, VA 22043<br />www.harris.com<br />Healthcare Resolution Services, Inc.<br />14504 Greenview Drive, Suite 102<br />Laurel, MD 20708<br />www.hcrs-inc.com<br />8(a), Small Business, SDB, Woman Owned<br />HeiTech Services, Inc.<br />4200 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 202<br />Lanham, MD 20706<br />www.heitechservices.com<br />Small Business, SDB, Veteran Owned,<br />Woman Owned<br />High Sierra<br />217 Rawson Creek Rd.<br />Bishop, CA 93514<br />Hirota Painting Company, Inc.<br />2188 Kamehameha Highway<br />Honolulu, HI 96819-2306<br />Holland & Knight, LLP<br />1600 Tysons Boulevard, Suite 700<br />McLean, VA 22102-4867<br />www.hklaw.com<br />Home Depot Supply<br />10641 Scripps Summit Ct.<br />San Diego, CA 92131<br />www.homedepot.com<br />IAP Worldwide Services, Inc.<br />2231 Crystal Dr., Suite 1113<br />Arlington, VA 22202<br />www.iapwws.com<br />IMSOLUTIONS, LLC<br />17300 River Ridge Blvd<br />Woodbridge, VA 22191<br />www.imsolutionsllc.com<br />8(a), Small Business, SDB, Veteran Owned<br />INNOLOG<br />2010 Corporate Ridge — 9th Floor<br />McLean, VA 22102-7838<br />www.innolog.com<br />Inquiries, Inc.<br />129 North West Street<br />Easton, MD 21601<br />www.inquiries.com<br />J & J Maintenance, Inc.<br />3755 Capital of TX Hwy. S., Suite 355<br />Austin, TX 78704<br />www.jandjmaintenance.com<br />Jantec, Inc.<br />2810 W. Charleston Boulevard, Suite 75<br />Las Vegas, NV 89102<br />www.jantec-inc.com<br />Small Business, Woman Owned<br />Jefferson Consulting<br />1401 K St NW, Suite 900<br />Washington, DC 20005<br />www.jeffersonconsulting.com<br />Page 29<br />Contract Services Association<br />Service Contractor/Fall 2005<br />/ 29<br />Johnson Diversey, Inc.<br />8310 16th St.<br />Sturtevant, WI 53177<br />www.johnsondiversey.com<br />KBR Government Operations<br />1550 Wilson Blvd.<br />Arlington, VA 22209<br />www.halliburton.com<br />Ki, LLC<br />Pikes Peak Research Park One, Suite 301,<br />5475 Mark<br />Colorado Springs, CO 80918-3847<br />www.kicompany.com<br />KWG Associates<br />40599 Feather Bed Lane<br />Lovettsville, VA 20180<br />L-3 Communications, Link<br />Simulation and Training<br />P.O. Box 5328<br />Arlington, TX 76005<br />www.link.com<br />Law Offices of Margaret A.<br />Dillenburg, PC<br />P.O. Box 58234<br />Washington, DC 20037<br />Small Business, Woman Owned<br />Lockheed Martin Services<br />3601 Koppens Way<br />Chesapeake, VA 23323<br />www.lmco.com<br />Louis Berger Group<br />2300 N Street, NW<br />Washington, DC 20037<br />www.louisberger.com<br />M. Shiroma Painting Co., Inc.<br />94-120 Leokane Street<br />Waipahu, HI 96797<br />www.mshiroma.com<br />M.C. Contracting Services, Inc.<br />4626 30th Street<br />San Diego, CA 92116<br />M.L. Hawkins & Associates, Inc.<br />6958 Emerald Springs Lane<br />Las Vegas, NV 89113<br />Small Business, Woman Owned<br />M1 Support Services<br />300 N. Carroll Boulevard, Suite 101<br />Denton, TX 76201<br />www.m1services.com<br />Hubzone, Small Business, Veteran Owned,<br />Woman Owned<br />Madison Services, Inc.<br />P.O. Box 1639<br />Madison, MS 39130-1639<br />www.madisonservices.com<br />Maguire Group Inc.<br />One Court Street<br />New Britain, CT 6051<br />www.maguriegroup.com<br />McKenna Long & Aldridge, LLP<br />444 South Flower Street, 8th Floor<br />Los Angeles, CA 90071<br />www.mckennalong.com<br />The Mercer Group, Inc.<br />551 W. Cordova Road, Suite 726<br />Santa Fe, NM 87505<br />Small Business, Veteran Owned<br />Minuteman Ventures LLC<br />11 Cyprus Drive<br />Burlington, MA 1803<br />www.minutemanventures.com<br />Mosaic Systems<br />6723 Passageway Place<br />Burke, VA 22015<br />Veteran Owned<br />NANA Development Corporation<br />1001 E. Benson Blvd<br />Anchorage, AK 99508<br />www.nanaservices.com<br />ANC<br />Native American Insurance Services<br />111 Woodland Hills Dr.<br />East Peoira, IL 61611<br />www.naisinc.net<br />Neff Services, Inc.<br />334 Walnut Avenue<br />Grand Junction, CO 81501<br />www.neffservices.com<br />Nexpointe Strategies, Inc.<br />11595 N. Meridian St. Suite 320<br />Carmel, IN 46032<br />www.nexpointe.com<br />Small Business<br />Nick Pecoraro Painting and<br />Decorating, Inc.<br />1726 India Street<br />San Diego, CA 92101<br />Noack and Dean/Interwest<br />Insurance Brokers<br />3636 American River Drive, 2nd Floor<br />Sacramento, CA 95864-5901<br />www.iwins.com<br />Northrop Grumman Corporation<br />1000 Wilson<br />Arlington, VA 22209<br />www.ngc.com<br />Olgoonik<br />1655 N. Ft. Myer Dr.<br />Arlington, VA 22209<br />www.olgoonik.com<br />ANC<br />Omega<br />808 Ahua Street, Suite 26<br />Honolulu, HI 96819<br />www.omeaghub.tv<br />Woman Owned<br />OMNI Government Services, L.P.<br />424 Lakeview Road, Suite A<br />Ozark, AL 36360<br />www.omnillp.com<br />Small Business<br />O’Neal and Associates<br />7305 Trevorwood Drive<br />Willow Springs, NC 27592<br />OPAL Enterprises, Inc.<br />5810 Kingstowne Boulevard, Suite 120-806<br />Alexandria, VA 22315<br />PAC, Inc.<br />P.O. Box 2557<br />Silverdale, WA 98383<br />SDV, Veteran Owned, Small Business<br />Native American<br />PAE Government Services, Inc.<br />888 South Figueroa Street, Suite 1700<br />Los Angeles, CA 90017<br />www.paegroup.com<br />Pestmaster Services, Inc.<br />137 E. South Street<br />Bishop, CA 93514-3545<br />www.pestmaster.com<br />Phoenix Management, Inc.<br />11825 Buckner Road<br />Austin, TX 78726<br />www.pmiaus.com<br />Woman Owned<br />Piedmont<br />43831 Chadwick Terrace<br />Ashburn, VA 20148<br />www.piedmontria.com<br />Piliero, Mazza & Pargament<br />888 17th Street, NW, Suite 1100<br />Washington, D.C. 20006<br />www.pmplawfirm.com<br />Pitney Bowes Government Solutions<br />4200 Parliament Rd.<br />Landover, MD 20706<br />www.pb.com<br />PREEMPT, Inc.<br />1200 G Street, NW Suite 820<br />Washington, DC 20005<br />www.fedconhr.com<br />8(a), Hubzone, SDB, Woman Owned<br />Page 30<br />30 /<br />Service Contractor / Fall 2005<br />Contract Services Association<br />Rainbow Brite Industrial Services<br />LLC<br />3114 North Willow Avenue, Suite 102<br />Clovis, CA 93612<br />8(a), Hubzone, Native American,<br />Small Business, SDB<br />Raven Services Corporation<br />9626 Center Street, Suite 200<br />Manassas, VA 20110-5522<br />www.ravenservices.us<br />Veteran Owned<br />Red River Service Corporation<br />209 North Arroyo Boulevard<br />Los Fresnos, TX 78566<br />www.redriverservice.com<br />Republic Risk Management<br />1775 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Suite 120<br />Washington, DC 20006<br />www.republicrisk.com<br />RGF Consulting Corporation<br />9900 Traverse Way, Suite 100<br />Fort Washington, MD 20744<br />www.rgfcc.org<br />Small Business, SDB, Veteran Owned<br />Richard Princinsky & Associates<br />335 Clubhouse Road<br />Hunt Valley, MD 21031<br />www.rjpassociates.com<br />Small Business<br />Robert L. Johnson, Consultant<br />6 Katherine Court<br />Placitas, NM 87043<br />SAGE Systems Technologies, Inc.<br />10440 Balls Ford Road<br />Manassas, VA 20109<br />www.sagealaska.com<br />Satellite Services, Inc.<br />309 South Front Street<br />Marquette, MI 49855<br />www.ssi-main.com<br />Small Business<br />Science and Technology Corporation<br />10 Basil Sawyer Drive<br />Hampton, VA 23666<br />www.stcnet.com<br />Small Business, SDB<br />Science Applications International<br />Corporation<br />10260 Campus Point Dr. M/S C-6<br />San Diego, CA 92121<br />www.saic.com<br />Securiguard, Inc.<br />6858 Old Dominion Drive, Suite 307<br />McLean, VA 22101<br />www.securiguardinc.com<br />Woman Owned<br />Service Strategies International, Inc.<br />848 Brickell Key Drive, Suite 1204<br />Miami, FL 33131<br />ServiceMaster<br />3250 Lacey Rd., Suite 600<br />Downers Grove, IL 60515-2023<br />www.servicemaster.com<br />Shaw Infrastructure<br />4171 Essen Lane<br />Baton Rouge, LA 70809<br />www.shawgrp.com<br />Singletree Consulting<br />44 Singletree Drive<br />Shepherdstown, WV 25443<br />www.singletreeconsultants.com<br />Small Business<br />SODEXHO<br />9801 Washingtonian Boulevard<br />Gaithersburg, Maryland 20878<br />www.sodexho.com<br />Source One<br />1225 17th St Ste 1500<br />Denver, CO 80202<br />www.sourceone.com<br />SSI Business Solutions<br />1420 King St., Suite 500<br />ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314<br />www.ssistaff.com<br />8(a), Small Business, SDB, Woman Owned<br />Sullivan International Group, Inc.<br />409 Camino Del Rio South, Suite 100<br />San Diego, CA 92108<br />www.sullivan.com<br />8(a), Small Business, SDB, Veteran Owned,<br />SDVO<br />Superior Services, Inc.<br />1505 N Chestnut Ave<br />Fresno, CA 93703<br />www.superiorservices.com<br />Hubzone, Small Business, Woman Owned<br />SYMVIONICS, Inc.<br />488 East Santa Clara Street, Suite 201<br />Arcadia, CA 91006<br />www.symvionics.com<br />Small business, Hispanic-owned<br />Syntegrity Networks, Inc.<br />9500 Braddock Rd.<br />Fairfax, VA 22032<br />www.syntegritynet.com<br />Small Business<br />Tatitlek Management, Inc.<br />1577 C Street #203<br />Anchorage, AK 99501<br />www.tatitlek.com<br />8(a), ANC<br />Tech Flow<br />12220 El Camino Real<br />Suite 300<br />San Diego, CA 92130<br />www.techflow.com<br />Tetra Tech, Inc.<br />3475 East Foothill Blvd.<br />Pasadena, CA 91107<br />www.tetratech.com<br />Three Saints Bay LLC<br />900 West 5th Avenue, Suite 702<br />Anchorage, AK 99501<br />www.threesaintsbay.com<br />8(a), ANC, SDB<br />Tifco Industries, Inc.<br />21400 U.S. Highway 290<br />Cypress, TX 77429<br />www.tifco.com<br />Small Business<br />TKC Communications, LLC<br />711 H Street, Suite 510<br />Anchorage, AK 99501<br />www.tkccommunications.com<br />ANC, Native American, Small Business,<br />SDB<br />Tlingit & Haida Technology<br />Industries<br />9097 Glacier Hgwy.<br />Juneau, AK 99801<br />Tunista, Inc.<br />301 Calista Court<br />Anchorage, AK 99518<br />www.tunista.com<br />VT Griffin Services, Inc.<br />5755 Dupree Drive, NW<br />Atlanta, GA 30327<br />www.griffinserv.com<br />VW International, Inc.<br />8800-C Peartree Village Court<br />Alexandria, VA 22309<br />www.vwi.com<br />Wachovia Bank, N.A.<br />125 Independence Boulevard<br />Virginia Beach, VA 23462<br />www.wachovia.com<br />Wackenhut Services, Inc.<br />7121 Fairway Dr Ste 301<br />Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33418<br />www.wsihq.com<br />Wyle Laboratories, Inc.<br />128 Maryland St.<br />El Segundo, CA 90245<br />www.wylelabs.comdannoynted1http://www.blogger.com/profile/14945400306838778051noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22129949.post-1150777028913800182006-06-19T21:16:00.000-07:002006-06-19T21:17:08.926-07:00http://political.moveon.org/exxon/read it exxondannoynted1http://www.blogger.com/profile/14945400306838778051noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22129949.post-1147598434862121332006-05-14T02:20:00.000-07:002006-06-08T04:43:43.703-07:00<a href="http://blogshares.com/blogs.php?blog=http%3A%2F%2Fhumbleoil.blogspot.com%2F&user=47102"><img alt="Listed on BlogShares" src="http://blogshares.com/images/blogshares.jpg" height="23" width="117" />All C.I.A. operations in South Texas go back to Kenedy and Jim Wells counties. Some in the C.I.A. do not want the Fernandez family uncovering any more hidden secrets especially since archives contain much unexposed coverups. The kenedy hidden daughter is just the tip of the iceberg. If this is confirmed then it will set off a chain of events that the C.I.A. has been trying to hide for years.<br /><br /></a>Jaime Kenedeñohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/12787459880135027366noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22129949.post-1143169288815001522006-03-23T19:01:00.000-08:002006-03-23T19:01:30.850-08:00South Texas Chisme: Power stronger than blood<a href="http://stxc.blogspot.com/2006/03/power-stronger-than-blood.html">South Texas Chisme: Power stronger than blood</a>dannoynted1http://www.blogger.com/profile/14945400306838778051noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-22129949.post-1139390537726703992006-02-08T01:21:00.000-08:002006-02-08T01:22:17.733-08:00Humble oilunder constructiondannoynted1http://www.blogger.com/profile/14945400306838778051noreply@blogger.com0